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Abstract
The main research question of this thesis is how globalization shapes the
organization of production within firms, with a particular focus on the role
of labor market imperfections in open economies. For that reason, I make
use of three different models to investigate the interaction between firm or-
ganization and labor market imperfections in the process of globalization.
Thereby, the organization of production is discussed from different perspec-
tives: (i) the number of products a firm is willing to produce and (ii) the
organization of labor within firms. In each chapter, I use a different ap-
proach to account for imperfections in factor markets. This allows a broad
discussion on how labor market institutions affect the equilibrium outcome
in closed and open economies, and how these imperfections affect a firm’s
organization choice.
After a short introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 sets up a general
oligopolistic equilibrium model with multi-product firms and union wage
setting. In this model, two policy experiments are conducted. First, it
is shown that deunionization induces a general decline in firm scale and
scope, with the respective reduction being more pronounced in non-unionized
industries. Second, the consequences of trade liberalization are studied, and
it is shown that access to foreign markets lowers firm scope in all industries
as well as the scope differential between unionized and non-unionized firms.
Adjustments in firm scale turn out to be less clearcut and inter alia depend
on the degree of product differentiation.
Chapter 3 looks inside the firm and investigates how trade alters the
matching of worker-specific abilities and task-specific skill requirements. The
outcome of this matching process depends on how firms organize their re-
cruitment process and how much they invest into the screening of applicants.
In the open economy, the most productive firms start exporting. They in-
crease their market share and therefore find it attractive to increase their
screening investment, which improves the matching outcome. Things are
different for non-exporters, whose market share shrinks in the open econ-
omy, lowering their incentive to invest for screening applicants. Due to this
asymmetric response, access to trade raises the dispersion of productivity
between heterogeneous producers, while at the same time increasing the
average quality of worker-task matches and thus economy-wide labor pro-
ductivity.
Chapter 4 sets up a heterogeneous firms model, where production consists
of a continuum of tasks and firms hire low-skilled and high-skilled workers for
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the performance of tasks, which differ in their complexity. How firms assign
workers to tasks depends on factor prices for the two skill types and the pro-
ductivity advantage of high-skilled workers in the performance of complex
tasks. After characterizing the closed economy equilibrium with fully flexi-
ble wages, I show how firms adjust the assignment of workers top tasks in
response to the introduction of a binding real minimum wage for low-skilled
workers and migration of low-skilled or high-skilled workers. With a mini-
mum wage, the opening up for trade reduces the range of tasks performed
by high-skilled workers. It furthermore leads to a higher per-capita income
of both skill types, which implies a higher welfare in the open than in the
closed economy, while inequality between the two skill types increases. In
an extension, I discuss how the firm-internal assignment of skills to tasks is
affected by labor market linkages in open economies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A large number of empirical studies have documented that the largest firms in local and interna-
tional markets are complex organizations, which produce multiple products in multiple sectors
and many different countries.1 For these firms, the organization of production becomes essen-
tial in surviving in a competitive globalized market. While trade economists treated firms as a
”black box” for a large time, recent contributions to the literature have changed this view by
looking inside the firm. This allows to discuss questions related to the organization of modern
production processes from different perspectives. According to Marin (2012), the literature can
be separated into two different subdisciplines. The first one addresses the boundaries of multi-
national firms,2 whereas the second one focuses on the internal organization of international
firms.3 The three articles in this thesis contribute to the second subdiscipline by shedding new
light on the firm internal organization, and how the organization is adjusted in response to a
country’s opening up for trade. Hereby, all articles in the thesis put particular emphasis on
the interaction of firm organization and labor market imperfections in the context of globaliza-
tion. In the remainder of the introductory section, I briefly summarize the content of Chapter
2–4, whereas a detailed discussion on how the different modeling approaches contribute to the
literature is delegated to the respective chapter.
Chapter 2 analyzes how labor market imperfection affects scale and scope of multi-product
firms (MPFs). To address this issue, a general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model with
MPFs along the lines of Eckel and Neary (2010) is set up and enriched by assuming union wage
setting in a subset of industries.4 The asymmetry of sectors with respect to their labor market
institutions is a key aspect of the analysis. It allows me to study the consequences of union
wage setting on firm scale and scope in unionized industries and it provides novel insights on
how labor market imperfections in certain industries spill over on firm organization in the rest
of the economy. Within this framework, two comparative-static experiments are conducted. In
1See, for instance, Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007); Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010); Yeaple
(2013).
2See, for instance, Grossman and Helpman (2002); Antra´s (2003); Antra´s and Helpman (2004) and the liter-
ature cited in Marin (2012).
3See, for instance, Marin and Verdier (2008a, 2012); Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) and the literature
cited in Marin (2012).
4This chapter is based on Egger and Koch (2012), which has been published in the Canadian Journal of
Economics. When working on this chapter, I have benefited from comments by Carsten Eckel and participants
at the 12th Go¨ttingen Workshop on International Economics, the European Trade Study Group, the 4th FIW
Research Conference on International Economics, the Spring Meeting of Young Economists in Groningen and
the 9th and 10th BGPE Research Workshop as well as seminar participants at the University of Bayreuth.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
the comparative-static experiments, the focus is on two specific research questions that have
sparked considerable interest in academic circles and, at the same time, are relevant for policy
makers who aim at introducing measures of deregulation in product and/or labor markets. The
first question is how firms absorb changes in labor market institutions, and how institutional
changes in certain industries spill over on the rest of the economy. From an empirical point of
view, the probably most notable change in labor market institutions is the significant decline
in union relevance. This deunionization process induces an increase in the competitive as well
as the union wage. In a setting with MPFs the associated cost increase renders production of
those varieties that have the largest distance to a firm’s core competence unattractive, so that
firms reduce the scope of their product range and thus shrink at the extensive margin. Both
the cost increase and the shortening of the product range induce a decline in total firm scale.
Furthermore, by focusing on the production of high-competence, i.e. low-cost, varieties, all firms
(except for the newly deunionized ones) can produce a higher level of output with a given level
of labor input and thus are more productive on average. Finally, it is shown that deunionization
by lowering the union wage premium makes firms more similar in both size dimensions, scale and
scope. In a second part of this chapter, I investigate how firm scale and scope are affected if a
country opens up for free trade with a symmetric partner country. Access to international trade
stimulates labor demand and raises the competitive as well as the union wage, thereby lowering
firm scope in all industries. Since the labor market distortion becomes less severe, unionized
and non-unionized firms become more similar in the size of their product range. While scope
effects are unambiguous, adjustments in firm scale turn out to be less clearcut and inter alia
depend on the degree of product differentiation.
Studying the role of firms for matching workers with tasks and discussing how access to trade
affects the matching outcome is the main purpose of Chapter 3.5 Starting point of the analysis is
a Melitz (2003) model, in which firms are heterogeneous due to differences in their productivity
levels. As in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), it is assumed that production consists of a continuum
of tasks that differ in their skill requirements. For performing these tasks, firms hire heteroge-
neous workers. Heterogeneity is horizontal in the sense that workers differ in their ability to
perform specific tasks because their human capital is occupation-specific, while they are equally
productive over the whole range of activities. This implies that all workers have the same value
to firms and, lacking information about abilities of individual workers, firms randomly draw their
employees from the labor supply pool. This lack of information generates a source of mismatch
between task-specific skill requirements and worker-specific abilities within the boundaries of a
production unit. To reduce this mismatch, firms can invest into a screening technology for gath-
ering some (imperfect) information about the abilities of their workforce. A higher investment
provides better knowledge about the abilities of workers and therefore leads to a better match
of these workers with the different tasks in the production process. The incentives to screen are
more pronounced in larger firms, and hence there is an additional source of heterogeneity in this
model, which is endogenous and reinforces heterogeneity of firms due to exogenous differences
in firm productivity. This model is used to shed new light on the consequences of trade for
labor market outcome, thereby focussing on adjustments in the firm-internal labor market. To
be more specific, it is analyzed how trade affects underemployment arising from a mismatch be-
5This chapter is based on Egger, Koch (2013). When working on this chapter, I have benefited from comments
by Carsten Eckel, James Harrigan, Frode Meland, Marc Muendler, Frank Sta¨hler and participants at the Euro-
pean Trade Study Group Meeting in Leuven, the GEP Postgraduate Conference in Nottingham, the Go¨ttingen
Workshop on International Economics, the Midwest International Economics Meeting at the Indiana University,
the Brown Bag Seminar of the Department of Economics at the University Bayreuth, the Research Workshop of
the Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE) and the Economics Research Seminars at the University
of Bergen and the University of Tuebingen.
3tween worker-specific abilities and task-specific skill requirements. To keep the analysis simple,
the focus is on trade between symmetric countries while considering the empirically relevant
case, in which only the most productive firms export in the open economy. Having access to
the export market, high-productivity firms can expand their market share in the open econ-
omy, which provides an incentive for these firms to screen their workforce more intensively, as
this further improves the matching quality and thus lowers production costs. Low-productivity
non-exporters, on the other hand, lose market share and thus lower their investment into the
screening technology, which raises their production costs. By changing the cost structure, this
asymmetric response to trade liberalization exerts a feedback effect on the entry/exit decision
of firms in both the domestic and the export market, which is not present in other trade models
with heterogeneous firms. Furthermore, it alters the productivity distribution of active firms
by driving a wedge between matching efficiency of exporters and non-exporters. Finally, ad-
justments in the firm-internal labor allocation process lower the aggregate mismatch between
worker-specific abilities and task-specific skill requirements, thereby generating a productivity
stimulus that reinforces the gains from trade in an otherwise identical Melitz (2003) model.
Chapter 4 builds upon the framework studied in Chapter 3 and sets up a heterogeneous
firms model in which a firm’s output is manufactured using a continuum of tasks.6 Firms
hire low-skilled and high-skilled workers for the performance of tasks. Tasks differ in their
complexity and workers differ in their ability to perform these tasks, with high-skilled workers
having a comparative advantage in performing more complex tasks. How firms organize the
firm-internal production process by assigning skills to tasks depends on the respective factor
costs and productivity advantage of high-skilled workers in performing more complex tasks.
This framework is used to analyze how imperfections in the labor market affect the firm-internal
assignment of skills to tasks in the closed economy. After characterizing the autarky equilibrium
outcome with fully flexible wages for both skill types, a (real) minimum wage is introduced,
that is set by the government for low-skilled workers and causes involuntary unemployment of
that skill type. As relative factor prices are changed and low-skilled task production becomes
more costly, firms assign high-skilled workers to a broader range of tasks. This firm-internal
skill upgrading improves a firm’s labor productivity. However, as more high-skilled workers are
employed for the performance of tasks, less of them are left to manage firms and the mass of firms
therefore declines. Firm exit triggers a decline in aggregate output, income and welfare. After
discussing migration of low-skilled and high-skilled workers under the two different labor market
regimes, the model is used to discuss how trade between two countries affects the firm-internal
production process. Only when low-skilled wages are set by a binding minimum wage, trade
exerts an impact on the firm-internal assignment process. The opening up to trade raises demand
for each firm due to a standard division of labor effect. When the factor price for low-skilled
workers is fixed, the skill premium increases implying that high-skilled task production becomes
relatively unattractive. Firms respond in broadening the range of tasks produced with low-
skilled workers, which reduces labor productivity of each firm. Beside this negative productivity
effect, trade increases the mass of producers in each country and reduces the unemployment
rate of low-skilled workers. This causes an increase in the relative income of both workers with
the respective increase being more pronounced for high-skilled workers. Furthermore, aggregate
output, income and welfare goes up. Moreover, high-skilled workers gain in relative terms as
their skill premium and relative per-capita income increases. After discussing the movement from
autarky to trade, it is shown how changes in local endowments and labor market institutions
6When working on this chapter, I have benefited from comments by Carsten Eckel, Hartmut Egger and
participants at the European Trade Study Group Meeting in Birmingham, the IO and Trade Seminar at the
Department of Economics at the University of Munich and the Brown Bag seminar at the University of Bayreuth.
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spill over to the partner country. Thereby, it is shown that an increase in the minimum wage
abroad reduces the range of tasks performed by low-skilled workers at home, while it increases
the productivity of active producers there. Both skill types end up with a lower per-capita
income, and thus welfare is reduced at home.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a brief summary of the most important results.
Chapter 2
Labor Unions and Multi-Product
Firms in Closed and Open
Economies
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze how labor market imperfection affects scale and scope of multi-
product firms (MPFs). To address this issue, we set up a general oligopolistic equilibrium
(GOLE) model with MPFs along the lines of Eckel and Neary (2010) and enrich this framework
by assuming union wage setting in a subset of industries. The asymmetry of sectors with
respect to their labor market institutions is a key aspect of our analysis. It allows us to study
the consequences of union wage setting on firm scale and scope in unionized industries and it
provides novel insights on how labor market imperfections in certain industries spill over on firm
organization in the rest of the economy. Within this framework, we undertake two comparative-
static experiments. First, we investigate the consequences of deunionization on firm scale and
scope in industries that are directly exposed to this institutional change as well as in industries
whose labor market institutions do not change. Second, we study the differential impact of trade
liberalization on firm scale and scope in unionized and non-unionized industries.
Relying on the Eckel and Neary (2010) framework, we assume a continuum of industries and a
small (exogenous) number of firms competing in quantities within each of these industries. Firms
employ labor to produce a range of differentiated product varieties. They have a core competence
in one of these varieties which they produce at the lowest marginal cost. By expanding the scope
of their product range, firms start manufacturing varieties with a larger distance to their core
competence and thus higher marginal production costs.1 Setting a markup on the competitive
1Abstracting from any additional costs of introducing a new variety the model captures the idea of flexible
manufacturing, which is a widely used concept of representing MPFs (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Eaton and
Schmitt, 1994; Norman and Thisse, 1999; Eckel, 2009). While there are many alternative ways of modeling MPFs
(see, for instance, Feenstra and Ma, 2008; Nocke and Yeaple, 2008; Arkolakis and Muendler, 2010; Mayer, Melitz,
and Ottaviano, 2010; Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2011), there are good reasons for relying on the Eckel and
Neary (2010) approach when accounting for union wage setting. With oligopolistic competition between a small
number of competitors and linear demand in each industry, our model is related to a large and well-established
literature on unionized oligopoly. Thus, we can directly compare our results with findings from this literature
to highlight whether and how previous insights on the interplay between labor market and product market
imperfections have to be modified if one accounts for multi- instead of single-product firms.
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wage, labor unions enforce a reduction in the output and employment level of unionized firms.
While this effect does also exist in other models of unionized oligopoly, there is an additional
adjustment margin in a setting with MPFs. By raising marginal production costs, unions reduce
the incentive of firms to operate a wide product range and thus lower firm scope. Furthermore,
union wage setting lowers aggregate employment ceteris paribus and thus induces a fall in the
market-clearing competitive wage. The decline of the competitive wage raises firm scale and
scope in non-unionized industries. This points to a new facet of spillovers associated with
union wage setting. Unions do not only influence wage payments in other sectors (due to labor
market clearing) but also affect the product range of non-unionized producers – and thus labor
productivity in our setting.
In the comparative-static experiments, we focus on two specific research questions that have
sparked considerable interest in academic circles and, at the same time, are relevant for policy
makers who aim at introducing measures of deregulation in product and/or labor markets. The
first question we are interested in is how firms absorb changes in labor market institutions, and
how institutional changes in certain industries spill over on the rest of the economy. From an
empirical point of view, the probably most notable change in labor market institutions is the
significant decline in union relevance. This deunionization process is a worldwide phenomenon
which has been observed in all industrialized economies over the last four decades (see OECD,
2004). From Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) we know that in an otherwise similar framework
with single product firms (SPFs), deunionization – captured by a decline in the share of unionized
industries – raises the competitive as well as the union wage and thus lowers scale of both
unionized and non-unionized firms. Since the union wage increases less than proportionally,
deunionization lowers the scale differential between the two types of producers.
In this chapter, we show that firm-level adjustments become more sophisticated when firms
produce more than just a single variety and that the endogeneity of the product range leads
to further interesting results upon how firms respond to changes in labor market institutions.
To be more specific, deunionization induces an increase in the competitive as well as the union
wage, similar to the model with SPFs. However, in a setting with MPFs the associated cost
increase renders production of those varieties that have the largest distance to a firm’s core
competence unattractive, so that firms reduce the scope of their product range and thus shrink
at the extensive margin. Both the cost increase and the shortening of the product range induce a
decline in total firm scale. Furthermore, by focusing on the production of high-competence, i.e.
low-cost, varieties, all firms (except for the newly deunionized ones) can produce a higher level
of output with a given level of labor input and thus are more productive on average. Finally,
we show that deunionization by lowering the union wage premium makes firms more similar in
both size dimensions, scale and scope, in our setting.
In a second application of our model, we investigate how firm scale and scope are affected if
a country opens up for free trade with a symmetric partner country. As pointed out by Brander
(1981), a movement from autarky to trade raises competition in an oligopolistic market and
thus provides a stimulus for the production of all firms ceteris paribus. In a general equilibrium
environment with factor market clearing, this induces an increase in the competitive wage,
which counteracts the partial equilibrium production stimulus. As outlined by Neary (2009), in
a model with SPFs, symmetric industries, and no labor market distortions, the two effects cancel
and thus firm scale remains unaffected by the trade shock. In an otherwise identical model with
MPFs, firms lower their scope in response to a higher competitive wage, thereby leaving more
labor for employment in activities that are closer to the firms’ core competences. To put it in
the words of Eckel and Neary (2010) firms are leaner and meaner in the open economy and
they experience a productivity surge as their total output increases for a given level of labor
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input. This points to a new channel through which gains from trade can materialize, one that
is specific to models of MPFs.
By extending the Eckel and Neary (2010) framework to one with labor market imperfections,
we further enrich the picture of possible firm-level adjustments to globalization. As in textbook
models of unionized oligopoly with SPFs, trade exerts a union-disciplining effect and thus lowers
union wage claims ceteris paribus (Huizinga, 1993; Sørensen, 1993). Hence, both scale and scope
effects of trade are more pronounced in unionized industries, so that economic activity shifts
towards these sectors. All other things equal, this lowers production in non-unionized industries
and the shift effect may actually be strong enough to dominate the output stimulus from being
more focused on the production of high-competence varieties. Hence, labor market imperfections
render firm-level adjustments to international trade more sophisticated and less clearcut than
one might have expected from the analysis in Eckel and Neary (2010).
Aside from looking at pure level effects, we are particularly interested in the differential
impact that trade exerts on unionized and non-unionized firms. In this respect, we show that
trade weakens the labor market distortion and thus lowers the union wage premium. This effect
is instrumental for a reduction in the scope differential between the two types of producers.
Similarly, the decline in the union wage premium also reduces the domestic output differential
of local producers. However, this effect is counteracted by a widening of the output gap at
the extensive margin as, after a country’s opening up for trade, firms start exporting and the
respective exports are larger for non-unionized than for unionized firms. Which of these two
effects dominates is not clearcut in general and depends on the degree of product differentiation.
Smaller degrees of product differentiation reinforce the pro-competitive effect of trade and thus
amplify the union-disciplining effect of foreign competition. This strengthens the negative im-
pact of trade on the domestic production gap between unionized and non-unionized producers,
so that the scale differential decreases for small degrees of product differentiation. On the con-
trary, for high degrees of product differentiation it is the output expansion effect in the export
market that dominates so that the firm scale differential increases in response to trade.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Chapter 2.2 we introduce the main
assumptions, describe the basic model structure, and characterize the autarky equilibrium. After
a brief discussion on how union wage setting affects firm scale and scope, we study how MPFs
respond to deunionization. In Chapter 2.3, we characterize the equilibrium in an open economy
with free trade between two symmetric countries and compare the outcome in the open economy
with the one in the closed economy to shed light on how trade affects union wage setting as well
as firm scale and scope in the presence of labor market imperfection. Chapter 2.4 concludes
with a brief summary of the most important results.
2.2 MPFs and imperfect labor markets: The closed econ-
omy
The country under consideration hosts a continuum of industries, with an oligopolistic market
structure and a small (exogenous) number n of firms in each of these industries. The industries
are identical in all respects except for the prevailing labor market institutions. While firms in a
subset of industries are exposed to union wage-setting, firms in the rest of the economy pay the
competitive wage, which is determined by a standard labor market clearing condition – provided
that labor is homogeneous and fully mobile across sectors. With respect to union wage-setting,
we apply a monopoly union framework, in which unions unilaterally set wages prior to the firms’
choice of employment, which in our setting involves the simultaneous decision upon firm scale
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and scope.
2.2.1 Preferences and consumer demand
There exists a representative consumer, whose preferences are represented by a two-tier quasi-
homothetic utility function. The upper tier is an additive function of a continuum of sub-utilities,
each of them corresponding to one industry z ∈ [0, 1]:
U [u {z}] =
∫ 1
0
u {z} dz. (2.1)
Each sub-utility is a quadratic function of consumption levels q(i, z), i ∈ [1, N(z)], where N(z)
is the measure (or, in the interest of a more accessible interpretation, the number, henceforth)
of differentiated varieties produced in industry z. To be more specific, we assume
u {z} = a
∫ N(z)
0
q(i, z)di− 1
2
b
(1− ρ)∫ N(z)
0
q(i, z)2di+ ρ
(∫ N(z)
0
q(i, z)di
)2 , (2.2)
where a, b denote non-negative preference parameters with the usual interpretation and ρ is an
inverse measure of product differentiation, which is assumed to lie between 0 and 1.2
Aggregate demand in this setting is determined by maximizing utility of the representative
consumer subject to her budget constraint∫ 1
0
∫ N(z)
0
p(i, z)q(i, z)didz ≤ I, (2.3)
where p(i, z) denotes prices for variety i in industry z and I is aggregate income of the economy.
This gives
p(i, z) =
1
λ
(
a− b[(1− ρ)q(i, z) + ρ
∫ N(z)
0
q(i, z)di]
)
, (2.4)
where λ is the representative consumer’s marginal utility of income. As it has become standard
in the literature, we choose utility as the nume´raire and set λ equal to one. Thus, all nominal
variables are measured relative to the representative consumer’s marginal utility of income (see
Neary, 2009, for further discussion).
From Eq. (2.4) we can infer insights upon the role of preference parameter ρ in our setting.
As mentioned above, ρ is a measure of product differentiation and lies in interval [0, 1]. If ρ = 1
products are homogeneous (perfect substitutes), so that the price is linear in total industry
consumption: p(i, z) = a − b ∫ N(z)
0
q(i, z)di. In the other limiting case with ρ = 0, goods are
perfectly differentiated in the perception of consumers, so that the price for each variety only
depends on consumption of this variety but is independent of the consumption of all other
varieties in this industry. In the latter case, indirect demand is given by p(i, z) = a− bq(i, z).
2By formulating the respective preferences of the representative consumer, we have presumed that the following
two conditions are fulfilled for any individual consumer: participation in the market for any good i and non-
satiation in the consumption of these goods. Clearly, both of these conditions depend on endogenous variables.
However, under the additional assumption of identical consumer preferences, we know from previous work that
these conditions are fulfilled if a lump-sum tax-transfer system redistributes a sufficient level of income from rich
to poor agents. Being not interested in income distribution or individual welfare levels per se, we can thus safely
assume that the two conditions are fulfilled throughout our analysis.
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2.2.2 Technology, production, and profit maximization
We associate MPFs with the idea of flexible manufacturing, and thus assume that firms can
expand their product range “with only a minimum of adaptation” (Eckel and Neary, 2010,
p.192). The costs of adaptation are modeled by higher labor requirements for producing a unit
of output of a firm’s non-core competence product, and the respective adaptation costs are
assumed to be monotonically increasing in the distance between a specific product to the firm’s
core competence variety. However, adding a new variety to the product range does not alter
the costs of producing other varieties nor does it involve any fixed costs. To put it formally, we
denote marginal production costs of firm j = 1, ..., n in industry z for producing variety i by
cj(i, z) = γj(i)wj(z), with γj(i) being the constant labor input coefficient for producing variety i
and wj(z) being the wage rate in industry z. We associate firm j’s core competence with variety
i = 0 and capture flexible manufacturing by assuming ∂cj(i, z)/∂i = ∂γj(i)/∂i × wj(z) >
0. While the main mechanisms of our analysis do not hinge on a specific functional form of
γj(i), we impose the additional assumption γj(i) = e
i in the interest of analytical tractability.
Furthermore, we assume that product ranges are firm-specific, implying that each firm has its
own core competence and produces its own set of varieties.3 Finally, as pointed out above, we
allow for sectoral differences in labor market institutions and thus end up with industry-specific
wage rates. Hence, in contrast to Eckel and Neary (2010) marginal production costs in our
model comprise both a product-specific component, γj(i), and a sector-specific one, wj(z).
Considering the technology assumptions above and denoting by δj(z) the scope of the product
range, profits of firm j in industry z are given by
Πj(z) =
∫ δj(z)
0
[
pj(i, z)− cj(i, z)
]
xj(i, z)di, (2.5)
where xj(i, z) denotes output of variety i. Firms simultaneously choose the output level of all of
their products as well as the scope of the product range. Wages (and thus marginal production
costs cj(i, z)) are exogenous from the perspective of individual producers. While the competitive
wage is an economy-wide variable and thus not affected by a single firm’s decision upon its scale
and scope, the unionized wage is determined before the firm sets xj(i, z) and δj(z) and thus
also treated as exogenous in the output game. Taking account of the market clearing condition
xj(i, z) = qj(i, z) and maximizing j’s profits in (2.5) with respect to xj(i, z) gives the first-order
condition
∂Πj(z)
∂xj(i, z)
= pj(i, z)− cj(i, z)− b [(1− ρ)xj(i, z) + ρXj(z)] = 0,
with Xj(z) ≡
∫ δj(z)
0
xj(i, z)di denoting firm scale. Substituting (2.4) and denoting industry-wide
output of all n producers by Y (z) =
∫ N(z)
0
x(i, z)di we can solve for
xj(i, z) =
a− cj(i, z)− bρ(Xj(z) + Y (z))
2b(1− ρ) . (2.6)
The negative impact of industry output Y (z) on firm j’s profit-maximizing output of variety
i captures the fact that under Cournot competition (and linear demand) output levels are
3Adaptation costs do not depend on the degree of product differentiation in consumer demand. This renders
the analysis simple and allows us to study preference and technology changes as two independent phenomena.
However, the respective results from our analysis may be restrictive if adaptation costs vary systematically with
the degree of product differentiation, which could be the case in industries in which products are tailored to
specific needs of individual consumers.
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strategic substitutes. Furthermore, the additional negative impact of this firm’s own total output
Xj(z) reflects the cannibalization effect, i.e. under Cournot competition MPFs internalize that
increasing output of a certain variety lowers prices for this as well as all other varieties in the
firm’s product range. Both of these effects do exist if and only if ρ > 0, i.e. if products are not
perfectly differentiated (see above).
Furthermore, maximizing profits (2.5) with respect to δj(z) gives the first-order condition
∂Πj(z)
∂δj(z)
= [pj(δj(z))− cj(δj(z))]xj(δj(z)) = 0,
which can be solved for firm j’s optimal product range
δj(z) = ln
[
a− bρ(Xj(z) + Y (z))
wj(z)
]
. (2.7)
Comparing Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7), we see that firms add new varieties to their product portfolio
until the marginal costs of the last variety δj(z) equals the marginal revenue of this variety at
zero output. Using the latter insight in Eq. (2.6), we can derive a second expression for optimal
output of variety i, by expressing the respective output level of this variety in terms of the
difference between its own marginal cost and that of the marginal variety:
xj(i, z) =
wj(z)[e
δj(z) − ei]
2b(1− ρ) . (2.6
′)
Integrating output xj(i, z) over all varieties i, finally gives total output, i.e. the scale, of firm j:
Xj(z) =
wj(z)
2b(1− ρ)
[
eδj(z)
(
δj(z)− 1
)
+ 1
]
, (2.8)
which, all other things equal, increases in the firm’s product range δj(z) and, for a given scope,
increases in wage rate wj(z). The latter effect has to be interpreted with care, as it does not
imply that higher factor costs increase firm size. Rather, higher wages lead to output adjustments
at the internal and the external margin. The former is associated with a firm’s relocation of
production from goods with a large distance towards goods with a small distance to its core
competence, holding the product range and output of the marginal variety constant. The latter
is associated with a change in the product range. The positive impact of an increase in wj(z) on
Xj(z) for a given δj(z) only captures the firm’s output adjustment at the intensive margin and
accordingly should be interpreted as a partial effect. As outlined below, this adjustment at the
internal margin is counteracted and dominated by a firm’s output adjustment at the external
margin, so that total firm size decreases in response to higher labor costs, as can be expected.
2.2.3 Union wage setting and the labor market
Regarding factor endowments, we assume that the country under consideration is populated by
L workers, each of them supplying one unit of labor. Workers are mobile across sectors, with
sectors differing in the prevailing labor market institutions. To be more specific, we apply the
labor market model of Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) and assume that a subset of industries is
unionized, while in the rest of the economy, the labor market is perfectly competitive. Without
loss of generality, we order industries such that unions are active in all sectors with z ≤ z˜. Pro-
vided that unions are only active in a subset of industries, i.e. z˜ < 1, involuntary unemployment
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does not materialize in this setting, as workers who do not find a job in unionized industries will
move to non-unionized industries, and the competitive wage will fall until all workers can find
employment there. With respect to wage setting in industries z ∈ [0, z˜], we consider sector-level
unions which unilaterally set wages that are binding for all workers of the respective industry,
while, at the same time, leaving the right-to-manage employment to firms. Since all firms of an
industry pay identical wages they are symmetric, and hence we can combine (2.8) and (2.7) to
obtain4
eδ(z) =
a/w(z)− φ
1 + φδ(z)− φ, (2.9)
where φ ≡ ρ(n + 1)/[2(1 − ρ)] is a measure of product market competition, which positively
depends on the number of competitors, n, and negatively depends on the degree of product
differentiation, as captured by the inverse of ρ. Eq. (2.9) establishes a negative relationship
between wage rate w(z) and firm scope δ(z). Furthermore, Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9) determine firm
scale X(z) as an implicit function of w(z), and it is shown in the Appendix that dX(z)/dw(z) <
0, as argued above.
The response of firm scale and scope to changes in the wage rate is taken into account by
unions. As in other models of union wage setting, unions face a trade-off between higher wages
and higher employment when deciding upon their wage claims. How unions evaluate this trade-
off depends on their objective function. We impose the common assumption that unions are
utilitarian and have an objective function of the form Ω(z) = [w(z)−wc]nl(z), where wc is the
economy-wide competitive wage. Substituting l(z) =
∫ δ(z)
0
eix(i, z)di, x(i, z) from (2.6′), and
eδ(z) from (2.9) into union objective Ω, we obtain5
Ω =
n
4b(1− ρ) (w
u − wc)wu
(
a/wu − φ
1 + φδu − φ − 1
)2
. (2.10)
Totally differentiating the latter with respect to wu and setting the resulting expression equal
to zero gives the first-order condition
dΩ
dwu
=
n
4b(1− ρ)
(
a/wu − φ
1 + φδu − φ − 1
)[
(2wu − wc)
(
a/wu − φ
1 + φδu − φ − 1
)
−2 (wu − wc) e
δu (1 + φδu − φ) + φ
1 + φδu
]
= 0.
Rearranging terms and accounting for (2.9) allows us to derive the union wage claim as an
implicit function of the competitive wage wc:
wu =
1
2
wc +
a
[1 + φδu][eδu − 1]
[
1− w
c
wu
]
. (2.11)
Unions set wages wu > wc and thus end up with lower scale and scope. Furthermore, our model
reproduces the common result that a higher competitive wage (and thus a higher alternative
income) provides a stimulus for the union wage, i.e. dwu/dwc > 0.6
4We suppress firm indices from now on to simplify notation.
5Since sectors only differ in their labor market institutions, we introduce superscripts u and c to refer to
unionized and non-unionized industries, respectively, and suppress sector index z from now on.
6The proof of this result is deferred to the Appendix.
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The competitive wage is not exogenous in our model but adjusts in general equilibrium to
clear the labor market. Substituting x(i, z) from Eq. (2.6′) into L =
∫ 1
0
∫ δ(z)
0
neix(i, z)didz, we
can write the condition for labor market clearing as follows:
L =
n
4b(1− ρ)
[
z˜wu
(
eδ
u − 1
)2
+ (1− z˜)wc
(
eδ
c − 1
)2]
, (2.12)
where the left-hand side of this equation represents exogenous labor supply, while the right-
hand side represents aggregate labor demand. Together with Eqs. (2.8), (2.9) – separately for
unionized and non-unionized industries – and (2.11) this gives a system of six equations, which
jointly determine the autarky level of the six endogenous variables wc, wu, δc, δu, Xc and Xu.
This completes the characterization of the closed economy equilibrium.
2.2.4 The consequences of deunionization for firm-level variables
With the characterization of the closed economy equilibrium at hand, we are now equipped to
investigate how firms respond to a fall in the share of unionized industries, z˜. We summarize
the main insights from this comparative-static analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A decline in the share of unionized industries lowers firm scale and scope, while
raising labor productivity in all industries, except of the newly deunionized ones.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since non-unionized firms employ more workers than unionized ones, a fall in z˜ provides an
employment stimulus in the newly deunionized industries and thus raises economy-wide labor
demand. Due to the requirement of labor market clearing, this induces an increase in wc and
wu. The higher factor costs prompt firms to use their labor input more productively, thereby
inducing a shortening of the product range (see (2.9)). At the same time, firms reduce the
output of each interior variety, and they do so more than proportionally for varieties that are
further away from their core competence (see (2.6′)). Hence, all MPFs (except for the newly
deunionized ones) end up with smaller scale and scope, and higher labor productivity.7 By
construction, such a productivity increase does not materialize in models with SPFs, provided
that output of a specific variety is linear in labor input (see Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009).8
Aside from studying pure level effects, we can also shed light on the differential impact a
decline in z˜ exerts on unionized and non-unionized firms. The respective insights are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Provided that the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently high, a decline
in the share of unionized industries lowers the scale differential ∆ ≡ δc− δu as well as the scope
differential Ξ ≡ Xc −Xu between firms in non-unionized and unionized industries.
7Clearly, this productivity increase is a consequence of associating MPFs with flexible manufacturing and the
assumption of higher unit production costs for goods that are further away from a firm’s core competence, while,
as pointed out by an anonymous referee, counteracting effects would materialize if economies of scope could be
exploited by an increase in the product range – an effect that is absent in our model.
8Of course, by affecting firm scope, deunionization also changes the total number of available product varieties.
This may be an important channel through which welfare effects of deunionization materialize. We have studied
these welfare effects in detail, but due to space constraints have deferred the welfare analysis to the Appendix and
only report the main insights from this analysis here: Similar to its impact on the number of available varieties,
deunionization exerts a non-monotonic impact on welfare in our model, with the respective effect being positive
for small initial levels of z˜ and negative for high initial levels of z˜.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
While deunionization increases both wc and wu, the respective factor price stimulus turns out
to be stronger in competitive industries, implying that the union wage premium ω ≡ wu/wc
falls. As formally shown in the Appendix, this decline in ω is instrumental for rendering firms
more similar in both scale and scope, at least if ρ is sufficiently small.
To round off the analysis of the closed economy, we briefly discuss whether our theoretical
insights upon the interaction between firm scale and scope, on the one hand, and labor market
institutions, on the other hand, are in accordance with empirical evidence. The main advantage
of a general equilibrium framework is its suitability for studying cross-sectoral linkages through
economy-wide factor market clearing. In our setting, these linkages lead to spillovers of deunion-
ization on wages in other industries. To be more specific, deunionization of certain industries
lowers the wages within these industries relative to other ones.9 As pointed out above, this
stimulates economy-wide labor demand and thus raises the labor return in all other (unionized
and non-unionized) industries. This spillover effect has received considerable attention in the
labor market literature and has strong empirical support.10
In our model, the spillover of deunionization on wage payments in other industries changes
the firms’ profit maximizing choice of scale and scope, there. While these additional spillover
effects have to the best of our knowledge not been at the agenda of empirical research so far,
shedding light on these effects may be useful for getting a more comprehensive picture upon
how labor market institutions affect the economic well-being in modern societies. That firm-level
adjustments to union activity are important for total output can be inferred from the observation
that unionized firms have, all other things equal, lower employment and profits. While there is
indeed strong empirical support for a negative impact of unions on these two measures of firm
performance, existing evidence regarding the impact of unionization on labor productivity is less
clear (see Turnbull, 2003). Many economists would agree that unions reduce the incentives for
investment and thereby lower labor productivity. But it is difficult to find strong evidence for this
theoretically convincing argument. Our model suggests that changes in firm scope counteract
the negative productivity effects as firms lower their product range when facing higher wage costs
(with feedback effects on other industries), and thus it offers an explanation for why conclusive
evidence for a negative impact of unionization on labor productivity is missing.11
9We do not put emphasis on absolute changes in the competitive and the union wage, as they are measured
in terms of the representative consumer’s utility and therefore represent real wages at the margin (see Neary,
2009). For that reason, we cannot directly compare our findings with empirical evidence on real wage effects
of deunionization. The relative loss of workers in newly deunionized industries, on the other hand, is a simple
consequence of union members receiving a wage premium which is well supported by empirical evidence (see, for
instance, Freeman and Medoff, 1981).
10The literature distinguishes two types of spillovers of union wage setting on non-union workers. On the
one hand, workers move from unionized to non-unionized firms, generating additional labor supply and lowering
wages there. On the other hand, firms may be willing to pay higher wages due to the threat of union formation
if wage gaps between unionized and non-unionized producers are too large (Freeman and Medoff, 1981). While
there is empirical support for both types of spillover effects (see Neumark and Wachter, 1995; Farber, 2005;
Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke, 2008), only the first one is present in our model as the share of unionized
firms/industries is assumed to be exogenous throughout our analysis.
11Doucouliagos and Laroche (2009) put it in the following way: “The broad view emerging from [the] literature
is that the impact of unions on profitability is a priori indeterminate: any positive effect of unions on productivity
may be offset by higher production costs, while any negative effect on productivity reinforces cost pressures” (p.
146f).
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2.3 MPFs and labor market imperfection in an open econ-
omy
It is the purpose of this chapter to shed light on firm level adjustments if the country under
consideration opens up to trade. Thereby, we consider trade between two fully symmetric
economies and abstract from the existence of any impediments of shipping goods across borders.
Product markets are segmented and labor is not allowed to move across borders. In the interest
of readability, we do not repeat all the steps of the formal analysis in Chapter 2.2, but instead
stick to an informal discussion of the trade effects on firm scale and scope in the main text of
our chapter, while deferring derivation details of the analysis to the Appendix.
We start our analysis with first focusing at the benchmark scenario with ρ = 0. As outlined
in the previous chapter, firms behave as monopolists in this case. Hence, access to trade does
not change the competitive environment and all trade effects materialize due adjustments of
factor costs in general equilibrium. To be more specific, firms start serving foreign consumers in
the open economy and thus expand production and labor demand at the extensive margin. To
restore the labor market equilibrium, the competitive wage must increase and unions respond to
this increase in wc by raising their wage claims. The surge in factor costs causes a shortening of
the product range of all competitors and firm scope falls in unionized as well as non-unionized
industries. This is instrumental for a productivity surge. With respect to firm scale, we can
note that the increase in factor costs lowers the output of firms for the domestic market. How-
ever, in the open economy firms additionally serve foreign consumers and this expansion at the
extensive margin dominates the output reduction, so that firm scale unambiguously increases in
all industries when a country opens up for trade. This effect is intuitive, as the decline in firm
scope leaves more labor for employment in the firms’ high-competence varieties which means
that resources are used more productively and firm scale can expand in the open economy. This
outcome is in line with the key finding of Eckel and Neary (2010) that firms become leaner and
meaner when a country opens up for trade, thereby generating productivity gains which refer
to a new channel through which gains from trade can materialize, a channel that is not present
in textbook models of trade with SPFs.
In order to determine how trade affects relative firm performance, it is worth noting that
union wage claims, while stimulated by the surge in the competitive wage, increase less than
proportionally, so that the union wage premium, ω, shrinks when the country opens up for
trade with a symmetric partner country. The fall in the wage differential reduces the cost
disadvantage of unionized firms, thereby lowering the differential in firm scope across industries,
i.e. ∆ is lower in the open than in the closed economy. The fall in the union wage premium is
also instrumental for a decline of the output differential in the domestic market. However, with
market-specific output being larger in non-unionized sectors, firms in these industries experience
a more than proportional output increase from exporting. It is this second effect that dominates
in our model, so that the firm scale differential, Ξ, is magnified in the open economy if ρ = 0.
Equipped with the insight from the closed economy that, due to differentiability of the main
variables of interest, the findings from the benchmark scenario with ρ = 0 extend to high degrees
of product differentiation (i.e., low levels of ρ), we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Provided that the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently high, a coun-
try’s movement from autarky to trade with a symmetric partner country lowers firm scope and
raises firm scale as well as labor productivity in all industries. Furthermore, the scope differ-
ential shrinks, while the firm size differential increases between firms from non-unionized and
unionized industries.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The results from Proposition 3 are useful for explaining several empirical regularities. One
of these regularities is that exporting has a positive impact on firm size (see, for instance,
Wagner, 2002). While this effect is also present in models of heterogeneous SPFs along the
lines of Melitz (2003), the mechanisms behind the respective adjustments differ significantly
between the two settings. In a Melitz-type model, firm size increases due to a relocation of labor
towards more productive firms. In our setting, there is also relocation of employment from
non-unionized to unionized producers. However, this relocation is not decisive for the positive
output effect. To be more specific, in our model with MPFs total output would increases as
well, if employment stayed constant in any firm (which would be the case, for instance, if
z˜ → 0). The reason is that export opportunities increase wages and render a shortening of
the product range attractive from the perspective of each individual producer. Accounting
for sector-specific labor market institutions, our model is thus suited for disentangling output
effects that materialize due to relocation of labor and output effect that are attributable to a
shortening of the product range. A further implication of our model is that firm productivity
increases when a country opens up for trade, and this effect is again driven by a stronger focus
on core-competence products in response to higher wage payments in the open economy. This
provides an explanation for the empirical finding that exporting increases firm productivity
(see Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006; Greenaway and Kneller, 2008) – without relying on a
learning mechanism for which direct empirical evidence is still missing.12 Finally, our model
also provides an rationale for the empirical finding in di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Rancie`re
(2011) that trade raises the variance in firm size. While these authors explain their observation
by means of a modified Melitz model with heterogeneous SPFs, we show that differences in
the prevailing labor market institutions may also generate such an outcome in a setting with
otherwise symmetric MPFs.13
With partial product differentiation access to international trade gives rise to pro-competitive
effects, which materialize along multiple lines. On the one hand, trade fosters product market
competition and thus reduces profits ceteris paribus. While in a model with SPFs this does
not exert a direct effect on union wage setting, it induces a fall in firm scope and thus gives
room for higher union wage claims in our setting. On the other hand, trade changes the labor
market environment. While sector-level unions unilaterally set industry-wide wage standards
in the closed economy, they have to account for the outcome of union wage setting in the
foreign economy when the opening up for trade exposes domestic producers to international
competition. All other things equal, this gives rise to a union-disciplining effect and induces a
fall in union wage claims. Hence, in the partial equilibrium there are now two counteracting
effects of trade on union wage setting, while in the general equilibrium there is an additional
positive effect due to a labor demand stimulus and a higher competitive wage. As noted above,
the additional partial equilibrium effects do not change the insights from the benchmark model
if the degree of product differentiation is high. However, we cannot be certain that the results
in Proposition 3 also extend to small degrees of product differentiation. Shedding light on this
issue is the purpose of the following analysis.14
12While conclusive evidence for learning in the export market is to the best of our knowledge not available,
there is strong empirical support for firms focusing on their most successful products when being exposed to
competition in the export market (see, for instance, Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2011, and the literature cited
there).
13This result differs significantly from Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) unionized GOLE model with SPFs,
where the output gap between non-unionized and unionized firms is more pronounced in the closed than in the
open economy.
14The Appendix provides a formal characterization of the open economy equilibrium.
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wut − wua wct − wca δut − δua δct − δca Dut −Dua Dct −Dca Xut −Xua Xct −Xca
z˜ = 0.1 -0.17 5.55 -0.02 -0.06 -0.61 -1.96 0.67 0.02
z˜ = 0.3 0.24 6.78 -0.03 -0.07 -0.73 -2.29 0.66 -0.16
z˜ = 0.5 0.90 8.50 -0.03 -0.08 -0.91 -2.72 0.61 -0.42
Notes: D denotes domestic firm-level output and subscripts a, t refer to autarky and trade
variables, respectively. Parameter values are a = 100, b = 1, ρ = 0.8, n = 5, L = 20.
Table 2.1: Trade effects on wages, scope and scale for different degrees of unionization
Since we are not able to derive sharp analytic results for small degrees of product differenti-
ation, we have conducted a series of numerical simulation exercises to get insights into the trade
effects for high levels of ρ. Table 2.1 displays the results for ρ = 0.8.15 From the second column
of the table we can conclude that for high values of ρ union wage claims may actually fall in
response to trade liberalization. But this can only happen if the share of unionized industries
is sufficiently small. An intuition for the role of z˜ in determining the impact of trade on union
wage claims can be found in Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009). As shown in their study on SPFs,
a higher z˜, while not directly affecting the strength of the (partial equilibrium) impact effect on
union wage setting in a given industry, implies that this impact effect is relevant for a larger
share of sectors, thereby reinforcing the labor demand stimulus of trade and thus the general
equilibrium feedback effect through adjustments in wc. From this we can deduce that a posi-
tive effect of trade on union wage claims is the more likely, the larger is the share of unionized
industries z˜.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.1 present numerical results for the impact of trade on firm
scope, and these results indicate that all firms shorten their product range in response to trade,
irrespective of the prevailing labor market institutions. The negative effect of trade on firm scope
is more pronounced in non-unionized industries, so that, in line with our benchmark model, firms
become more similar in this dimension. Furthermore, from inspection of Columns 6 and 7, we
can conclude that the findings from our benchmark model regarding the impact of trade on
domestic output (D) also remain unaffected if one considers relatively high values of ρ: All
firms reduce their domestic output level in response to trade. However, this does not mean that
firm scale falls as well, as firms get access to the export market and thus increase output at the
extensive margin. From columns 8 and 9 we see that, in contrast to the benchmark model, the
expansion at the extensive margin needs not be strong enough to dominate the output decline
at the intensive margin so that the total impact on firm scale is not clearcut in general if ρ is
sufficiently large. To be more specific, the numerical results indicate that firm scale definitely
increases in unionized industries, while it may increase or fall in non-unionized sectors. In our
simulation exercise, firm scale increases in non-unionized industries if z˜ is low, while it declines
if z˜ is sufficiently large.
To get an intuition for the role of z˜ in determining the impact of trade on firm scale, it is
useful to distinguish two effects. On the one hand, trade induces a general decline in firm scope
which leaves more labor for producing high-competence varieties and thus stimulates firm scale
in all industries. On the other hand, the wage differential between unionized and non-unionized
industries shrinks, which implies that production shifts towards unionized sectors. The stronger
15The program code for the simulation exercise (in Mathematica 8.0 ) is deferred to the Appendix.
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the latter effect is, the more likely is a negative firm scale effect of trade in non-unionized
industries. From inspection of columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.1, we can infer that the reduction
in the wage differential is more pronounced for high degrees of unionization. Hence, the second
effect dominates if z˜ is sufficiently large. Finally, for all parameter configurations in Table 2.1,
the scale differential between unionized and non-unionized industries shrinks in response to a
country’s movement from autarky to trade, which constitutes a further important difference to
our benchmark model (and is in line with the respective findings in Bastos and Kreickemeier,
2009).
We complete the discussion of this chapter by summarizing the main insights from the nu-
merical simulation exercise. For small degrees of product differentiation, a country’s movement
from autarky to free trade with a symmetric partner country does not necessarily increase firm
scale of all producers. Furthermore, the scale differential between firms of non-unionized and
unionized industries may shrink in response to trade if ρ is sufficiently large.
2.4 Concluding remarks
We have set up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model of MPFs and labor market imperfec-
tions due to union wage-setting in a subset of industries. We have used this setting to tackle
two questions that have sparked considerable interest of economists in recent years and are of
relevance for policy makers alike. The first question we are interested in deals with firm-level
(and related economy-wide) adjustments to deunionization, a phenomenon that has been ob-
served in all industrialized countries over the last four decades. Associating deunionization with
a reduction in the share of unionized industries, we have shown that deunionization raises both
the competitive and the union wage and thus renders a shortening of the product range attrac-
tive for MPFs. In addition to the decline in firm scope, the cost increase lowers total output
of all interior varieties, so that firm scale decreases in unionized as well as non-unionized in-
dustries. With firms concentrating on high-competence varieties, deunionization therefore leads
to an increase in labor productivity of all firms (except for the newly deunionized ones). The
second question we tackle in this chapter is the impact of trade on firm scale and scope. In this
respect, the main insight from our analysis is that, while firms become leaner and meaner as in
models of MPFs without labor market frictions, the additional labor force that has been set free
by the decline in firm scope is not equally allocated to unionized and non-unionized industries
and thus it is not guaranteed that all firms actually increase their scale when being exposed to
international trade. To be more specific, with labor market institutions being industry-specific,
the firm-level effects of trade depend on a non-trivial interplay of product differentiation and
the degree of unionization.
While we hope that our analysis contributes to a better understanding of how MPFs adjust
their scale and scope in response to macroeconomic shocks, it is clear that, in the interest of
analytical tractability we had to impose several simplifying assumptions which limit the prac-
tical relevance of our results. For instance, we have considered a exponential adaptation costs,
implying a strictly convex relationship between the distance of a product to the firm’s core
competence and the unit costs for manufacturing the respective product. To check whether our
results are driven by the specific functional form of adaptation costs, we have considered a lin-
ear unit cost-distance relationship as an alternative specification in an extension of our baseline
model.16 It turns out that the main insights from our analysis regarding the implications of
deunionization and trade liberalization for firm-level variables are not affected by this modifi-
16Derivation details are deferred to the Appendix.
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cation. In a further extension, we have accounted for firm-level instead of sector-level unions.17
While in the borderline case of perfect product differentiation, this modification has no impact
on our analysis, it renders the formal analysis much more complicated if one accounts for par-
tial product differentiation. However, it is still possible to characterize the autarky as well as
the trade equilibrium, and results from numerical simulation exercises indicate that the main
insights from our analysis on adjustments in firm scale and scope are robust to this modification.
A further restrictive assumption of our model is the exogenous and equal number of com-
petitors within each industry. This assumption closes one important adjustment margin and
restricts our analysis to a short-run perspective. In the long run, it is plausible that firm own-
ers de-invest their capital stock and search for the best investment opportunities in the whole
economy. If there are no extra costs of moving capital across sectors, firm owners will adjust
their investment strategy in the long run until the return to their investment is the same in
all industries. In comparison to our short-run model with an exogenous and equal number of
competitors in all industries, this induces a movement of producers towards non-unionized in-
dustries. Since non-unionized firms are larger than unionized ones, this gives a labor demand
stimulus, thereby raising the competitive as well as the union wage. Hence, compared to our
short-run model firm scale and scope shrink in both unionized and non-unionized industries if
capital is mobile across industries (at least as long as products are sufficiently differentiated).
Another extension of our model which is worthwhile to consider is one that allows for analyzing
the consequences of marginal trade liberalization. Since the introduction of trade impediments
would significantly complicate our analysis, such a modification is beyond the scope of this
chapter. However, we can follow Eckel and Neary (2010) and associate marginal steps of trade
liberalization with an increase in the number of trading partners. In the case of perfect product
differentiation, opening up for trade with an additional (symmetric) partner country reinforces
the respective effects identified in the previous chapter. While this result can be extended to
sufficiently high degrees of (partial) product differentiation, determining the respective effects
for arbitrary levels of ρ is not a trivial task and, hence, we leave a more detailed discussion of
this issue open for future research.
17Derivation details are deferred to the Appendix.
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2.5 Appendix
The link between wages and firm scale and scope
Applying the implicit function theorem to (2.9) gives
dδ(z)
dw(z)
= − 1
w(z)
eδ(z)
(
1 + φδ(z)− φ)+ φ
eδ(z)(1 + φδ(z))
< 0. (2.13)
Furthermore, substituting (2.9) into (2.8) and differentiating the resulting expression with re-
spect to w(z) gives
dX(z)
dw(z)
= − e
δ(z) − 1
2b(1− ρ)[1 + φδ(z)] < 0. (2.14)
This proves the respective statements in the main text. QED.
The link between the competitive wage and the union wage
To show that a higher competitive wage provides a stimulus for the union wage, i.e. dwu/dwc >
0, we can define the implicit function
Γ(wc, wu) ≡ wu − 1
2
wc − a
(1 + φδu)(eδu − 1)
[
1− w
c
wu
]
= 0, (2.15)
according to (2.11). Partially differentiating Γ(·) with respect to wc and accounting for a/wu =
eδ
u
(1 + φδu − φ) + φ, according to (2.9), we obtain
∂Γ(·)
∂wc
=
(eδ
u
+ 1)(1 + φδu)− 2φ(eδu − 1)
2(1 + φδu)(eδu − 1) , (2.16)
which is positive.18 Partially differentiating Γ(·) with respect to wu gives
∂Γ(·)
∂wu
= 1− w
c
wu
a/wu
(1 + φδu)(eδu − 1) +
(
1− w
c
wu
)
a
[
eδ
u
(1 + φδu) + φ
(
eδ
u − 1)]
(1 + φδu)2 (eδu − 1)2
dδu
dwu
. (2.17)
Using (2.13) and substituting a/wu = eδ
u
(1 + φδu − φ) + φ, we can further calculate
∂Γ(·)
∂wu
= −
[
(α2β − 1)− w
c
wu
(α2β − α)
]
, (2.18)
with
α ≡ e
δu(1 + φδu)− φ (eδu − 1)
(eδu − 1)(1 + φδu) , β ≡
eδ
u
(1 + φδu) + φ
(
eδ
u − 1)
eδu(1 + φδu)
> 1. (2.19)
Hence, α > 1, which is equivalent to 1 − φ(eδu − δu − 1) > 0, is sufficient for ∂Γ(·)/∂wu < 0.
Using (2.9) together with (2.11), we can conclude that 1− φ(eδu − δu − 1) > 0 is equivalent to
ω > 1, so that ∂Γ(·)/∂wu < 0 and, by applying the implicit function theorem to (2.15), also
dwu/dwc > 0 are immediate.
18It is immediate that the denominator of this expression is positive, while the numerator is strictly increasing
in δu and equals 2 at δu = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Let us first differentiate f(z) ≡ w(z)[eδ(z)−1]2 with respect to w(z). Accounting for (2.13), this
gives19
df(z)
dw(z)
= − e
δ(z) − 1
1 + φδ(z)
[
(eδ(z) + 1)(1 + φδ(z))− 2φ(eδ(z) − 1)
]
< 0. (2.20)
This implies wu(eδ
u − 1)2 < wc(eδc − 1)2, so that the right-hand side of (2.12) unambigu-
ously falls in z˜, when holding wages constant. Furthermore, combining df(z)/dw(z) < 0 with
dwu/dwc > 0, we can conclude that the right-hand side of (2.12) determines a negative relation-
ship between economy-wide labor demand and the competitive wage wc. Applying the implicit
function theorem to Eq. (2.12), we therefore get dwc/dz˜ < 0, dwu/dz˜ < 0, which, in view of
dδ(z)/dw(z) < 0 and dX(z)/dw(z) < 0 (see Eqs. (2.13) and (2.14)), establishes a positive re-
lationship between z˜ and the scale and scope of MPFs. Finally, substituting x(i, z) from (2.6′)
into l(z) =
∫ δ(z)
0
eix(i, z)di, gives l(z) = w(z)
(
eδ(z) − 1)2 /[4b(1− ρ)]. Using the latter together
with Eq. (2.8) X(z)/l(z) gives labor productivity, ξ, as a function of firm scope:
ξ(z) = 2
eδ(z) (δ(z)− 1) + 1(
eδ(z) − 1)2 (2.21)
It is straightforward to show that dξ(z)/dδ(z) < 0, so that dξ(z)/dz˜ < 0 is immediate. This
completes the proof of Proposition 1. QED.
Deunionization and the number of product varieties when ρ = 0
The total number of product varieties is given by N ≡ z˜Nu + (1 − z˜)N c = z˜nδu + (1 − z˜)nδc.
Differentiating the latter with respect to z˜, we obtain
dN
dz˜
= n
{
ln
(
1
ω
)
− dw
c
dz˜
[
z˜
1
wu
a+ wu
4wu − wc + (1− z˜)
1
wc
]}
, (2.22)
according to (2.7).20 Totally differentiating (2.12) and accounting for a/wu = 2ω − 1, a/wc =
ω(2ω − 1) from (2.11)21, we can calculate
dwc
dz˜
= wc
4ω(ω − 1)2 − [ω(2ω − 1)− 1]2
8z˜ω3(4ω − 1)−1(ω − 1) + (1− z˜)[(ω(2ω − 1))2 − 1] . (2.23)
Substituting the latter into (2.22), we get
dN
dz˜
= n
{
ln
(
1
ω
)
−
{
4ω(ω − 1)2 − [ω(2ω − 1)− 1]2} [2z˜ω(4ω − 1)−1 + (1− z˜)]
8z˜ω3(4ω − 1)−1(ω − 1) + (1− z˜)[(ω(2ω − 1))2 − 1]
}
. (2.24)
Evaluating dN/dz˜ at z˜ = 0 gives
dN
dz˜
∣∣∣∣
z˜=0
= n
[
ln
(
1
ω
)
− 4ω(ω − 1)
2 − [ω(2ω − 1)− 1]2
[(ω(2ω − 1))2 − 1]
]
, (2.25)
19For a negative sign of (2.20) the bracket term on the right-hand side of this equation must be positive. To
show that this is the case, we can differentiate the bracket term and obtain eδ(z) (1 + φδ(z)− φ)+φ = a/wu > 0.
Furthermore, evaluating the bracket term at δ(z) = 0 gives 2. Hence, we can safely conclude that the bracket
term is positive for any δ(z) > 0.
20Note that with ρ = 0 total firm scope reads δ(z) = ln[a/w(z)].
21With ρ = 0 we have wu = 1/2 [wc + a/ω].
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which is negative for any ω > 1. Evaluating dN/dz˜ at z˜ = 1 gives
dN
dz˜
∣∣∣∣
z˜=1
= n
[
ln
(
1
ω
)
− ω − 1
ω
+
[ω(2ω − 1)− 1]2
4ω2(ω − 1)
]
, (2.26)
which is positive for any ω > 1. This proves the respective statement in the main text. QED.
Welfare effects of deunionization when ρ = 0
Setting ρ = 0 and accounting for λ = 1, we can rewrite (2.4) in the following way: q(i, z) =
1
b [a− λp(i, z)]. Substituting the latter into (2.2), gives u{z} = [n/(2b)]
[
a2δ(z)− ∫ δ(z)
0
p(i, z)2
]
and, accounting for p(i, z) = (1/2)[a+ w(z)ei], we can calculate
u{z} = n
16b
[
6a2 ln[
a
w(z)
]− 4a2 + 4aw(z)− a2 + w(z)2
]
. (2.27)
And adding over all industries, we thus get
U =
n
16b
z˜
[
6a2 ln[
a
wu
]− 4a2 + 4awu − a2 + (wu)2
]
+
n
16b
(1− z˜)
[
6a2 ln[
a
wc
]− 4a2 + 4awc − a2 + (wc)2
]
(2.28)
Differentiating the latter with respect to z˜
dU
dz˜
=
n
16b
{
6(wc)2
( a
wc
)2
ln
(
1
ω
)
+ (wc)2
(
4
a
wc
ω + ω2 − 4 a
wc
− 1
)
+
+
dwc
dz˜
[
z˜
dwu
dwc
wu
(
4
a
wu
+ 2− 6
( a
wu
)2)
+ (1− z˜)wc
(
4
a
wc
+ 2− 6
( a
wc
)2)]}
(2.29)
Using a/wu = 2ω−1 and a/wc = ω(2ω−1) and dwu/dwc = (a+wu)/4wu−wc) = 2ω2/(4ω−1),
further implies
dU
dz˜
=
n
16b
{
(wc)2
(
24ω4 − 24ω3 + 6ω2) ln( 1
ω
)
+ (wc)2
(
8ω3 − 11ω2 + 4ω − 1)
+
dwc
dz˜
wc
[
z˜
2ω3
4ω − 1
(−24ω2 + 32ω − 8)+ (1− z˜) (−24ω4 + 24ω3 + 2ω2 − 4ω + 2)]}
And substituting
dwc
dz˜
= wc
4ω(ω − 1)2 − [ω(2ω − 1)− 1]2
8z˜ω3(ω − 1)(4ω − 1)−1 + (1− z˜)[(ω(2ω − 1))2 − 1] (2.30)
we finally arrive at
dU
dz˜
=
n
16b
(wc)2
{(
24ω4 − 24ω3 + 6ω2) ln( 1
ω
)
+ 8ω3 − 11ω2 + 4ω − 1
+
[
z˜
2ω3
4ω − 1
(−24ω2 + 32ω − 8)+ (1− z˜) (−24ω4 + 24ω3 + 2ω2 − 4ω + 2)] ρ(ω)}, (2.31)
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with ρ(ω) ≡ dwc/dz˜ × (wc)−1.
Evaluating the latter at z˜ = 0, gives
dU
dz˜
∣∣∣∣
z˜=0
=
n
16b
(wc)2
{(
24ω4 − 24ω3 + 6ω2) ln( 1
ω
)
+ 8ω3 − 11ω2 + 4ω − 1
+
[
24ω4 − 24ω3 − 2ω2 + 4ω − 2] (4ω2 + 1)(ω − 1)
4ω3 + ω + 1
}
, (2.32)
which is negative for any ω > 1. Furthermore, evaluating dU/dz˜ at z˜ = 1, gives
dU
dz˜
∣∣∣∣
z˜=1
=
n
16b
(wc)2
{(
24ω4 − 24ω3 + 6ω2) ln( 1
ω
)
+ 8ω3 − 11ω2 + 4ω − 1
+
(
6ω2 − 8ω + 2) (4ω2 + 1)(ω − 1)}, (2.33)
which can shown to be positive for any ω > 1. This completes the proof. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first consider the benchmark case of ρ = 0, which implies φ = 0. Rearranging terms in
(2.11) and accounting for φ = 0, we can calculate wc = (a/ω) (2ω − 1)−1, with ω = wu/wc and
dω/dwc < 0. Noting dwc/dz˜ < 0 from Proposition 1, this implies dω/dz˜ > 0. Furthermore,
substituting δ(z) from (2.9) into ∆ = δc − δu and evaluating the resulting expression at ρ = 0,
gives ∆ = ln(ω), with d∆/dω > 0 and, in view of dω/dz˜ > 0, also d∆/dz˜ > 0. Finally,
substituting (2.8) into Ξ = Xc −Xu and evaluating the resulting expression at ρ = 0, we can
calculate
Ξ =
a
2b
[
ln(ω)− ω − 1
ω(2ω − 1)
]
(2.34)
Differentiating the latter with respect to ω and evaluating the resulting expression at ω > 1,
gives dΞ/dω > 0.We can thus safely conclude that dΞ/dz˜ > 0.
Unfortunately, we are not able to show that the insights from the benchmark scenario with
perfect product differentiation (ρ = 0) extend to the more general case of partial product
differentiation, when allowing for arbitrary levels of ρ. However, with all variables of interest
being continuously differentiable in ρ, we can at least conclude that the respective insights from
the benchmark scenario are robust to small changes in ρ. This completes the proof of Proposition
2. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us first consider the benchmark case of ρ = 0. With firms being a monopolist in all sub-
markets of their production, opening up to trade leaves Eqs. (2.6′), (2.7) and (2.11) unaffected.
Furthermore, with firms serving two instead of just a single market total firm output is given
by X(z) = 2D(z) in the open economy, where D(z) equals local output in (2.8), when setting
ρ = 0. As a consequence, labor demand, as determined on the right-hand side of (2.12), dou-
bles for any wage configuration. This implies that wc and wu must increase to restore labor
market clearing (see the formal discussion in the closed economy). With wc and wu increasing,
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firm scope and domestic output must fall, according to (2.13) and (2.14). Furthermore, labor
productivity increases, according to (2.21).
To determine the impact of trade on total firm scale X(z), we can make use of the following
fact: The impact of trade on X(z) is qualitatively the same as the impact of trade on Y (z) ≡
nˆX(z), where nˆ = n under autarky and nˆ = 2n under free trade. Differentiating Y (z) with
respect to nˆ, accounting for (2.8) and setting ρ = 0, we can calculate
dY (z)
dnˆ
=
1
2b
{
a
[
ln
(
a
w(z)
)
− 1
]
+ w(z)− w(z)
(
a
w(z)
− 1
)
nˆ
w(z)
dw(z)
dnˆ
}
. (2.35)
Distinguishing between non-unionized and unionized industries, accounting for a/wc = ω(2ω−1)
and a/wu = 2ω − 1, according to (2.11), and using dwc/dnˆ = (wc/nˆ)β(ω), with
β(ω) ≡ 4z˜ω(ω − 1)
2 + (1− z˜) [ω(2ω − 1)− 1]2
8z˜ω(ω − 1)2ω2/ [4ω2 − 5ω + 1] + (1− z˜) [ω(2ω − 1)− 1] [ω(2ω − 1) + 1] , (2.36)
according to (2.12), the latter can be rewritten as
dY c
dnˆ
=
wc
2b
{
ω(2ω − 1)
[
ln
(
ω(2ω − 1)
)
− 1
]
+ 1−
[
ω(2ω − 1)− 1
]
β(ω)
}
, (2.37)
dY u
dnˆ
=
wc
2b
{
ω(2ω − 1)
[
ln
(
2ω − 1
)
− 1
]
+ ω − 4(ω − 1)ω
2
4ω − 1 β(ω)
}
, (2.38)
respectively. It is tedious but straightforward to show that the right-hand sides of (2.37) and
(2.38) are positive, implying that dY c/dnˆ > 0, dY u/dnˆ > 0.
Noting from the analysis of the closed economy that ∆ = ln(ω) if ρ = 0 and recollecting
from above that ω shrinks if wc increases, it is immediate that the scope differential declines in
response to a country’s movement form autarky to free trade with a symmetric partner economy.
In a further step, we now look at the impact of trade on firm size differential Ξ. Noting that,
with a constant number of competitors in either country, changes in Ξ are qualitatively the same
as changes in Ψ ≡ Y c−Y u, we can conclude from Eqs. (2.37) and (2.38) that dΞ/dnˆ >,=, < 0 is
equivalent to [4ω − 1] [ω(2ω−1) ln(ω)−(ω−1)]−(ω−1) (4ω2 + 2ω − 1)β(ω) >,=, < 0. Further-
more, taking into account β(ω) is increasing in z˜ and that β(ω)|z˜=1 =
[
4ω2 − 5ω + 1] /(2ω2),
we can further conclude that ζ(ω) ≡ 2ω2[ω(2ω−1) ln(ω)−(ω−1)]−(ω−1)2 (4ω2 + 2ω − 1) > 0
is sufficient for dΞ/dnˆ > 0.22
Noting finally that the variables of interest are continuously differentiable in ρ, we can
conclude that the insights from above are robust to small changes in ρ. This completes the
proof of Proposition 3. QED.
Characterization of the open economy equilibrium: the case of ρ > 0
In the open economy, a firm’s domestic output, D(z), is given by Eq. (2.8). Due to symmetry
of trading partners, a similar expression is obtained for the foreign economy: D∗(z), where the
asterisk is introduced to indicate foreign variables. Total sector output in the open economy is
22Differentiating ζ(ω) three times gives ζ′′′(ω) = 96ω ln(ω)− 12 ln(ω) + 8ω + 2 > 0. Together with ζ′′(1) = 0,
this proves that the second derivative of ζ(·) is strictly positive for any ω > 1. Noting further that ζ′(1) = 0, we
can also conclude that the first derivative of ζ(·) is strictly positive for any ω > 1. Noting finally that ζ(1) = 0,
therefore proves that ζ(·) has a positive sign for any ω > 1.
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then given by Y (z) = nD(z) + nD∗(z). Substituting the latter together with (2.8) – separately
for the home and the foreign country – into (2.7) and noting that in the open economy D(z)
assumes the role that X(z) had in the closed economy, we can calculate
eδ(z) =
1
w(z)
a− w(z)φ− w∗(z)φ[n/(n+ 1)][eδ∗(z)(δ∗(z)− 1) + 1]
1 + φδ(z)− φ , (2.39)
eδ
∗(z) =
1
w∗(z)
a− w∗(z)φ− w(z)φ[n/(n+ 1)][eδ(z)(δ(z)− 1) + 1]
1 + φδ∗(z)− φ (2.40)
for domestic and foreign firms’ scope, respectively. Thereby, φ = ρ(n+1)/[2(1− ρ)] is the same
as in the closed economy. In the case of symmetry, with δu = δu∗ and wu = wu∗, Eq. (2.39)
can be simplified to
δ(z) = ln
[
a/w(z)− φ(2n+ 1)/(n+ 1)
1 + φ(δ(z)− 1)(2n+ 1)/(n+ 1)
]
. (2.41)
Equipped with these insights we can now solve the wage-setting problem of labor unions.
Following the steps from the analysis in the closed economy and using eδ
u
from (2.39) instead
of (2.9), we can calculate the first-order condition for the Ω-maximization problem as follows
dΩ
dwu
=
n(eδ
u − 1)
2b(1− ρ)
[
(2wu − wc)(eδu − 1)+ 2wu(wu − wc)eδu dδu
dwu
]
= 0. (2.42)
Applying the implicit function theorem to system (2.39), (2.40) and evaluating the resulting
expression at δu = δu∗ (symmetry), we get
dδu
dwu
= − 1
wu
[
eδ
u
(1 + φδu − φ) + φ] (1 + φδu)− φ2[n/(n+ 1)]2[eδu(δu − 1) + 1]δu
eδu
[
(1 + φδu)2 − (φδu)2 [n/(n+ 1)]2
] . (2.43)
Substituting (2.43) into (2.42), we obtain after tedious but straightforward calculations:
wu = wc
(
1
2
(eδ
u − 1)
1− eδu +H(δu) + 1
)
, (2.44)
where
H(δu) ≡ (1 + φδ
u)
[
eδ
u
(1 + φδu − φ) + φ]− φ2δu [n/(n+ 1)]2 [eδu(δu − 1) + 1]
(1 + φδu)2 − [φδu[n/(n+ 1)]]2 . (2.45)
Finally, we can write the full employment condition as follows
L =
n
2b(1− ρ)
[
z˜wu
(
eδ
u − 1
)2
+ (1− z˜)wc
(
eδ
c − 1
)2]
. (2.46)
Putting all elements together, the open economy equilibrium is characterized by (2.8), (2.41) –
separately for u and c –, (2.44), and (2.46). This completes the characterization of the open
economy.
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2.5.1 Extension – Linear cost function
In the main text, we represent adaptation costs by an exponential unit cost-density function. In
this extension, we check the robustness of our results when changing our assumption, regarding
the functional form of adaptation costs. To be more specific, we consider the linear specification
γj(i) = 1 + i, and investigate whether the main insights from our analysis remain the same in
this modified framework. To keep the analysis tractable, we focus on a benchmark scenario with
ρ = 0 throughout the subsequent discussion.
With a linear cost specification, product-specific output and the product range are given by
xj(i, z) =
a− (1 + i)w(z)
2b
δj(i, z) =
a
w(z)
− 1 (2.47)
instead of (2.6) and (2.7), while product-specific output relative to the marginal good is given
by
xj(i, z) =
w(z)[δ(z)− i]
2b
(2.48)
instead of (2.6′). Integrating xj(i, z) over all varieties gives, after straightforward calculations,
total firm output Xj(z) = w(z)δ(z)
2/(4b). To calculate firm-level labor demand lj(z) we use
(2.48) in lj(z) =
∫ δ(z)
0
xj(i, z)γ(i)di and obtain lj(z) = a
[
(a/w(z))
2 − 3 + 2w(z)/a
]
/(12b).
With these insights at hand, we are now well equipped to calculate the union wage. For
this purpose, we substitute lj(z) into the union objective function Ω = [w(z) − wc]nl(z) (and
suppress firm indices in the interest of better readability). Differentiating Ω with respect to wu
and setting the resulting expression equal to zero, we can calculate23
wu = 2wc
(δu)2 + 3δu + 3
(δu)2 + 3δu + 6
. (2.49)
Furthermore, accounting for δu = a/wu − 1, we can rewrite (2.49) as follows
wu = 2wc
a2 + awu + (wu)2
a2 + awu + 4(wu)2
. (2.50)
Applying the implicit function theorem, we can furthermore calculate
dwu
dwc
= 2
a2 + awu + (wu)2
a2 + 2a(wu − wc) + 4wu(3wu − wc) . (2.51)
Hence, (2.50) establishes a positive relationship between wc and wu.
Before turning to the general equilibrium outcome, it is worth inspecting the firm scale and
scope differential between non-unionized and unionized firms. The scope differential is given by
∆ = δc − δu = a/wc − a/wu, which, in view of (2.47), can be rewritten as
∆ = [1 + δc]
[
1− 1
ω
]
, (2.52)
which is unambiguously positive, as wu > wc and thus ω > 1. The scale differential is given by
Ξ = Xc −Xu = [wc(δc)2 − wu(δu)2] /(4b) and, accounting for (2.47), we can calculate
Ξ =
wc
4b
[ a
wc
(δc − δu) + 1− ω
]
, (2.53)
23Noting that [(δu)2 + 3δu + 3]/[(δu)2 + 3δu + 6] ≥ 1/2, we can easily confirm that wu ≥ wc.
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which is positive as a > wu > wc.24
The general equilibrium outcome is characterized by the labor market clearing condition
L =
∫ 1
0
∫ δ(z)
0
nx(i, z)γ(i)didz = n
∫ 1
0
l(z)dz. Rearranging terms, we get25
L =
an
12b
{
z˜
[( a
wu
)2
− 3 + 2w
u
a
]
+ (1− z˜)
[( a
wc
)2
− 3 + 2w
c
a
]}
(2.54)
We are now prepared to study the implications of deunionization in the closed economy.
In analogy to the model variant in the main text, a decrease in z˜ raises economy-wide labor
demand and hence wc must increase in order to restore a labor market equilibrium. Formally,
this can be shown by applying the implicit function theorem to (2.54). Furthermore, a higher
competitive wage provides a stimulus for the union wage, according to (2.51), so that wu also
increases in response to a decline in z˜. Due to these wage effects, it is immediate that unionized
as well as non-unionized firms lower the scope in response to deunionization, i.e. δc and δu
decrease, according to (2.47). Accounting for
X(z) =
w(z)
4b
δ(z)2 =
1
4b
[
a2
w(z)
− 2a+ w(z)
]
(2.55)
it is straightforward to show that both Xc and Xu decline in response to deunionization, i.e.
all firms, except of the newly deunionized ones, shrink if z˜ falls.
Aside from these firm-level effects, we can also analyze the differential impact of deunioniza-
tion on unionized and non-unionized firms. For this purpose, we can first analyze the impact of
a decline in z˜ on ω. From (2.49)
ω = 2
(δu)2 + 3δu + 3
(δu)2 + 3δu + 6
. (2.56)
Since the right-hand side of the latter increases in δu, it follows from our insights above that a
decline in z˜ induces a fall in ω. However, since wc increases while ω falls in response to deunion-
ization, it follows from (2.52) that the scope differential between non-unionized and unionized
producers shrinks if z˜ declines. With firms concentrating more on their core competence prod-
ucts, labor productivity is stimulated by deunionization in our model. Regarding the impact of
deunionization on the firm scale differential, it is worth noting that (2.55) implies
Ξ =
1
4b
[
a2
wc
(
1− 1
ω
)
+ wc(1− ω)
]
(2.57)
Differentiating Ξ with respect to z˜, then implies
dΞ
dz˜
=
1
4b
{[
−
( a
wc
)2(
1− 1
ω
)
+ 1− ω
]
dwc
dz˜
+ wc
[( a
wu
)2
− 1
]
dω
dz˜
}
. (2.58)
24To see this, note that (1+ δc)(δc − δu) = (1+ δc)2(1− 1/ω), according to (2.52). Hence, Ξ > 0 is equivalent
to (1 + δc)2 > ω and, in view of (2.47), equivalent to (a/wc)2 > wu/wc. This implies that a > wu > wc is
sufficient for Ξ > 0.
25Defining f(z) ≡ a3/w(z)2 − 3a+ 2w(z) and accounting for ∂f(z)/∂w(z) = 2[1− (a/w(z))3] < 0, it is easily
confirmed that the right-hand side (RHS, in short) of (2.54) is strictly decreasing in wc. Furthermore, noting
that limwc→0RHS =∞, while limwc→aRHS = 0, we can safely conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium
with factor market clearing in our model.
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And noting dwc/dz˜ < 0, dω/dz˜ > 0 from above, we can conclude that the firm size differential
shrinks if z˜ declines. This completes our discussion upon firm-level adjustments in response to
deunionization. And we can now turn to analyzing the open economy.26
Similar to the scenario with an exponential cost-distance function, trade raises economy-wide
labor demand, so that wc increases. This provides a stimulus for wu, while δu and δc shrink.
As firms produce less varieties their productivity increases. Furthermore, similar to the model
variant in the main text, we find that any firm’s total domestic sales, D(z), shrink, that ω falls
and that the scope differential, ∆, decreases. To analyze the impact on total firm output we
follow the analysis in the main text and note that the impact of trade on total firm output can
be inferred from dY/dnˆ, where
Y (z) = nˆX(z) =
nˆ
4b
w(z)
[
a
w(z)
− 1
]2
(2.59)
is industry-wide output. Straightforward calculations give
dY (z)
dnˆ
=
1
4b
w(z)
[
a
w(z)
− 1
]2
+
nˆ
4b
dw(z)
dnˆ
[
1−
(
a
w(z)
)2]
. (2.60)
And, following the derivation in the main text step by step, we arrive at
dY c
dnˆ
=
1
4b
wc
[ a
wc
− 1
]2
+
1
4b
g(wc)
g′(wc)
[( a
wc
)2
− 1
]
, (2.61)
where
g(wc) ≡ z˜a
[( a
wu
)2
− 3 + 2w
u
a
]
+ (1− z˜)a
[( a
wc
)2
− 3 + 2w
c
a
]
> 0 (2.62)
and
g′(wc) = 2z˜
dwu
dwc
[
1−
( a
wu
)3]
+ 2(1− z˜)
[
1−
( a
wc
)3]
< 0. (2.63)
We can thus conclude that dY c/dnˆ >,=, < 0 is equivalent to
0 >,=, < wc
[ a
wc
− 1
]2
g′(wc) + g(wc)
[( a
wc
)2
− 1
]
(2.64)
Accounting for g(wc) and g′(wc) from above and substituting κ ≡ a/wu, we can further note
that dY c/dnˆ >,=, < 0 is equivalent to
0 >,=, <z˜
[
ω
(
κ3 − 3κ+ 2) (κω + 1)− 2 (κ3 − 1) (κω − 1) dwu
dwc
]
+ (1− z˜)
[ (
κ3ω3 − 3κω + 2) (κω + 1)− 2 (κ3ω3 − 1) (κω − 1) ], (2.65)
26We have also analyzed the impact of deunionization on the total number of available product varieties
N . While we do not present details of this analysis here, it is worth noting that similar to the main text,
deunionization does not exert a monotonic impact on N . To be more specific, our results indicate that N
increases in response to deunionization if z˜ has been small initially, while the opposite is true if z˜ has been large
prior to the deunionization shock.
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when taking into account that κ > 1, ω > 1 must hold by construction. Substituting
dwu
dwc
= 2
κ2 + κ+ 1
κ2 + 2κ+ 12− 2κ/ω − 4/ω , (2.66)
according to (2.51), we can finally conclude that dY c/dnˆ >,=, < 0 is equivalent to 0 >,=, <
T1 + T2, with
T1 ≡ z˜ (κω − 1)ω
[(
κ3 − 3κ+ 2) (κω + 1)− 4(κ3 − 1) (κω − 1) (κ2 + κ+ 1)
κ2ω + 2κω + 12ω − 2κ− 4
]
, (2.67)
T2 ≡ (1− z˜) (κω − 1)
[ (
κ3ω3 − 3κω + 2) (κω + 1)− 2 (κ3ω3 − 1) (κω − 1) ]. (2.68)
It is immediate to show that T2 = −(1− z˜)κω(κω− 1)4 < 0. Furthermore, we can rewrite T1 in
the following way
T1 = z˜ (κω − 1) (κ− 1)ω
[(
κ2 + κ− 2) (κω + 1)− 4 (κω − 1) (κ2 + κ+ 1)2
κ2ω + 2κω + 12ω − 2κ− 4
]
and, accounting for
ω = 2
κ2 + κ+ 1
κ2 + κ+ 4
, (2.69)
according to (2.50), we get
T1 = −z˜ (κω − 1)ω (κ− 1)
3κ(2κ+ 1)(κ5 + 4κ4 + 10κ3 + 8κ2 + 14κ+ 8)
(κ2 + κ+ 4)(κ4 + 2κ3 + 12κ2 + 8κ+ 4)
< 0.
Accounting for T1 < 0 and T2 < 0 we can thus conclude that dY
c/dnˆ > 0.
In a next step, we can now analyze the impact of an increase in nˆ on Y u. According to
(2.60), we can calculate
dY u
dnˆ
=
1
4b
wu
( a
wu
− 1
)2
+
1
4b
dwu
dwc
g(wc)
g′(wc)
[( a
wu
)2
− 1
]
. (2.70)
Substituting g(wc) and g′(wc) from above and accounting for κ = a/wu, we can show that
dY u/dnˆ >,=, < 0 is equivalent to
0 >,=, <z˜ω(κ− 1)dw
u
dwc
[ (
κ2 + κ− 2) (κ+ 1)− 2 (κ3 − 1) ]
+ (1− z˜)
[
dwu
dwc
(κ+ 1)
(
κ3ω3 − 3κω + 2)− 2ω (κ− 1) (κ3ω3 − 1)] (2.71)
and thus equivalent to 0 >,=, < T3 + T4, with
T3 ≡ z˜ dw
u
dwc
ω (κ− 1)
[ (
κ2 + κ− 2) (κ+ 1)− 2 (κ3 − 1) ] (2.72)
T4 ≡ (1− z˜)
[
dwu
dwc
(κ+ 1)
(
κ3ω3 − 3κω + 2)− 2ω (κ− 1) (κ3ω3 − 1)] (2.73)
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It is easily confirmed that T3 = −z˜κω (κ− 1)3 dwu/dwc < 0. Furthermore, substituting (2.66),
we can rewrite T4 in the following way
T4 = 2(1− z˜)ω (κω − 1)
[(
κ2 + κ+ 1
)
(κ+ 1)
(
κ2ω2 + κω − 2)
κ2ω + 2κω + 12ω − 2κ− 4 − (κ− 1)
(
κ2ω2 + κω + 1
)]
Rearranging terms and accounting for (2.69), we can simplify the latter to
T4 = −2(1− z˜)ω (κω − 1)
(κ− 1)2 κ (2κ8 + 7κ7 + 41κ6 + 107κ5 + 181κ4 + 206κ3 + 170κ2 + 64κ+ 32)
(κ2 + κ+ 4)
2
(κ4 + 2κ3 + 12κ2 + 8κ+ 4)
.
which is unambiguously negative. In view of T3 < 0 and T4 < 0, we can thus conclude that
dY u/dnˆ > 0.
In a final step, we now investigate the impact of trade on the firm scale differential. To study
this effect, we can note that
Ψ = Y c − Y u = nˆ
4b
[
wc
( a
wc
− 1
)2
− wu
( a
wu
− 1
)2]
(2.74)
Differentiating the latter, we obtain
dΨ
dnˆ
=
1
4b
[
wc
( a
wc
− 1
)2
− wu
( a
wu
− 1
)2]
+
1
4b
g(wc)
g′(wc)
{( a
wc
)2
− 1− dw
u
dwc
[( a
wu
)2
− 1
]}
(2.75)
Substituting for g(wc) and g′(wc) from above and accounting for κ = a/wu, we can conclude
that dΨ/dnˆ >,=, < 0 is equivalent to 0 >,=, < T5 + T6, with
T5 ≡z˜ω(κ− 1)
{(
κ2 + κ− 2) (κ2ω2 − 1)
− 2
(
κ2 + κ+ 1
) [
ω
(
κ2 + κ− 2) (κ2 − 1)+ 2 (κ2 + κ+ 1) (κ2ω − 1) (ω − 1) ]
κ2ω + 2κω + 12ω − 2κ− 4
}
(2.76)
and
T6 ≡(1− z˜) (κω − 1)
{(
κ2ω2 + κω − 2) (κ2ω2 − 1)− 2 (κ2ω2 + κω + 1) (κ2ω − 1) (ω − 1)
− 2ω
(
κ2 + κ+ 1
) (
κ2ω2 + κω − 2) (κ2 − 1)
κ2ω + 2κω + 12ω − 2κ− 4
}
(2.77)
respectively. Rearranging terms and accounting for (2.69), we can rewrite T5 and T6 in the
following way:
T5 = −z˜ ωκ
2(κ+ 2)2(κ− 1)4t5
(κ2 + κ+ 4)
2
(κ4 + 2κ3 + 12κ2 + 8κ+ 4)
T6 = −(1− z˜) 2κ
2 (κ+ 2)
2
(κ− 1)3 (κω − 1) t6
(κ2 + κ+ 4)
4
(κ4 + 2κ3 + 12κ2 + 8κ+ 4)
30 CHAPTER 2. LABOR UNIONS AND MULTI-PRODUCT FIRMS
with
t5 ≡ 2κ5 + 8κ4 + 11κ3 + 16κ2 + 10κ+ 16
and
t6 ≡ 4κ9 + 22κ8 + 92κ7 + 255κ6 + 475κ5 + 719κ4 + 720κ3 + 610κ2 + 296κ+ 128.
Since t5, t6 > 0, we have T5, T6 < 0 and thus dΨ/dnˆ > 0, which confirms that the respective
insight from the main text is not specific to the cost structure, we have chosen in the main text.
2.5.2 Extension – Firm level unions
Firm-level unions maximize objective function
Ωj =
1
4b(1− ρ)
[
wuj − wc
]
wuj
[
eδ
u
j − 1
]2
(2.78)
instead of (2.10). Furthermore, when setting the wage, unions take wages in other firms as
given, but at the same time account for the impact of their wage choice on scale and scope of
the own firm in the output competition with the other producers. Since the union anticipates
that a higher wage choice worsens the firm’s position in the output competition, there exists an
additional strategic effect if firm-level instead of sector-level unions are accounted for. For that
reason, we have to solve for firm scale and scope as a function of the own and the competitors’
wage before we can solve for the Ω-maximizing wj-level. Imposing the standard assumption
that the union treats all other unions symmetrically, we can solve for firm scale of firm j and
k 6= j. Accounting for Y = Xuj + (n − 1)Xuk in (2.6) and adding over all varieties of j and k,
respectively, we obtain
Xuj =
δuj a− wuj
(
eδ
u
j − 1
)
− δuj (n− 1)bρXuk
2b(1− ρ) + 2δuj bρ
, Xuk =
δuka− wuk
(
eδ
u
k − 1)− δuk bρXuj
2b(1− ρ) + nδuk bρ
. (2.79)
In a similar vein, we can use (2.7) to calculate
eδ
u
j =
a− 2bρXuj − (n− 1)bρXuk
wuj
, eδ
u
k =
a− nbρXuk − bρXuj
wuk
(2.80)
for the scope of firm j and k 6= j, respectively. Rearranging terms the latter can be rewritten as
Xuj =
a− neδuj wj + (n− 1)eδukwuk
bρ(n+ 1)
, Xuk =
a+ eδ
u
j wuj − 2eδ
u
kwuk
bρ(n+ 1)
. (2.81)
And substituting (2.81) into (2.79), we obtain a system of two equations, which implicitly
determines δuj and δ
u
k as functions of w
u
j and w
u
k , respectively. To be more specific, we get
Γ1(δ
u
j , δ
u
k ;w
u
j , w
u
k ) ≡ 2a(1− ρ)− [ρ(n+ 1)]wuj + [3ρn− 2n+ ρ]wuj eδ
u
j
− [ρ(n+ 1)]wuj δuj eδ
u
j + 2(1− ρ)(n− 1)eδukwk = 0, (2.82)
Γ2(δ
u
j , δ
u
k ;w
u
j , w
u
k ) ≡ 2a(1− ρ)− ρ(n+ 1)wuk + eδ
u
kwuk [ρ(n+ 1)− 4(1− ρ)]
− δkeδ
u
kwuk [ρ(n+ 1)] + 2(1− ρ)eδ
u
j wuj = 0.
(2.83)
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Differentiating system (2.82) and (2.83), and setting dwk = 0, we obtain:
∂Γ1
∂wj
dwj +
∂Γ1
∂δj
dδj +
∂Γ1
∂δk
dδk +
∂Γ1
∂wk
dwk = 0 ⇒ ∂Γ1
∂δj
dδj
dwj
+
∂Γ1
∂δk
dδk
dwj
= −∂Γ1
∂wj
and
∂Γ2
∂wj
dwj +
∂Γ2
∂δj
dδj +
∂Γ2
∂δk
dδk +
∂Γ2
∂wk
dwk = 0 ⇒ ∂Γ2
∂δj
dδj
dwj
+
∂Γ2
∂δk
dδk
dwj
= −∂Γ2
∂wj
.
Applying Cramer’s rule, we obtain after tedious but straightforward calculations
dδuj
dwuj
=
[ρ(n + 1)δuj e
δu
j + ρ(n + 1)− (3ρn− 2n + ρ)eδ
u
j ][4(ρ− 1)− ρ(n + 1)δuk ] + [4(1− ρ)
2(n− 1)eδ
u
j ]
wuj e
δu
j [2n(ρ− 1)− ρ(n + 1)δuj ][4(ρ− 1)− ρ(n + 1)δ
u
k ]− 4(1− ρ)
2(n− 1)wuj e
δu
j
,
which we need for determining the Ωj-maximizing wage rate. The latter is characterized by the
first-order condition
dΩj
dwuj
=
eδ
u
j − 1
4b(1− ρ)
[(
2wuj − wc
) (
eδ
u
j − 1
)
+ 2
(
wuj − wc
)
wuj e
δuj
dδuj
dwuj
]
= 0. (2.84)
Substituting for dδuj /dw
u
j and, in view of our symmetry assumption, setting w
u
j = w
u
k , we can
calculate
wu = wc
[
1− 1
2
[
eδ
u − 1]
eδu − 1 +G(δu)
]
, (2.85)
with G(δu) ≡ wuj eδ
u
j × dδuj /dwuj . Setting ρ = 0, gives G(δu) = −eδ
u
and thus
wu =
wc
2
[
eδ
u
+ 1
]
, (2.86)
according to (2.85). Accounting for eδ
u
= a/wu, according to (2.7), it is then immediate that in
the benchmark model with ρ = 0, firm-level unions set the same wage as sector-level unions (see
(2.11)) and, hence, there is no difference between the two settings in this special case. This result
is intuitive as ρ = 0 implies perfect product differentiation, so that firms act as monopolists in
any of their submarkets. However, facing a monopolist, the level of centralization in union wage
setting (firm-level vs. sector-level) becomes irrelevant. In the more general case with ρ > 0, the
autarky equilibrium values of wc, wu, δc, δu, andXc,Xu are implicitly given by (2.7) – separately
for u and c –, (2.12), (2.85), and, setting δj = δk in (2.81),
27
Xu =
a− eδuwu
bρ(n+ 1)
, Xc =
a− eδcwc
bρ(n+ 1)
. (2.87)
Having solved for these variables, we can easily calculate ω, ∆, and Ψ as well as the total number
of available product varieties N .
Similar to the main text, we can now analyze the comparative-static effects of deunionization
on the main variables of interest. However, since the firm-level union scenario turns out to be
much more complicated than the sector-level union scenario from the main text, we cannot rely
on analytical tools but instead have to conduct numerical simulation experiments in order to
gain insights into the respective effects. The following table summarizes the main insights from
these experiments.
27Notably, (2.87) can also be inferred from (2.8), when substituting eδj(z) (δj(z)− 1) + 1 =[
a/w(z)− eδj(z)
]
/φ, according to (2.9).
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wc wu δc δu Xc Xu ω ∆ Ξ N
z˜ = 0.1 66.57 75.16 0.202 0.156 3.87 2.53 1.13 0.047 1.34 0.9848
z˜ = 0.3 64.82 73.76 0.211 0.163 4.16 2.74 1.14 0.048 1.42 0.9834
z˜ = 0.5 62.87 72.20 0.221 0.171 4.48 2.98 1.15 0.050 1.51 0.9830
Parameter values are a = 100, b = 1, ρ = 0.8, n = 5, L = 20.
Table 2.2: Autarky equilibrium variables for different levels of z˜ with firm-level unions
The results in Table 2.2 indicate that the main results regarding the impact of deunionization
on multi-product firms extend to the case of firm-level unions. Deunionization increases labor
demand and thus provides a stimulus for the wage rate in unionized and non-unionized industries.
This wage increase render the shortening of the product range attractive and thus induce a
decline in δc and δu. Total firm scale declines in all industries except of the newly deunionized
ones. Regarding the impact of deunionization on relative firm performance, we see from Table 2.2
that the union wage premium falls in response to deunionization and this effect is instrumental
for a decline in the scale and scope differential between non-unionized and unionized firms.
Finally, while the figures in Table 2.2 suggest a positive impact of deunionization on the total
number of available varieties, we are able to show that the respective impact is non-monotonic.
For sufficiently high levels of z˜, (marginal) deunionization exerts a negative impact on N .28
In a final step, we now look at the open economy. Following the analysis from the closed
economy, it is easily confirmed that the open economy equilibrium is characterized by (2.41) –
again separately for u and c –, (2.46), (2.85), and
Xut = 2
a− eδuwu
bρ(n+ 1)
, Xct = 2
a− eδcwc
bρ(n+ 1)
, (2.88)
where subscript t refers to trade. Similar to the model variant with sector-level unions, trade
provides a labor demand stimulus and thus raises wc. Regarding the unionized wage there is
a counteracting effect, as trade lowers the unions scope for setting excess wages. While with
sector-level unions the latter effect may be strong enough to induce an overall fall of union wages
in response to trade liberalization, there is a presumption from previous work on SPF that such
an outcome is not possible if unions are organized at the firm level (see Bastos and Kreickemeier,
2009). The results from our numerical simulation exercise provide support for this difference and
indicate that union wages increase along with the competitive wage in response to a country’s
movement from autarky to free trade with a symmetric partner country if unions are organized
at the firm level (see Table 2.3). The wage increase triggers a fall in firm scope in all industries,
while output increases in unionized but not necessarily in non-unionized industries. Finally, the
impact of trade on the relative performance of unionized and non-unionized firms remains the
same as in the model variant with sector-level unions. This can be confirmed by comparing the
figures in Tables 2.1 and 2.3.
28The N -levels for z˜ = 0.99, z˜ = 0.95 and z˜ = 0.9 are 0.985671, 0.985287, and 0.98484, respectively.
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wut − wua wct − wca δut − δua δct − δca Dut −Dua Dct −Dca Xut −Xua Xct −Xca
z˜ = 0.1 2.68 5.3 -0.04 -0.06 -1.11 -1.91 0.32 0.05
z˜ = 0.3 3.04 5.83 -0.04 -0.07 -1.22 -2.08 0.29 -0.01
z˜ = 0.5 3.48 6.47 -0.05 -0.07 -1.36 -2.29 0.25 -0.09
Notes: D denotes domestic firm-level output and subscripts a, t refer to autarky and trade
variables, respectively. Parameter values are a = 100, b = 1, ρ = 0.8, n = 5, L = 20.
Table 2.3: Trade effects on wages, scope and scale for different degrees of unionization and
firm-level unions
2.5.3 Program codes for simulation exercises
All simulation exercises has been executed in Mathematica.
Program code for Table 2.1
In the following we offer the source code to derive the reported values from Table 2.1. At first,
we set the parameter values: a = 100, b = 1, ρ = 0.8, n = 5, L = 20, which determines
φ = ρ(n + 1)/[2(1 − ρ)] and set the share of unionized industry equal to z˜ = 0.1, z˜ = 0.3 or
z˜ = 0.5.29
a=100;1
b=1;2
ρ=0.8;3
n=5;4
L=20;5
φ=(ρ(n+1))/(2(1-ρ));6
z=0.1; (* z=0.3 ; z=0.5 *)7
In a next step we use Equations (2.9), (2.11) and (2.12) to define
g1=0.5*wc+a(1-wc/wu)/((Exp[δu]-1)(1+φδu));8
g2=Log[((a/wu)-φ)/(1+φδu-φ)];9
g3=Log[((a/wc)-φ)/(1+φδc-φ)];10
g4=(4*b(1-ρ)L/n-z*wu(Exp[δu]-1) 2ˆ)/((1-z)(Exp[δc]-1) 2ˆ);11
where wu denotes the union wage, wc the competitive wage, δu firm scope in unionized and δc
in non-unionized sectors. To solve the autarky situation, we use the FindRoot command and
print the variables of interest:
B=FindRoot[{wu==g1,δu==g2,δc==g3,wc==g4},{wc, 75},{wu, 89},{δc, 0.15},{δu,12
0.1}];13
Print["Union wage autarky: ", wu1=g1/.B];14
Print["Scope unionized autarky: ", δu1=g2/.B];15
Print["Scope non-unionized autarky: ", δc1=g3/.B];16
Print["Competitive wage rate autarky: ", wc1=g4/.B];17
29In the source code, we use z instead z˜ to save on notation.
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Print["Scale unionized autarky: ", Du=(wu1(Exp[δu1](δu1-1)+1))/(2b(1-ρ))];18
Print["Scale non-unionized autarky: ", Dc=(wc1(Exp[δc1](δc1-1)+1))/(2b(1-ρ))];19
In a next step we use Equations (2.44), (2.41) and (2.46) from the open economy to define
Hδut=20
21
((φ+(1+φ*δut-φ)Exp[δut])(1+φ*δut)-((ρ*n) 2ˆ*δut(Exp[δut](δut-1)+1))/(4(1-ρ) 2ˆ))/22
((1+φδut) 2ˆ-((ρ*n) 2ˆ*δut 2ˆ)/(4(1-ρ) 2ˆ));23
g10=wct(1+(0.5(Exp[δut]-1))/(1-Exp[δut]+Hδut));24
g20=Log[(a/wut-φ((2n+1)/(n+1)))/(1+((2n+1)/(n+1))(φ*δut-φ))];25
g30=Log[(a/wct-φ((2n+1)/(n+1)))/(1+((2n+1)/(n+1))(φ*δct-φ))];26
g40=(2*b(1-ρ)L/n-z*wut(Exp[δut]-1) 2ˆ)/((1-z)(Exp[δct]-1) 2ˆ);27
where the letter t added to wu, wc, δu and δc refers to trade. To solve the open economy
situation, we use the FindRoot command and print the variables of interest:
B=FindRoot[{wut==g10,δut==g20,δct==g30,wct==g40},{wct, 75},{wut, 89},{δct,28
0.15},{δut, 0.1}];29
Print["Union wage trade: ", wut1=g10/.B];30
Print["Scope unionized trade: ", δut1=g20/.B];31
Print["Scope non-unionized trade: ", δct1=g30/.B];32
Print["Competitive wage rate trade: ", wct1=g40/.B];33
Print["Scale home unionized trade: ",34
Dut=(wut1(Exp[δut1](δut1-1)+1))/(2*b(1-ρ))];35
Print["Scale home non-unionized trade: ",36
Dct=(wct1(Exp[δct1](δct1-1)+1))/(2*b(1-ρ))];37
Print["Scale unionized trade: ", Xut=(wut1(Exp[δut1](δut1-1)+1))/(b(1-ρ))];38
Print["Scale non-unionized trade: ",39
Xct=(wct1(Exp[δct1](δct1-1)+1))/(b(1-ρ))];40
Finally, we compare the free trade with the closed economy variables, to derive the values as
reported in Table 2.1.
Print["Impact on union wage: ", Round[wut1-wu1,0.01]];41
Print["Impact on competitive wage: ", Round[wct1-wc1,0.01]];42
Print["Impact on scope unionized: ", Round[δut1-δu1,0.01]];43
Print["Impact on scope non-unionized: ", Round[δct1-δc1,0.01]];44
Print["Impact on scale home unionized: ", Round[Dut-Du,0.01]];45
Print["Impact on scale home non-unionized: ", Round[Dct-Dc1,0.01]];46
Print["Impact on scale unionized: ", Round[Xut-Du,0.01]];47
Print["Impact on scale non-unionized: ", Round[Xct-Dc,0.01]];48
Program code for Table 2.2
In the following we offer the source code to derive the reported values from Table 2.2. At first,
we set the parameter values: a = 100, b = 1, ρ = 0.8, n = 5, L = 20, which determines
φ = ρ(n + 1)/[2(1 − ρ)] and set the share of unionized industry equal to z˜ = 0.1, z˜ = 0.3 or
z˜ = 0.5.
Clear["Global‘*"];1
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a=100;2
b=1;3
ρ=0.8;4
n=5;5
L=20;6
φ=(ρ(n+1))/(2(1-ρ));7
z=0.1; (* z=0.3 ; z=0.5 *)8
In a next step we use Equations (2.9), (2.85) and (2.12) to define
Gδu=9
(((ρ(n+1))(Exp[δu]δu+1)-(3*ρ*n-2*ρ*n)Exp[δu])(4(ρ-1)-ρ(n+1)δu)+10
4(1-ρ) 2ˆ(n-1)Exp[δu])/ ((2*n(ρ-1)-ρ(n+1)δu)(4(ρ-1)-(ρ(n+1)δu))-4(1-ρ) 2ˆ(n-1));11
g1=wc(1-0.5(Exp[δu]-1)/(Exp[δu]-1+Gδu));12
g2=Log[(a/wu-φ)/(1+φδu-φ)];13
g3=Log[(a/wc-φ)/(1+φδc-φ)];14
g4=(4*b(1-ρ)L/n-z*wu(Exp[δu]-1) 2ˆ)/((1-z)(Exp[δc]-1) 2ˆ);15
To solve the autarky situation, we use the FindRoot command and print the variables of interest,
that are listed in Table 2.2:
B=FindRoot[{wu==g1,δu==g2,δc==g3,wc==g4},{wc, 40},{wu, 50},{δc, 0.15},{δu,16
0.1}];17
Print["Competitive wage: ", wc1=g4/.B];18
Print["Union wage: ", wu1=g1/.B];19
Print["Scope non-unionized: ", δc1=g3/.B];20
Print["Scope unionized: ", δu1=g2/.B];21
Print["Scale non-unionized: ", Xc=(wc1(Exp[δc1](δc1-1)+1))/(2*b(1-ρ))];22
Print["Scale unionized: ", Xu=(wu1(Exp[δu1](δu1-1)+1))/(2*b(1-ρ))];23
Print["Union wage premium: ", ω=wu1/wc1];24
Print["Scope Differential: ", Δ=δc1-δu1];25
Print["Scale Differential: ", Ξ=Xc-Xu];26
Print["Number of varieties: ", Nt=z*n*δu1+(1-z)n*δc1];27
Program code for Table 2.3
In the following we offer the source code to derive the reported values from Table 2.3. At first,
we set the parameter values: a = 100, b = 1, ρ = 0.8, n = 5, L = 20, which determines
φ = ρ(n + 1)/[2(1 − ρ)] and set the share of unionized industry equal to z˜ = 0.1, z˜ = 0.3 or
z˜ = 0.5.
Clear["Global‘*"];1
a=100;2
b=1;3
ρ=0.8;4
n=5;5
L=20;6
φ=(ρ(n+1))/(2(1-ρ));7
z=0.1; (* z=0.3 ; z=0.5 *)8
In a next step we use Equations (2.9), (2.85) and (2.12) to define
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Gδu=9
(((ρ(n+1))(Exp[δu]δu+1)-(3*ρ*n-2*ρ*n)Exp[δu])(4(ρ-1)-ρ(n+1)δu)+10
4(1-ρ) 2ˆ(n-1)Exp[δu])/ ((2*n(ρ-1)-ρ(n+1)δu)(4(ρ-1)-(ρ(n+1)δu))-4(1-ρ) 2ˆ(n-1));11
g1=wc(1-0.5(Exp[δu]-1)/(Exp[δu]-1+Gδu));12
g2=Log[(a/wu-φ)/(1+φδu-φ)];13
g3=Log[(a/wc-φ)/(1+φδc-φ)];14
g4=(4*b(1-ρ)L/n-z*wu(Exp[δu]-1) 2ˆ)/((1-z)(Exp[δc]-1) 2ˆ);15
To solve the autarky situation, we use the FindRoot command and print the variables of interest:
B=FindRoot[{wu==g1,δu==g2,δc==g3,wc==g4},{wc, 40},{wu, 50},{δc, 0.15},{δu,16
0.1}];17
Print["Union wage autarky: ", wu1=g1/.B];18
Print["Scope unionized: ", δu1=g2/.B];19
Print["Scope non-unionized: ", δc1=g3/.B];20
Print["Competitive wage autarky: ", wc1=g4/.B];21
Print["Scale unionized autarky: ", Du=(wu1(Exp[δu1](δu1-1)+1))/(2*b(1-ρ))];22
Print["Scale non-unionized autarky: ",23
Dc=(wc1(Exp[δc1](δc1-1)+1))/(2*b(1-ρ))];24
In a next step we use Equations (2.41), (2.46) and (2.85) to define
Gδut=25
(((ρ(2n+1))(Exp[δut]δut+1)-(6*ρ*n-4*ρ*n)Exp[δut])(4(ρ-1)-ρ(2*n+1)δut)26
+4(1-ρ) 2ˆ(2*n-1)Exp[δut])/27
((4*n(ρ-1)-ρ(2*n+1)δut)(4(ρ-1)-(ρ(2*n+1)δut))-4(1-ρ) 2ˆ(2*n-1));28
g10=wct(1-0.5(Exp[δut]-1))/(Exp[δut]-1+Gδut);29
g20=Log[(a/wut-φ((2*n+1)/(n+1)))/(1+((2n+1)/(n+1))φδut-φ)];30
g30=Log[(a/wct-φ((2*n+1)/(n+1)))/(1+((2n+1)/(n+1))φδct-φ)];31
g40=(2*b(1-ρ)L/n-z*wut(Exp[δut]-1) 2ˆ)/((1-z)(Exp[δct]-1) 2ˆ);32
To solve the open economy situation, we use the FindRoot command and print the variables of
interest:
B=FindRoot[{wut==g10,δut==g20,δct==g30,wct==g40},{wct, 40},{wut, 50},{δct,33
0.15},{δut, 0.1}];34
Print["Union wage trade: ", wut1=g10/.B];35
Print["Scope unionized trade: ", δut1=g20/.B];36
Print["Scope non-unionized trade: ", δct1=g30/.B];37
Print["Competitive wage rate trade: ", wct1=g40/.B];38
Print["Scale home unionized trade: ",39
Dut=(wut1(Exp[δut1](δut1-1)+1))/(2*b(1-ρ))];40
Print["Scale home non-unionized trade: ",41
Dct=(wct1(Exp[δct1](δct1-1)+1))/(2*b(1-ρ))];42
Print["Scale unionized trade: ", Xut=(wut1(Exp[δut1](δut1-1)+1))/(b(1-ρ))];43
Print["Scale non-unionized trade: ",44
Xct=(wct1(Exp[δct1](δct1-1)+1))/(b(1-ρ))];45
Finally, we compare the free trade with the closed economy variables, to derive the values as
reported in Table 2.1.
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Print["Impact on union wage: ", Round[wut1-wu1,0.01]];46
Print["Impact on competitive wage: ", Round[wct1-wc1,0.01]];47
Print["Impact on scope unionized: ", Round[δut1-δu1,0.01]];48
Print["Impact on scope non-unionized: ", Round[δct1-δc1,0.01]];49
Print["Impact on scale home unionized: ", Round[Dut-Du,0.01]];50
Print["Impact on scale home non-unionized: ", Round[Dct-Dc1,0.01]];51
Print["Impact on scale unionized: ", Round[Xut-Du,0.01]];52
Print["Impact on scale non-unionized: ", Round[Xct-Dc,0.01]];53
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Chapter 3
Trade and the Firm-Internal
Allocation of Workers to Tasks
3.1 Introduction
In any industrialized economy, labor markets have to solve the complex problem of matching
task-specific skill requirements and worker-specific abilities. The outcome of this matching
process is typically not efficient. This is not only because some workers do not find a job at
all. Rather, a significant share of workers cannot exploit full productivity because they are not
matched with the best occupation (see Legros and Newman, 2002; Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011).
In recent years, this source of inefficiency has also sparked considerable attention in the trade
literature. With an increasing general interest in the consequences of trade for underemployment,
several authors have highlighted improvements in matching quality as a key aspect of gains
from trade in terms of both welfare and employment (Amiti and Pissarides, 2005; Davidson,
Matusz, and Shevchenko, 2008; Larch and Lechthaler, 2011). Thereby, the typical approach is
to associate the quality of the matching process with its ability to match heterogeneous workers
with heterogeneous firms in an efficient way, assuming implicitly that the production process
covers just a single task with a certain skill requirement. However, this ignores the sophisticated
structure of modern production processes and thus misses an important role of firms in reducing
the requirement-ability mismatch by improving the assignment of workers to specific tasks within
the boundaries of a single production entity.1
Studying the role of firms for matching workers with tasks and discussing how access to
trade affects the matching outcome is the main purpose of this chapter. Starting point of our
analysis is a Melitz (2003) model, in which firms are heterogeneous due to differences in their
productivity levels. As in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we assume that production consists
of a continuum of tasks that differ in their skill requirements. For performing these tasks,
firms hire heterogeneous workers. Heterogeneity is horizontal in the sense that workers differ
in their ability to perform specific tasks because their human capital is occupation-specific (see
1The idea that the quality of worker-task matches are important for firm performance at least dates back to
work by Barron and Loewenstein (1985) and Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989). Meyer (1994) points to
the relevance of optimal task assignment in the context of team production. Burgess, Propper, Ratto, von Hinke
Kessler Scholder, and Tominey (2010) show that productivity losses from a mismatch of workers and tasks in
teams can indeed be significant and that one important channel through which incentive payments to managers
can improve the outcome of production units is the better assignment of workers to tasks.
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Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Sullivan, 2010, for empirical evidence), while they are equally
productive over the whole range of activities. This implies that all workers have the same value
to firms and, lacking information about abilities of individual workers, firms randomly draw their
employees from the labor supply pool. This lack of information generates a source of mismatch
between task-specific skill requirements and worker-specific abilities within the boundaries of
a production unit. To reduce this mismatch, firms can invest into a screening technology for
gathering some (imperfect) information about the abilities of their workforce. We model the
screening investment in a rudimentary way, allowing for two possible interpretations that are
common in the literature. On the one hand, screening may be part of the recruitment process as
in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) and can help narrowing the pool of suitable applicants.
On the other hand, screening may take place after the recruitment of workers, for instance, in
the form of job rotation (see Li and Tian, 2013).2 In both interpretations, a higher investment
provides better knowledge about the abilities of workers and therefore leads to a better match
of these workers with the different tasks in the production process (cf. Pellizzari, 2011). The
incentives to screen are more pronounced in larger firms, and hence there is an additional source
of heterogeneity in our model, which is endogenous and reinforces heterogeneity of firms due to
exogenous differences in firm productivity.
We use this model to shed new light on the consequences of trade for labor market outcome,
thereby focussing on adjustments in the firm-internal labor market.3 To be more specific, we
are interested in how trade affects underemployment arising from a mismatch between worker-
specific abilities and task-specific skill requirements. To keep the analysis simple, we focus on
trade between symmetric countries and consider the empirically relevant case, in which only the
most productive firms export in the open economy (see, for instance, Bernard and Jensen, 1995,
1999). Having access to the export market, high-productivity firms can expand their market
share in the open economy, which provides an incentive for these firms to screen their workforce
more intensively, as this further improves the matching quality and thus lowers production
costs. Low-productivity non-exporters, on the other hand, lose market share and thus lower
their investment into the screening technology, which raises their production costs. By changing
the cost structure, this asymmetric response to trade liberalization exerts a feedback effect
on the entry/exit decision of firms in both the domestic and the export market, which is not
present in other trade models with heterogeneous firms. Furthermore, it alters the productivity
distribution of active firms by driving a wedge between matching efficiency of exporters and non-
exporters. This provides an alternative to the ‘learning-by-exporting’ hypothesis for explaining
the empirical finding that firms become more productive when entering the export market
(see Fryges and Wagner, 2008).4 Finally, adjustments in the firm-internal labor allocation
process lower the aggregate mismatch between worker-specific abilities and task-specific skill
requirements, thereby generating a productivity stimulus that reinforces the gains from trade in
an otherwise identical Melitz (2003) model. The firm-level adjustments to trade liberalization
2The literature distinguishes three motives for job rotation: employee learning (job rotation as a training
device); employee motivation (job rotation makes work more interesting) and employer learning (job rotation as
a way to discover in which jobs different employees are best at). Our model is in line with the ‘employer learning’
view, which was first discussed by Ortega (2001). Empirical support for this motive is provided by Eriksson and
Ortega (2006).
3According to Doeringer and Piore (1971) an internal labor market is “an administrative unit, such as a
manufacturing plant, within which the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules
and procedures. [... This market] is to be distinguished from the external labor market of conventional economic
theory where pricing, allocating and training decisions are controlled directly by economic variables” (pp. 1f).
4Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Wagner (2007) summarize existing empirical evidence regarding the
feedback effects of exporting on firm productivity. Our reading of the literature is that there is some support for
such a positive feedback effect, but not all existing studies can identify a significant impact.
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are not so different, in principle, from the adjustments in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding
(2010). In their model, firms can invest into a screening technology in order to receive a more
precise signal about the quality of applicants. More specifically, screening allows the firm to
detect (and reject) applicants below a certain ability threshold. The higher the investment, the
more effective is screening and the higher is the average ability of workers employed by the firm.
The screening investment is endogenous and responds to trade in a similar way as the screening
investment does in our model. It increases in exporting firms and shrinks in non-exporting ones.
Aside from these similarities, there is a crucial difference between the focus of Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding (2010) and the focus of this chapter. Whereas Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding
(2010) study imperfections in the external labor market, we are interested in the firm-internal
allocation of workers. To be more explicit, in our setting all workers are equally valuable to
firms and only differ in their ability to perform specific tasks, whereas workers in Helpman,
Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) differ in the productivity they can elicit in a firm of a specific
type. Hence, there is an efficiency loss in the Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) model,
because firms are not matched with the ideal worker, while there is an efficiency loss in our
setting, because workers do not perfectly fit the skill requirements of tasks they are performing
within the boundaries of a firm.
By opening up the black box of production and modeling explicitly the firm-internal labor
allocation process, our model not only identifies a new channel through which positive trade
effects can materialize, but also contributes to a growing literature on the role of globalization for
firm organization. A first line of research in this literature has pointed to the role of openness for
the boundaries of firms (see Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Antra´s, 2003; Antra´s and Helpman,
2004; Conconi, Legros, and Newman, 2012). In contrast to these studies, we focus on the
question how trade changes the organization of labor within these boundaries. This renders
our analysis akin to Marin and Verdier (2008a, 2012) who investigate the impact of trade on
the hierarchy structure in firms and the incentives to empower human capital. The hierarchy
structure of firms is also addressed by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) who analyze how
access to exporting changes the number of layers of management.5 In contrast to all of these
studies, we do not look on changes in the hierarchy structure but on matching quality, so that
our findings are complementary to the results in this literature. Finally, the key mechanism
discussed in this chapter differs from a pure division of labor effect, which arises if there is a
change in the number of tasks performed by a single worker (Becker and Murphy, 1992) or a
team of workers (Chaney and Ossa, 2013). In our setting, it is not the number of tasks performed
by a single worker but rather the matching of workers with these tasks that matters.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Chapter 3.2, we set up a baseline
model with a perfect labor market and characterize the equilibrium in the closed economy. In
Chapter 3.3, we consider trade between two symmetric countries, characterize the open economy
equilibrium, and investigate how a movement from autarky to trade affects the allocation of
labor ‘inside’ the firm as well as per capita income. We also shed light on the consequences of
marginal trade liberalization. In Chapter 3.4, we extend the baseline model to one with search
frictions in the hiring process and analyze how imperfections in the outside labor market alter
our insights regarding the impact of trade on the firm-internal organization of workers. Chapter
3.5 provides a calibration exercise that allows us to quantify the impact of trade on welfare and
underemployment. Chapter 3.6 concludes with a brief summary of the most important results.
5In a recent study, Sly (2012) investigates the composition of management teams and shows that trade can
alter this composition significantly.
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3.2 The closed economy
3.2.1 Model structure
We consider an economy that is populated by an exogenous mass of workers L, who supply
one unit of labor in a perfectly competitive labor market. There are two sectors of produc-
tion: a perfectly competitive final goods industry that produces a homogeneous output good by
assembling differentiated intermediate goods; and a monopolistically competitive intermediate
goods industry that hires labor for its production of differentiated goods. Similar to Egger and
Kreickemeier (2009, 2012), we represent the final goods technology by a constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) production function without external scale economies. To be more specific,
we assume that the technology for producing final output Y is given by
Y =
[
M−
1
σ
∫
ω∈Ω
x(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (3.1)
where x(ω) denotes the quantity of intermediate good ω used in the final goods production,M is
the Lebesgue measure of set Ω and represents the mass of available intermediate goods, and σ > 1
denotes the (constant) elasticity of substitution between different product varieties. Y serves as
nume´raire in our analysis, implying that the price index corresponding to the production function
in Eq. (3.1) is equal to one, by assumption. Denoting by p(ω) the price of intermediate good ω,
we can write total costs of producing output Y as follows:
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)x(ω)dω. Maximizing final
goods profits with respect to x(ω), then gives intermediate goods demand
x(ω) =
Y
M
p(ω)−σ. (3.2)
At the intermediate goods level, there is a continuum of firms, each of them supplying
a unique variety under monopolistic competition. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we
assume that intermediate goods production is a composite of different tasks. To be more specific,
there is a continuum of tasks that is represented by the unit interval. The production technology
is of the Cobb-Douglas type and given by
x(ω) = φ(ω) exp
[∫ 1
0
ln x(ω, i)di
]
, (3.3)
where x(ω, i) is the production level of task i in firm ω and φ(ω) is this firm’s baseline productiv-
ity. Task x(ω, i) is performed (produced) by workers who are employed in a linear-homogenous
production technology, which is the same for all tasks. To keep things simple, we assume that
task-level output is equal to the effective labor input: the mass of workers performing the task
multiplied by these workers’ average productivity. The productivity of workers in performing
a specific task differs, because workers differ in their abilities, whereas tasks differ in their skill
requirements. To capture this in a tractable way, we assume that both workers and tasks are
uniformly distributed along the unit interval, and the gap between ability and skill requirement
is measured by the distance of a worker to the task in the unit interval.
In the hiring process firms have to solve the problem of matching specific workers with
specific tasks, and this is essential because firms face an efficiency loss from mismatch if workers
do not end up in those occupations, in which they have the highest competence. The degree
of mismatch depends on the average distance between workers and tasks in a firm’s production
process. To determine this average distance, we can first note that the expected distance when
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randomly assigning workers from interval [0, b] to a task located at t ∈ [0, b] is given by
dist(t) =
1
b
[∫ t
0
(t− j)dj +
∫ b
t
(j − t)dj
]
=
1
b
(
t2 − tb+ b
2
2
)
, (3.4)
where j gives the location of workers in the considered interval. Accordingly, the expected
distance when drawing t randomly from interval [0, b] amounts to
d̂ist =
1
b2
∫ b
0
(
t2 − tb+ b
2
2
)
dt =
b
3
. (3.5)
From (3.5) it follows that the extent of mismatch crucially depends on the length of the interval,
b. We interpret b as the amount of information firms have about the location of workers in
the unit interval. Without screening, firms are uninformed about the specific abilities of their
applicants. Hence, they hire workers by randomly selecting them from the labor supply pool at
the common market-clearing wage rate w.6 This gives b = 1 and d̂ist = 1/3.
However, firms do not have to accept this outcome. They can reduce the efficiency loss from
mismatch by screening their applicants. Similar to Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010),
we associate the implementation of a screening technology with a fixed cost expenditure fµ =
[1+µ(ω)]γ and assume that screening provides an imprecise signal about worker ability, with the
quality of the signal increasing in screening effort µ(ω). To be more specific, by screening with
effort µ(ω), a firm can divide the ability interval into 1+µ(ω) segments of equal length. Firms can
then hire workers at the market-clearing wage rate, w, for a specific task by randomly selecting
them from the respective ability segment, so that the average distance between worker-specific
abilities and task-specific skill requirements reduces to d̂ist(ω) = (1/3) [1 + µ(ω)]
−1
.7
At the firm level, efficiency of workers in the performance of tasks is inversely related to
d̂ist(ω) and denoted by κ(ω). In the interest of analytical tractability, we choose a specific func-
tional form and capture the relationship between κ(ω) and d̂ist(ω) by κ(ω) ≡ (1/3)d̂ist(ω)−1.
This gives κ(ω) = 1 + µ(ω). Effective labor input at the task level is therefore given by
[1 + µ(ω)]l(ω) and, since tasks enter production function (3.3) symmetrically, total output of
firm ω can be written in the following way:
x(ω) = φ(ω) [1 + µ(ω)] l(ω). (3.6)
According to (3.6), firm productivity consists of two parts: an exogenous baseline productivity
φ(ω), which captures the efficiency of coordinating the bundle of different tasks within the
boundaries of the firm, and an endogenous productivity term κ(ω) = 1 + µ(ω), which captures
how effectively the heterogeneous abilities of workers are used for performing the different tasks
in the production process. Crucially, firms can increase their productivity by investing into a
screening technology which improves the matching quality in the firm-internal labor allocation
process and thus raises κ(ω).8
The baseline productivity is drawn by firms in a lottery from the common Pareto distribution,
G(φ) = 1−φ−ν . To participate in this lottery, firms have to pay a fee fe in units of final output
Y . This investment allows just a single draw and is immediately sunk. After productivity levels
6Due to symmetry, all workers receive the same wage in equilibrium, irrespective of their location in the ability
interval.
7We ignore integer problems and, due to symmetry, suppress task indices.
8This mechanism is not too different, in principle, from an R&D investment that lowers variable production
costs (see, for instance, Eckel, 2009).
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are revealed, producers decide upon setting up a plant and starting production. This involves
an additional fixed cost f (in units of final output) for setting up a local distribution network.
Only firms with a sufficiently high baseline productivity will pay this additional fixed cost and
start production, while firms with a low φ will stay out of the market. This two-stage entry
mechanism is similar to Melitz (2003), with two main differences. On the one hand, we consider
a static model variant along the lines of Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding (2010). On the other hand, firms can install a screening technology for improving
the quality of worker-task matches, by making an investment fµ which is endogenous.
3.2.2 Equilibrium in the closed economy
After the lottery, the baseline productivity is revealed, and the firm either stays out of the
market or it decides to produce, sets its employment level l(ω) and chooses its screening effort
µ(ω) to maximize profits
pi(ω) = p(ω)x(ω)− wl(ω)− [1 + µ(ω)]γ − f (3.7)
subject to (3.2), (3.6), and a set of common non-negativity constraints. The (interior) solution
to this maximization problem is given by the two first-order conditions:
pil(ω) =
σ − 1
σ
p(ω)φ(ω) [1 + µ(ω)]− w = 0, (3.8)
piµ(ω) =
σ − 1
σ
p(ω)l(ω)φ(ω)− γ [1 + µ(ω)]γ−1 = 0. (3.9)
Being interested in interior solutions, we must ensure that all firms find it attractive to implement
a screening technology. Intuitively, this requires that the costs of screening applicants must be
small relative to production fixed costs f . To put it more formally, all firms find it attractive
to screen their applicants at least a little bit if (1 + f)(σ − 1) > γ. Furthermore, to avoid that
(all) firms make an infinitively high investment into screening, the additional costs of further
increasing the screening effort must exceed the additional benefits of doing so at high levels of
µ(ω), which is the case if γ > σ − 1. In the appendix, we derive the two conditions and show
that for the respective parameter domain, pi(ω) has a unique interior maximum in (l, µ)-space.
With these insights at hand, we can proceed with rewriting first-order condition (3.8) as
follows:
p(ω) =
σ
σ − 1
w
φ(ω) [1 + µ(ω)]
. (3.10)
Hence, in line with textbook models of monopolistic competition, firms set prices as a constant
markup on marginal costs, which in our setting are inversely related to the firms’ screening effort
µ(ω). First-order condition (3.9) determines the profit-maximizing screening effort µ(ω), and
accounting for (3.6), we can reformulate the respective condition to
r(ω) =
σγ
σ − 1 [1 + µ(ω)]
γ
, (3.11)
where r(ω) = p(ω)x(ω) denotes revenues of firm ω. Eq. (3.11) establishes a positive relationship
between firm-level revenues and screening expenditures. Combining (3.2), (3.10), and (3.11), we
get:
r(ω1)
r(ω2)
=
(
1 + µ(ω1)
1 + µ(ω2)
)γ
,
r(ω1)
r(ω2)
=
(
φ(ω2) [1 + µ(ω2)]
φ(ω1) [1 + µ(ω1)]
)1−σ
. (3.12)
3.2. THE CLOSED ECONOMY 45
These two expressions jointly determine relative screening effort and relative revenues of firms
1 and 2 as functions of these firms’ baseline productivity ratio. This implies that heterogeneity
of the two firms is fully characterized by their baseline productivity differential, and we can
therefore use productivity φ to index firms from now on. Hence, we can rewrite (3.12) in the
following way:
1 + µ(φ1)
1 + µ(φ2)
=
(
φ1
φ2
) σ−1
γ−σ+1
,
r(φ1)
r(φ2)
=
(
φ1
φ2
) γ(σ−1)
γ−σ+1
. (3.13)
Since γ > σ−1 is a prerequisite for finite screening investment, we can conclude that in an interior
equilibrium firms with higher φ-levels make higher revenues and choose a higher screening effort.
This is well in line with evidence, for example, by Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1987), who
document a positive relationship between expenditures in screening workers and employer size.
Furthermore, the model is also consistent with the finding that workers are more productive
in larger firms (see Idson and Oi, 1999), pointing to the role of better matching quality for
explaining this size differential.
To separate active from inactive firms we can characterize a marginal producer, who is
indifferent between starting production and remaining inactive. We denote the productivity of
this firm by φ∗, which we refer to by the term cutoff productivity level. The zero-cutoff profit
condition, which characterizes this firm, is given by r(φ∗)/σ = f+[1 + µ(φ∗)]
γ
. We can combine
this indifference condition with (3.11) to explicitly solve for screening effort and revenues of the
marginal producer:
1 + µ(φ∗) =
(
f(σ − 1)
γ − σ + 1
) 1
γ
, r(φ∗) =
σγf
γ − σ + 1 . (3.14)
In view of (3.13) and (3.14), we can calculate average profits of active producers, p¯i. Defining
ξ ≡ γ(σ − 1)/(γ − σ + 1) , we obtain9
p¯i =
fξ
ν − ξ , (3.15)
where ν > ξ is assumed to ensure a finite positive level of p¯i. Furthermore, free entry into the
productivity lottery requires that, in equilibrium, the expected return to entry (1−G(φ∗)) p¯i
equals the participation fee fe. Therefore, the free entry condition in our static model reads
p¯i = fe(φ
∗)ν . (3.16)
Together, Eqs. (3.15) and (3.16) determine p¯i and φ∗. This completes the characterization of
firm-level variables in the closed economy, and we can now turn to studying the main economy-
wide variables of interest: welfare and underemployment, arising from the firm-internal mismatch
of workers and tasks.
With just a single consumption good, per-capita income is a suitable measure for utilitarian
welfare. Since aggregate profits equal total expenditures for the lottery participation fee and the
price of final output equals one, according to our choice of nume´raire, per-capita income equals
wage rate w in our setting. To solve for the wage rate, we can combine r(φ∗) = p(φ∗)x(φ∗) and
Y = Mr(φ∗)ν/(ν − ξ). Substituting (3.2) and (3.10) and accounting for (3.14)-(3.16), we can
calculate
w =
σ − 1
σ
(
ν
ν − ξ
) 1
σ−1
[1 + µ(φ∗)]φ∗ =
σ − 1
σ
(
ν
ν − ξ
) 1
σ−1
(
fξ
fe(ν − ξ)
) 1
ν
(
fξ
γ
) 1
γ
. (3.17)
9Derivation details are deferred to the appendix.
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According to (3.17), our model gives rise to the somewhat counter-intuitive results that an in-
crease in production fixed costs f provides a stimulus for per-capita income (and thus utilitarian
welfare). The reason for this outcome is that firm entry exerts a negative externality on the
output of incumbent firms, who end up being too small relative to the social optimum. In other
models of monopolistic competition, this negative externality is counteracted by a positive ex-
ternality due to stronger labor division in the production of final output (see Ethier, 1982), and
the two externalities exactly offset when applying the technology in Matusz (1996). Final goods
production does not give rise to an external scale effect in our setting, and hence the model
considered here lacks a positive externality of firm entry, implying that the mass of producers
deviates from the social optimum.10 Higher production fixed costs imply that firms must be
more productive in order to survive in the market. This improves the composition of active
producers, which is to the benefit of consumers in our setting.
To obtain an economy-wide measure of mismatch between workers and tasks, we compute
the average distance between task-specific skill requirements and worker-specific abilities. As
formally shown in the appendix, this aggregate measure of mismatch is given by
u =
1
3 [1 + µ(φ∗)]
γ(ν − ξ)
γ(ν − ξ) + ξ =
1
3
(
γ − σ + 1
f(σ − 1)
) 1
γ γ(ν − ξ)
γ(ν − ξ) + ξ , (3.18)
where the second equality follows from (3.14). The existence of underemployment due to a
mismatch of abilities and skill-requirements is the main difference between our setting and
an otherwise identical Melitz (2003) framework with homogeneous workers and a single-task
production technology. The source of underemployment also differs from other models that
introduce search frictions into a Melitz framework (see, for instance, Helpman and Itskhoki,
2010; Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010; Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer, 2011). In our
setting, it is not the existence of recruitment costs per se but rather the mismatch of worker-
specific abilities and task-specific skill requirements in the production of goods that generates
an inefficient allocation of labor and thus underemployment. This completes the analysis of the
closed economy.
3.3 The open economy
3.3.1 Basic structure and preliminary insights
In this chapter, we consider trade between two fully symmetric countries, whose economies
are as characterized in the previous chapter. There are no impediments to the international
transaction of final goods, whereas exporting of intermediates involves two types of costs: On
the one hand, there are fixed costs fx > 0 (in units of final output) for setting up a foreign
distribution network and, on the other hand, there are iceberg transport costs, which imply
that τ > 1 units of intermediate goods must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive in
the foreign economy. Both of these costs are also present in the Melitz (2003) framework and
– in combination with the heterogeneity of firms in their baseline productivity levels – they
generate self-selection of only the best (most productive) producers into exporting, provided
10Combining the labor market clearing condition with the constant markup rule, gives wLσ/(σ − 1) =
Mr(φ∗)ν/(ν − ξ), which in view of (3.14) and (3.17), can be solved for the mass of firms M :
M =
σ − 1
σ
(
ν
ν − ξ
) 2−σ
σ−1
(
fξ
γ
) 1
γ
(
fξ
fe(ν − ξ)
) 1
ν L
ξf
.
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that these costs are sufficiently high. The decision to start exporting is more sophisticated in
our setting, because it influences a firm’s optimal choice of screening effort and thus exerts a
feedback effect on profits attainable in the domestic market. Hence, there is an interdependence
between the decision to export and a firm’s performance in its domestic market, which does not
exist in Melitz (2003). Due to this interdependence, we have to distinguish between variables
referring to exporters (denoted by superscript e) and non-exporters (denoted by superscript n).
Furthermore, we use subscript x to refer to variables associated with foreign market sales of an
exporter, while domestic variables are index free.
Holding economy-wide variables constant, access to exporting does not affect a non-exporter’s
profit-maximizing choice of l(φ) and µ(φ) as characterized by (3.8) and (3.9). Things are different
for an exporter, who realizes revenues re(φ) and rex(φ) = τ
1−σre(φ) in the domestic and foreign
market, respectively, implying that in the open economy this firm’s profit-maximizing choice of
µ(φ) is given by (
1 + τ1−σ
)
re(φ) =
σγ
σ − 1 [1 + µ
e(φ)]
γ
(3.19)
instead of (3.11). However, since condition (3.19) is structurally the same for all exporters, we
can conclude that the ratio of screening effort and the ratio of total revenues in (3.13) remain
unaffected in the open economy, when comparing two firms of the same export status (n or e)
but differing productivity levels. In contrast, when comparing two firms with the same baseline
productivity but differing export status, we obtain
1 + µe(φ)
1 + µn(φ)
=
(
1 + τ1−σ
) 1
γ−σ+1
re(φ)
rn(φ)
=
(
1 + τ1−σ
) σ−1
γ−σ+1 . (3.20)
From the analysis of the closed economy we know that a firm’s screening effort increases with
its revenues. Since, all other things equal, exporting generates additional revenues from sales
to foreign consumers, it renders screening more attractive, resulting in µe(φ) > µn(φ). On
the other hand, the higher screening effort under exporting improves the quality of worker-task
matches and thus lowers unit production costs. This stimulates sales in both the domestic and
the foreign market, implying re(φ) > rn(φ) in Eq. (3.20). Hence, there is a positive feedback
effect of exporting on domestic revenues, and this raises the incentives of firms to serve foreign
consumers.
Despite the additional complexity arising from the feedback effect that a firm’s exporting
decision exerts on its domestic profits, our model preserves key properties of the Melitz (2003)
model, regarding the partitioning of firms by export status. To see this, we can make use of
(3.11), (3.13), (3.14), (3.19), and (3.20) and write a firm’s profit gain from exporting, ∆pi(φ) ≡
pie(φ)− pin(φ), as follows:
∆pi(φ) =
[(
1 + τ1−σ
) ξ
σ−1 − 1
](
φ
φ∗
)ξ
f − fx. (3.21)
The profit differential in (3.21) increases in φ, and we can thus conclude that if the two trade cost
parameters, fx and τ , are sufficiently high, there is self-selection of only the most productive
firms into exporting as in other applications of the Melitz model. This is the case we are
focussing on in this chapter, and we can therefore characterize a firm that is indifferent between
exporting and non-exporting: ∆pi(φ) = 0. We denote the (cutoff) productivity of this firm by
φ∗x, implying that firms with φ > φ
∗
x end up being exporters, while firms with φ < φ
∗
x end up
being non-exporters. Solving ∆pi(φ∗x) = 0 for the ratio between the two productivity cutoffs φ
∗
x
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and φ∗, we obtain
φ∗x
φ∗
=
(
fx/f
(1 + τ1−σ)
ξ
σ−1 − 1
) 1
ξ
, (3.22)
and there is partitioning of firms by export status if φ∗x/φ
∗ > 1. Furthermore, we can use
the productivity ratio in (3.22) to calculate the share of exporting firms in the open economy:
χ ≡ [1−G(φ∗x)]/[1−G(φ∗)] = (φ∗x/φ∗)−ν . This gives
χ =
{
f
fx
[(
1 + τ1−σ
) ξ
σ−1 − 1
]} ν
ξ
. (3.23)
From (3.22) and (3.23), we can conclude that higher trade cost costs, i.e. a higher fixed exporting
cost fx or a higher iceberg transport cost parameter τ , raise the minimum productivity level that
is necessary to render exporting an attractive choice, thereby lowering the share of exporters
in the total population of active firms, χ. With this insights at hand, we are now equipped to
solve for the open economy equilibrium.
3.3.2 The open economy equilibrium
The equilibrium in the open economy is characterized by a two-stage entry mechanism that is
similar to the closed economy, but additionally involves the decision to start exporting or to sell
exclusively to the domestic market (at stage 2). Access to the export market raises profits of the
most productive producers, and this provides a stimulus for the average profit of active firms,
which in the open economy are given by11
p¯i =
fξ
ν − ξ
(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
(3.24)
instead of (3.15). Combining Eq. (3.24) with the free entry condition in (3.16), we can calculate
cutoff productivity φ∗ in the open economy and contrast it with its closed economy counterpart,
φ∗a (where index a refers to autarky): φ
∗/φ∗a = (1 + χfx/f)
1/ν
. Hence, opening up to trade
with a symmetric partner country leads to an upward shift in the cutoff productivity level φ∗.
The mechanism behind this effect is well understood from Melitz (2003). Access to exporting
generates additional demand for labor, and hence firms at the lower bound of the productivity
distribution have to leave the market in order to restore the labor market equilibrium. This
points to an important asymmetry of how firms are affected by trade liberalization. Whereas
the most productive firms experience a profit gain due to access to the export market, the least
productive ones experience a profit loss due to stronger competition for scarce labor in the open
economy.
To shed further light on the asymmetry in the firm-level response to trade, we can study
how producers adjust their internal labor market in the open economy. We start with a closer
look on non-exporting firms. Provided that the marginal firm in the market is not exporting, its
screening effort remains to be given by (3.14). However, the new marginal producer has a higher
baseline productivity than the marginal producer in the closed economy, and hence its screening
effort is definitely lower than under autarky. Furthermore, since the link between the ratio of
screening effort and the ratio of baseline productivities among non-exporting firms remains to
11Derivation details are deferred to the appendix.
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be given by (3.13), it is clear that all non-exporting firms respond to the trade shock with a
reduction in their screening effort. This is intuitive, as the sales level of non-exporting firms
declines in the open economy, so that these firms are not willing to keep the (relatively) expensive
screening technology they have installed in the closed economy. Contrasting the screening effort
of a non-exporter in the closed and the open economy, we can compute:
1 + µn(φ)
1 + µa(φ)
=
(
1
1 + χfx/f
) ξ
γν
< 1. (3.25)
Calculating the screening differential for an exporting firm, we obtain
1 + µe(φ)
1 + µa(φ)
=
((
1 + τ1−σ
) ν
σ−1
1 + χfx/f
) ξ
γν
=
((
1 + χξ/νfx/f
) ν
ξ
1 + χfx/f
) ξ
γν
, (3.26)
where the second equality follows from Eq. (3.23). Noting that ν > ξ holds by assumption, it is
straightforward to show that µe(φ) > µa(φ): A firm that starts exporting in the open economy
realizes higher revenues and thus raises its screening effort relative to autarky. The differential
impact of trade on screening effort of non-exporting and exporting firms is graphically depicted
by Figure 3.1 and summarized in Proposition 4.12
φ
f
1/γ
µ
φ∗a φ
∗ φ∗x
1 + µa(φ∗a) = 1 + µ
n(φ∗)
1 + µe(φ∗x) Autarky
Trade
Figure 3.1: The impact of trade on firm-level screening effort
Proposition 4 A country’s opening up to trade, leads to an asymmetric response in the firm-
internal allocation of workers to tasks. Whereas exporters expand their screening effort and
thus improve the quality of worker-task matches, non-exporters reduce their screening effort and
accept a larger mismatch between skill requirements and abilities in the performance of tasks.
12For illustrative purposes, we have assumed ξ > γ, whereas in general ξ >,=, < γ is possible.
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Proof. Analysis in the text.
Due to asymmetric firm-level consequences, it is clear that access to trade exerts counteracting
effects on the general equilibrium variables of interest: wage rate (welfare) w and underemploy-
ment u. Similar to the autarky scenario, the wage rate in the open economy, can be derived by
combining r(φ∗) = p(φ∗)x(φ∗) with the adding up condition Y =M(1 + χfx/f)r(φ
∗)ν/(ν − ξ).
Substituting (3.2) and (3.10) – with M(1 + χ) presuming the role of M in the open economy –
and accounting for (3.14), (3.16), and (3.24), we can calculate
w =
(
1 + χfx/f
1 + χ
) 1
σ−1
(
1 + χ
fx
f
) 1
ν
wa. (3.27)
Hence, gains from trade are guaranteed if fx/f ≥ 1, while losses from trade cannot be ruled
out if fx/f < 1.
13 Trade can be welfare-deteriorating in our setting, because under production
technology (3.1) the outcome of decentralized firm entry is not socially optimal. To the extent
that trade aggravates the distortion of firm entry, the resulting welfare loss may outweigh the
welfare stimulus from market integration (cf. Shy, 1988). In our setting, the existence of net
gains from trade depends on the relative strength of two selection effects. On the one hand, there
is selection of the best producers into exporting, which raises labor demand ceteris paribus. On
the other hand, there is selection of the least productive firms out of the market, which lowers
labor demand. The two selection effects are interdependent and their relative strength depends
on fixed cost ratio fx/f . If this fixed costs ratio is sufficiently high, it is the selection into
exporting that dominates rendering the overall effect of trade on labor demand and thus welfare
positive.
As outlined in Proposition 4, there are asymmetric firm-level effects of trade on the mismatch
between abilities and skill requirements. Exporting firms increase their screening expenditures,
and hence their matching outcome is improved. The opposite is true for non-exporting firms.
However, there is an additional positive effect on economy-wide underemployment because labor
is relocated towards exporting firms in the open economy and, due to this change in labor
composition, the overall impact of trade on the average quality of worker-task matches is positive.
To see this, we can explicitly solve for our measure of underemployment in the open economy.
As formally shown in the appendix, we get:
u =
1 + a(τ)χ1+ξ/(νγ)fx/f
1 + χfx/f
ua, with a(τ) ≡
(
1 + τ1−σ
) (γ−1)ξ
γ(σ−1) − 1
(1 + τ1−σ)
ξ
σ−1 − 1
. (3.28)
Noting that a(τ) < 1, it is immediate that u < ua, which proves that trade reduces the average
mismatch between task-specific skill requirements and worker-specific abilities, thereby lowering
underemployment.
We can summarize the main insights from our analysis as follows.
Proposition 5 Opening up to trade improves the average quality of worker-task matches, thereby
reducing economy-wide underemployment due to a misallocation of workers to tasks. The im-
pact of trade on welfare is not clear-cut in general. Only if fixed costs of exporting relative to
production fixed costs, fx/f , are sufficiently high, there are gains from trade in our setting.
13For instance, with a parametrization of ν = 8, σ = 3, τ = 1.5, and γ = 10, there are losses from trade if
fx/f ≤ 0.77 – with fx/f ≥ 0.58 establishing selection of only the most productive firms into export status, i.e.
χ ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. Analysis in the text.
We complete the analysis in this chapter by shedding light on the consequences of a marginal
reduction in transport cost parameter τ . Such a decline increases expected income from ex-
porting, and thus raises χ, according to (3.23), as well as average profit income p¯i, according
to (3.24). On the other hand, there is a stimulus on labor demand, which enforces additional
market exit at the lower bound of the productivity distribution and therefore leads to an upward
shift in cutoff productivity φ∗. Furthermore, a marginal decline in the iceberg transport cost
parameter augments the heterogeneity in screening effort between non-exporting and exporting
producers, according to (3.20). With respect to adjustments in the wage rate, we can infer from
(3.27) that dw/dτ < 0 if fx/f > 1. In this case, a gradual reduction in the iceberg transport
cost parameter exerts a positive monotonic impact on welfare. In contrast, if fx/f < 1, changes
in τ need not exert a monotonic impact on w. Finally, from the analysis above we know that a
country’s movement from autarky to trade with an arbitrary transport cost level unambiguously
improves the average quality of worker-task matches. We can therefore safely conclude that a
marginal decline in τ must lower u if transport costs have been large initially. In the appendix
we show that this effect extends to the case where τ has already been low prior to the fall in
the iceberg transport cost parameter, so that a gradual decline in τ reduces underemployment
u monotonically.
3.4 A model variant with involuntary unemployment
In this chapter, we introduce search frictions as an additional source of inefficiency in the alloca-
tion of labor to show how mismatch between the abilities of workers and the skill requirements
of tasks interact with traditional forms of underemployment. For this purpose, we consider a
competitive search model along the lines of Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005), in which firms
post wages and workers direct their search to the most attractive employer to queue for a job,
there.14 The mass of matches between workers and jobs, m, depends positively on the number
of applicants, s, and the number of open vacancies, v. In the interest of analytical tractability,
we choose a Cobb-Douglas specification and write m(s, v) = As1−ζvζ , where ζ,A ∈ (0, 1) are
the same for all producers.15 Measuring by q ≡ s/v the queue length of workers applying for
jobs, the probability of the firm to fill a specific vacancy is given by αe(q) ≡ m(s, v)/v = Aq1−ζ .
In our static model, this equals the share of vacancies filled in the respective firm. The proba-
bility of a worker to be hired, when queuing for a job, is given by αw(q) ≡ m(s, v)/s = Aq−ζ .
In the subsequent analysis we focus on interior solutions with αe(q), αw(q) ∈ (0, 1). For which
parameter domain such an interior solution is realized will be discussed below.
Setting unemployment compensation equal to zero and denoting by V the highest income a
worker can expect when applying for a job at a different firm, queuing for vacancies in a firm
with productivity φ is only attractive for the worker if V ≤ αw[q(φ)]w(φ). Since firms set the
same wage for all workers in our setting (see above), additional workers apply for jobs in this
14Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) provide an excellent overview of different search-theoretic approaches,
their main advantages and disadvantages. In the context of heterogeneous firms, a competitive search model has
also been considered by Ritter (2011) and Felbermayr, Impulliti, and Prat (2012).
15In a competitive search model it is not necessary to choose an ad hoc specification of the matching function.
Instead, one can as well take the coordination problem of directed search seriously and provide a clean micro-
foundation of this problem by choosing an urn-ball matching function (see Peters, 1991, for an early contribution
and King and Sta¨hler, 2010, for an application in the context of trade). A disadvantage of this more advanced
approach is its lower analytical tractability, and we therefore prefer treating the matching function as a black
box as it is still common in the literature.
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firm as long as the inequality is strict. This lowers the probability of being hired by the firm,
αw[q(φ)], and the adjustment process continues until the expected return of workers is the same
in all active firms. Hence, V = Aq(φ)−ζw(φ) must hold in equilibrium, and the directed search
mechanism therefore establishes a positive link between queue length q(φ) and the posted wage
w(φ):
w(φ) =
q(φ)ζV
A
. (3.29)
The mass of vacancies set up by a firm with productivity φ, v(φ), is linked to this firm’s employ-
ment level, l(φ), according to v(φ) = l(φ)/[Aq(φ)1−ζ ]. The costs of installing and advertising a
vacancy are measured in units of final output and are given by k > 0.
With these insights at hand, we can write firm-level profits in the closed economy as follows:
pi(φ) = p(φ)x(φ)− q(φ)
ζV
A
l(φ)− [1 + µ(φ)]γ − f − kl(φ)
Aq(φ)1−ζ
. (3.30)
The firm sets l(φ), q(φ), and µ(φ) simultaneously to maximize profits (3.30) subject to (3.2),
(3.6), and a set of non-negativity constraints. The (interior) solution to this maximization
problem is characterized by the following three first-order conditions:
pil(φ) =
σ − 1
σ
p(φ)φ [1 + µ(φ)]− w(φ)− k
Aq(φ)1−ζ
= 0, (3.31)
piq(φ) = − l(φ)ζq(φ)
ζ−1V
A
+ (1− ζ)l(φ) k
Aq(φ)2−ζ
= 0, (3.32)
piµ(φ) =
σ − 1
σ
p(φ)l(φ)φ− γ [1 + µ(φ)]γ−1 = 0. (3.33)
Equations (3.29) and (3.32) jointly determine
q(φ) =
(1− ζ)k
ζV
≡ q, w(φ) = (1− ζ)k
ζAq1−ζ
≡ w, (3.34)
implying that all firms pay the same wage, irrespective of the prevailing productivity differences.
This outcome is in line with models of random matching between workers and heterogenous
firms, in which wages are determined by individual Nash bargaining. For instance, Felbermayr
and Prat (2011, p. 286) point out that in their setting all firms pay the same wage, because
“multiple-worker firms exploit their monopsony power until employees are paid their outside
option [that] is constant across firms because it depends solely on aggregate outcomes.” This
gives a prominent role to over-hiring in models with individual wage bargaining, which, however,
is not present under wage posting. Instead, in our model the finding of a uniform wage level is a
consequence of three model ingredients: linear hiring costs, the same outside option of workers
with differing abilities, and the isoelastic demand structure.16
16There are different possibilities to modify the model such that it gives rise to the empirically well-documented
pattern that larger, more productive firms pay higher wages. For instance, one could consider convex instead
of linear recruitment costs, as suggested by Helpman and Itskhoki (2010). Alternatively, one could modify the
wage setting process and assume that firms post fair wages, as in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009, 2012) and Amiti
and Davis (2012). Finally, one could also give up the symmetry of firm-worker matches and instead assume that
ability is firm-specific and employers can learn about this ability during the recruitment process by installing a
screening technology, as suggested by Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010). While all of these modifications
would allow for firm-specific wage payments, the costs of these extensions in terms of analytical tractability
would be enormous, and we therefore decided to stick to the more parsimonious model variant without wage
differentiation.
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Combining (3.31) and (3.34) gives the modified price-markup rule
p(φ) =
σ
(σ − 1)φ [1 + µ(φ)]
k
ζAq1−ζ
, (3.35)
where marginal labor costs are augmented by recruitment expenditures. Contrasting (3.9) and
(3.33), we see that the existence of search frictions does not change the profit-maximizing choice
of screening. Since search frictions do also not affect firm entry decisions, cutoff productivity
φ∗ and revenues of the marginal firm r(φ∗) remain to be given by (3.14). Similarly, the zero-
cutoff profit condition and the free entry condition remain to be given by (3.15) and (3.16),
respectively, and hence neither p¯i nor φ∗ depend on the prevailing search frictions or the costs
of establishing and posting vacancies, k.
With the firm-level variables at hand, we can now solve for the general equilibrium outcome
in the closed economy. For this purpose, we first look at queue length q. Substituting (3.2)
into r(φ∗) = p(φ∗)x(φ∗) and accounting for Y = Mr(φ∗)ν/(ν − ξ) gives p(φ∗)σ−1 = ν/(ν − ξ).
Using (3.35) and noting that φ∗ [1 + µ(φ∗)] = [(fξ)/γ]
1/γ {(fξ)/[fe(ν − ξ)]}1/ν follows from
(3.14)-(3.16), we can derive
q =
{
kσ
Aζ(σ − 1)
(
ν − ξ
ν
) 1
σ−1
(
fe
f
ν − ξ
ξ
) 1
ν
(
γ
fξ
) 1
γ
} 1
1−ζ
. (3.36)
To solve for economy-wide unemployment uˆ, we can substitute V = (1 − uˆ)w into (3.29).
Rearranging terms, yields 1 − uˆ = Aq−ζ , which establishes the intuitive result that a larger
queue length at individual firms leads to higher economy-wide unemployment. Accounting for
q from (3.36), we can compute
1− uˆ =
{
ζ(σ − 1)
kσ
(
ν
ν − ξ
) 1
σ−1
(
f
fe
ξ
ν − ξ
) 1
ν
(
fξ
γ
) 1
γ
} ζ
1−ζ
A
1
1−ζ . (3.37)
Eq. (3.37) characterizes involuntary unemployment as one important aspect of underemployment
and measures the efficiency loss due to search frictions. However, it does not capture the effi-
ciency loss, arising from a mismatch between workers and tasks in the firm-internal allocation
of labor. This form of underemployment can be measured by the average distance between
task-specific skill requirements and worker-specific abilities and is represented by u. Crucially,
the existence of search frictions does not impact firm-level screening (see above), and hence it
does not alter firm-internal labor allocation. Due to this, u remains to be given by (3.18) in the
closed economy.17
Finally, welfare in the closed economy is given by (1− uˆ)w, which, in view of (3.34), (3.36),
and (3.37), can be expressed as
(1− uˆ)w = 1− ζ
ζ
k
q
= (1− ζ)A 11−ζ
(
ζ
k
) ζ
1−ζ
w˜
1
1−ζ = (1− ζ)(1− uˆ)w˜, (3.38)
17Eqs. (3.36) and (3.37) can be used for characterizing the parameter domain that establishes an interior
solution with αe(q), αw(q) ∈ (0, 1). More specifically, we can conclude that αe(q) = Aq1−ζ < 1 and αw(q) =
Aq−ζ < 1 simultaneously hold if
A
1
ζ <
kσ
ζ(σ − 1)
(
ν − ξ
ν
) 1
σ−1
(
fe
f
ν − ξ
ξ
) 1
ν
(
γ
fξ
) 1
γ
< 1,
while the two probabilities are positive if ζ, k, A > 0 (and ν > ξ as previously assumed).
54 CHAPTER 3. TRADE AND THE ALLOCATION OF WORKERS TO TASKS
where w˜ equals the wage rate in the benchmark model with a perfect labor market, given by
(3.17). From (3.38) it is obvious that the existence of search frictions reduces per capita labor
income and thus welfare in our setting. This completes the discussion of the closed economy.
We now turn to the open economy and shed light on the effects of trade for the two sources
of underemployment. Thereby, we impose the same assumptions as in the baseline model and
consider two symmetric countries, iceberg transport costs for shipping intermediate goods across
borders and fixed exporting costs to generate selection of only the best firms into export status.
With these assumptions at hand, we can now repeat the analysis of the closed economy step
by step in order to derive the main variables of interest for the open economy. However, since
the respective calculations are straightforward, we leave them to the interested reader and only
summarize the main results from this analysis, here. From the closed economy, we know that
the existence of labor market imperfection does not affect the allocation of workers to tasks, and
hence our insights regarding the consequences of trade for the firm-internal mismatch remains
unaffected by adding a search friction. This implies that the open economy level of u remains
to be given by (3.28).
Furthermore, it is easily confirmed that the existence of a search friction does not alter Eqs.
(3.19)-(3.21), therefore leaving the exporting decision unaffected. As a consequence, the share of
exporting firms remains to be given by (3.23). Noting from (3.38) that per capita labor income
in the more sophisticated model variant with search frictions is a convex function of the wage
rate in the benchmark model with a perfect labor market, we can infer the welfare effects of
trade by considering Eq. (3.27). To more specific, we can write
(1− uˆ)w
(1− uˆa)wa =
(
w˜
w˜a
) 1
1−ζ
=
[(
1 + χfx/f
1 + χ
) 1
σ−1
(
1 + χ
fx
f
) 1
ν
] 1
1−ζ
. (3.39)
Hence, the existence of search frictions does not change the welfare effects of trade in a qualitative
way, but it magnifies the (positive or negative) welfare implications identified in Chapter 3.3.
To understand, where the additional welfare effect comes from, it is worth noting that we can
write
w
wa
=
(
q
qa
)ζ−1
=
(
1 + χfx/f
1 + χ
) 1
σ−1
(
1 + χ
fx
f
) 1
ν
, (3.40)
according to (3.34) and (3.39). From (3.27) and (3.40) it follows that in the presence of search
frictions the wage adjustments triggered by trade are of equal magnitude as in the benchmark
model with a perfectly competitive labor market. Therefore, any additional welfare effect must
come from adjustments in the employment rate. Looking at
1− uˆ
1− uˆa =
(
q
qa
)−ζ
=
(
(1− uˆ)w
(1− uˆa)wa
)ζ
=
[(
1 + χfx/f
1 + χ
) 1
σ−1
(
1 + χ
fx
f
) 1
ν
] ζ
1−ζ
(3.41)
provides support for this conclusion. Eqs. (3.39)-(3.41) show that there is a direct link between
employment, wage, and welfare effects of trade in our setting. From Chapter 3.3 we know that
lacking an external scale effect in the production of final goods, selection of exporters must be
sufficiently strong in order for trade to provide a stimulus on aggregate labor demand and equi-
librium wages. In this case, the price of the final good falls relative to the wage rate. This lowers
the costs of installing and advertising vacancies relative to the costs of compensating workers,
and thus alleviates the search friction with positive consequences for aggregate employment.
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Both of these effects contribute to a welfare gain if search frictions exist. Things are different
if selection effects are weak. In this case, it is possible that labor demand is dampened in the
open economy, so that wages decline. However, if wages decline relative to the price of the final
good, the establishment of new vacancies becomes less attractive, rendering the search friction
more severe than under autarky, with adverse effects on economy-wide employment.
The following proposition summarizes the main insights from the analysis in this chapter.
Proposition 6 The existence of search frictions does not alter our insights from the benchmark
model regarding the impact of trade on the mismatch between workers and task in the firm-
internal labor market. Furthermore, with search frictions, trade triggers wage and employment
effects that go into the same direction. As a consequence, the welfare implications of trade, while
not altered qualitatively, are reinforced in the model variant with search frictions.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
We complete the discussion in this chapter by having a closer look on the specific role played
by adjustments in the firm-internal allocation of workers for the impact of trade on welfare and
economy-wide unemployment. In particular, we want to shed light on whether one over-estimates
or under-estimates the effects of trade, when disregarding the firms’ ability to endogenously
adjust the quality of worker-task matches. For this purpose, it is worth noting that our model
degenerates to one without screening if γ → ∞. We can therefore infer insights upon the role
played by the firm-internal labor allocation from differentiating (3.39)-(3.41) with respect to γ.
More specifically, we can determine how changes in γ alter the employment and welfare effects
of trade, by studying the sign of
d(w/wa)
dγ
=
d(w/wa)
dχ
dχ
dγ
. (3.42)
Differentiating (3.23) with respect to γ gives
dχ
dγ
= −νχ
γ
 1γ − σ + 1
(
1 + τ1−σ
) ξ
σ−1
(1 + τ1−σ)
ξ
σ−1 − 1
ln
(
1 + τ1−σ
)− 1
γ
ln
(
χ
ξ
ν
) < 0. (3.43)
A higher γ implies that fixed costs are more responsive to changes in the screening effort.
Accordingly, firms will adjust their screening effort less strongly when facing the opportunity of
exporting, so that the fixed cost increase due to exporting is less pronounced (see Eq. (3.20)),
and hence the share of exporters increases ceteris paribus if γ goes up. On the other hand,
the now lower wedge of screening effort eats up part of the productivity advantage of exporters
relative to non-exporters, thereby lowering the incentives of firms to sell abroad. In our model,
it is the second effect that dominates, so that a higher γ reinforces self-selection into exporting,
and therefore implies a smaller share of exporting firms χ.
Furthermore, differentiating (3.40) with respect to χ yields
d(w/wa)
dχ
=
w/wa
ν (1 + χfx/f) (1 + χ)
[
ν
σ − 1
(
fx
f
− 1
)
+ (1 + χ)
fx
f
]
. (3.44)
It is easily confirmed that the bracket term on the right-hand side of (3.44) is increasing in
fx/f , and hence wages increase monotonically in the share of exporting firms if fx/f (and thus
the selection effect) is sufficiently large. In line with our insights from Chapter 3.3, fx/f ≥ 1
is sufficient (not necessary) for a monotonically positive impact of an increase in χ on w/wa.
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If such a monotonic effect exists, an increase in γ unambiguously lowers the positive wage,
employment, and welfare effects of trade, and hence positive economy-wide effects would be
underestimated if one ignores endogenous adjustments in the firm-internal allocation of workers
to tasks. However, if the impact of a higher χ on w/wa is non-monotonic, things are even more
worrying, because in this case ignoring endogenous adjustments in the way workers are assigned
to tasks may give wrong predictions regarding the existence of positive wage, employment, and
welfare effects of trade. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 7 The ability of firms to adjust the quality of worker-task matches leads to weaker
selection of firms into exporting, and thus a larger share of exporting firms. Provided that an
increase in the share of exporting firms exhibits a positive monotonic impact on wages, adjust-
ments in the firm-internal allocation of workers to tasks therefore strengthen the employment and
welfare stimulus relative to a model where such adjustments do not exist. If the relationship be-
tween the share of exporting firms and wages is non-monotonic, adjustments in the firm-internal
allocation of labor may reverse the employment and welfare effects of trade.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
3.5 A calibration exercise
In this chapter, we aim at quantifying the effects of trade in our setting. For this purpose, we
calibrate our model, using parameter estimates from the literature. A first set of useful parameter
estimates is provided by Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011). Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier
(2011) structurally estimate the main parameters of a trade model with heterogeneous firms
and labor market imperfections due to a fair-wage effort mechanism, using firm-level data from
five European countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Serbia, and Slovenia – for
the period 2000 to 2008. For our calibration exercise, we consider the parameter estimates
for France, which hosts the majority of firms in the respective data-set. A first parameter
available from the empirical application in Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011) is the elasticity
of substitution, for which they report a value of σ = 6.7. This estimate is similar to other
findings in the literature (see, for instance, Broda and Weinstein, 2006). Furthermore, using
the structural relationship between revenues of exporting firms, Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier
(2011) estimate an analogon to ξ/ν, for which they report a value of 0.87, when relying on
information for French firms. This is fairly close to the estimate of 0.83 reported by Arkolakis
and Muendler (2010) for Brazilian firms.
Unfortunately, there are no direct estimates available for γ, and we are therefore not able to
calculate the parameter values for γ and ν separately. However, from the formal discussion in
Chapter 3.2 we can infer that existence of an interior solution requires a sufficiently high level
of ν. With ξ/ν = 0.87, ν must be larger than 6.5 in our calibration exercise. Since we cannot
further confine the possible parameter values, we consider three parameter values that are in
line with this constraint and choose ν = 7, ν = 9 and ν = 11 for our calibration exercise.18
Taking account of σ = 6.7 and ξ/ν = 0.87, we can then calculate the corresponding γ-levels:
γ = 89.01 for ν = 7, γ = 20.95 for ν = 9 and γ = 14.10 for ν = 11.
An additional variable of interest is the share of exporters, χ. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2011) report from official administrative statistics that 15 percent of French manufacturing
firms were exporters in 1986. Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011) find a significantly larger
18These ν-values are well in line with shape parameters of the productivity distribution applied in other
numerical applications of the Melitz (2003) model. For instance, Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) consider 5 and
8 as low and high values for the shape parameter, whereas Felbermayr and Prat (2011) consider a value of 9.23.
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share of exporters, using the Amadeus data-set. According to their data-base, 45 percent of
French firms did export in the average year between 2000 and 2008. Since it is well known that
the Amadeus data is biased towards large, incorporated firms, we consider the evidence provided
by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) to be more reliable and accordingly set χ = 0.15 in
our calibration exercise. Recent empirical research aims at estimating compulsory measures of
the iceberg trade cost parameter τ by employing information on observed international trade
flows into a structural gravity equation. Existing results from this literature suggest setting
τ = 1.5 (see, for instance, McGowan and Milner, 2013; Novy, 2013). With the iceberg trade
cost parameter and the share of exporters at hand, we can then compute a theory-consistent
value of fixed cost ratio fx/f . Using the parameter values from above, we obtain fx/f = 0.93
if ν = 7, fx/f = 0.96 if ν = 9, and fx/f = 0.98 if ν = 11. Finally, we follow common practice
in the search literature and set ζ = 0.5 (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for supportive
empirical evidence).
Table 3.1: Quantifying the impact of trade on welfare and under-
employment
Parameter values Changes in percent
ν γ fx/f ∆(1− uˆ)w ∆(1− uˆ) ∆u
7 89.01 0.93 3.45 1.71 −0.37
9 20.95 0.96 2.81 1.39 −1.54
11 14.10 0.98 2.45 1.22 −2.29
Notes: An exporter share of χ = 0.15, an iceberg trade cost parameter of
τ = 1.5, a σ-value of 6.7, a ζ-value of 0.5, and a parameter ratio ξ/ν = 0.87
have been considered for computing the figures in this table.
Table 3.1 summarizes the main insights from our calibration exercise and reports employment
and welfare effects associated with a movement of France from autarky to its observed degree
of openness: χ = 0.15. From Column 4 we see that gains from trade seem to be rather small in
our setting, which at least partly may be explained by the absence of external scale economies
in the production of final goods. However, the welfare gains documented in Table 3.1 are in
the range of welfare effects reported by Eaton and Kortum (2002), who set up a multi-country
Ricardian model for 19 OECD economies and investigate how much countries in their data-set
would lose if trade were entirely abolished. They compute losses ranging from 0.2 percent for
Japan and 10.3 percent for Belgium, and for France they report a welfare loss of 2.5 percent.
This is fairly close to the welfare loss from abolishing trade entirely when setting ν = 11 in our
model, which amounts to 2.4 percent.
The effects of trade on economy-wide employment are reported in Column 5. At a first
glance, the employment effects may seem not sizable. However, it is noteworthy that evaluated
at a current unemployment rate of about 10 percent, an employment effect of ∆(1− uˆ) = 1.22
(for ν = 11) implies that the observed degree of openness has lowered the French unemployment
rate by 1.1 percentage points relative to autarky. Column 6 reports our calibration results for the
impact of trade on the average mismatch in the firm-internal allocation of workers to tasks. In
line with our theoretical result, this mismatch is reduced in the open economy and the more so,
the larger is ν. This is intuitive, as we see from Column 2 that higher levels of ν are associated
with smaller levels of γ and thus a smaller elasticity of screening costs in screening effort. As a
consequence, for higher values of ν firms will adjust their screening effort more strongly to new
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exporting opportunities, leading to a more pronounced reduction in the economy-wide mismatch
of workers and tasks in response to trade.
For providing insights on the extent to which adjustments in the firm-internal allocation of
workers govern the employment and welfare implications of trade in our setting, we can contrast
the findings in Table 3.1 with those from an otherwise identical model variant in which such
adjustments are not feasible. For this purpose, we look at the limiting case of γ → ∞, which,
as outlined in the previous chapter, implies that producers do not screen their applicants, so
that µ(φ) = 0 for all φ. Considering ν = 11 as the preferred value for the shape parameter of
the Pareto productivity distribution and thus setting fx/f = 0.98 according to Table 3.1, we
can compute a theory-consistent share of exporters that corresponds to the parameter values at
hand. We compute χ = 0.02, which confirms our insight from the formal analysis that higher
levels of γ lower the share of exporters monotonically (see Eq. (3.43)). From the analysis in
Chapter 3.4, we are warned that changes in the share of exporting firms need not exhibit a
monotonic effect on employment and welfare if fx/f < 1, which is the case in our exercise. It is
therefore a priori not clear whether the movement of France from autarky to the observed degree
of openness would have been beneficial in the absence of screening. In the numerical application,
we can evaluate the welfare and employment effects of trade for the limiting case of γ →∞. For
the preferred parametrization, this gives ∆(1 − uˆ)w = 0.28 and ∆(1 − uˆ) = 0.14, respectively.
Therefore, eliminating the ability of firms to screen their workforce and endogenously adjust
the quality of worker-task matches would not alter the welfare and employment effects of trade
qualitatively, but it would lead to a significant decline of its beneficial consequences. Finally,
recollecting from Chapter 3.4 that gains from trade in our model are a composite of positive
employment and positive wage effects, we can ask which of these two partial effects is the more
important source of welfare stimulus. The answer to this question is simple. Setting ζ = 0.5,
we obtain ∆(1− uˆ) = ∆w, according to (3.40) and (3.41). Since ∆w corresponds to the welfare
effect of trade in the absence of search frictions, we can therefore conclude that disregarding
labor market imperfections leads to a significant downward bias in the calibrated welfare effects
of trade.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter sets up a model of heterogeneous firms along the lines of Melitz (2003) and enriches
this workhorse of modern trade theory by associating production with a continuum of tasks that
differ in their skill requirements. Furthermore, we assume that workers differ in their abilities to
perform these tasks, and firms therefore face the complex problem of matching heterogeneous
workers with heterogeneous tasks. To solve this allocation problem in a satisfactory way, firms
require information about worker ability and they can get this information by screening their
applicants. Screening involves fixed costs and provides an imprecise signal about the ability of
workers. The higher the investment into the screening technology, the better is the signal and
the better is therefore the match between abilities of workers and skill requirements of tasks.
Intuitively, firms that have a higher ex ante productivity install a better screening technology,
so that heterogeneity of firms is reinforced by the endogenous investment into screening.
We use this framework to study the consequences of trade for welfare and underemployment,
arising from the mismatch between workers and tasks. If only the best (most productive) firms
self-select into exporting, trade exerts an asymmetric effect on the screening incentives of high-
and low-productivity firms. High-productivity firms expand production due to exporting, and
therefore find it attractive to install a better (more expensive) screening technology than in the
closed economy. In contrast, low-productivity firms do not export and lose market share at
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home. In response, they lower their screening expenditures. Despite this asymmetry in firm-
level adjustments to trade, we show that the average mismatch between worker-specific abilities
and task-specific skill requirements unambiguously shrinks in the open economy. This points to
a so far unexplored channel through which trade can improve the labor market outcome and
stimulate welfare.
In an extension to our baseline model, we consider imperfections in the external labor mar-
ket due to search frictions. Relying on a competitive search model with wage posting, we
show that this modification does not alter our insights regarding the consequences of trade for
the firm-internal allocation of workers to tasks. However, due to adjustments in involuntary
unemployment, there is now a second channel through which trade affects economy-wide under-
employment. Whether more or less workers find a job in the open economy is in general not
clear and depends on the strength of selection of firms into exporting. If fixed costs of exporting
are high relative to domestic fixed costs, selection into exporting is strong and in this case trade
increases welfare and lowers underemployment due to a higher matching efficiency inside and
outside the firm. In a calibration exercise, we rely on parameter estimates for French firms to
quantify the relative importance of adjustments in the firm-internal and the firm-external labor
market. We find that both adjustments are important channels for gains from trade to materi-
alize. For instance, eliminating the ability of firms to screen their applicants and to adjust the
quality of worker-task matches endogenously would lower gains from trade by almost 90 percent,
whereas disregarding improvements in the outside labor market would lower gains from trade
by 50 percent when relying on the preferred parametrization of our model.
To put it in broader perspective, one can interpret our analysis as an attempt to widen the
picture of underemployment and to show that positive labor market consequences of trade need
not only materialize due to a reduction in involuntary unemployment. Rather efficiency gains
may be triggered by adjustments in the firm-internal organization of labor and according to our
results these gains may indeed be sizable. Of course, more research is needed before one can
draw a definite conclusion about how trade affects the way labor is used in modern production.
We hope that the insights from our analysis encourage such research.
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3.7 Appendix
Existence and uniqueness of a maximum of pi(ω)
Let us first assume that system (3.8) and (3.9) has a solution, i.e. pi(ω) has a stationary point
(l0, µ0). Then, this stationary point is a strict local maximum if the Hessian matrix
H(ω) =
(
pill(ω) pilµ(ω)
piµl(ω) piµµ(ω)
)
(3.45)
of pi(ω) is negative definite when evaluated at (l0, µ0). H(ω) is negative definite if pill(ω) < 0
and |H(ω)| = pill(ω)piµµ(ω)− pilµ(ω)2 > 0 hold. Twice differentiating pi(ω) gives:
pill(ω) = −σ − 1
σ2
p(ω)
x(ω)
φ(ω)2 [1 + µ(ω)]
2
< 0, (3.46)
piµµ(ω) = −σ − 1
σ2
p(ω)
x(ω)
φ(ω)2l(ω)2 − γ(γ − 1) [1 + µ(ω)]γ−2 , (3.47)
pilµ(ω) = piµl(ω) =
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
p(ω)φ(ω) > 0. (3.48)
With r(ω) = p(ω)x(ω) we can therefore compute
|H(ω)| = σ − 1
σ2
φ(ω)2p(ω)
x(ω)
{
σ − 1
σ
(2− σ)r(ω) + γ(γ − 1) [1 + µ(ω)]γ
}
. (3.49)
Evaluating the latter at (l0, µ0), we can make use of (3.9) and set r(ω) = [γσ/(σ − 1)] [1 + µ(ω)]γ .
This implies
|H(ω)| = (σ − 1)
2
σ3
φ(ω)2p(ω)2 [γ − (σ − 1)] (3.50)
and thus |H(ω)| >,=, < 0 if γ >,=, < σ − 1. Therefore, γ > σ − 1 gives a sufficient condition
for a local maximum of pi(ω) at stationary point (l0, µ0).
We now show that system (3.8), (3.9) has a unique interior solution for all active producers if
we impose the additional parameter constraint (1+ f)(σ− 1) > γ. For this purpose, it is worth
noting that for any given µ(ω), Eq. (3.8) has a unique solution in p(ω) which is represented
by (3.10). Accounting for (3.2) and substituting this constant markup pricing rule into (3.11),
allows us to define a function
F (µ(ω)) ≡ Y
M
(
w
φ
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
− σγ
σ − 1 [1 + µ(ω)]
γ−σ+1
, (3.51)
whose function value is equal to zero if first-order conditions (3.8) and (3.9) hold. It is easily
confirmed that F ′(·) < 0 and limµ(ω)→∞ F (·) < 0 hold if γ > σ − 1 is assumed. Hence,
F
(
µ(ω)
)
= 0 has a unique solution in µ(ω) if F (0) > 0. In view of constant markup pricing,
operating profits are a constant fraction 1/σ of firm-level revenues r(ω) = p(ω)x(ω). Since
the minimum possible fixed cost of production (without screening) equals 1 + f , firms are only
willing to start production if r(ω) ≥ σ(1 + f). Accounting for (3.2) and (3.10), it follows that
r(ω) is increasing in screening effort µ(ω), so that
r(ω) ≥ Y
M
(
w
φ
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
. (3.52)
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Putting together, it follows that F (0) ≥ σ(1 + f) − σγ/(σ − 1) must hold for all active firms,
rendering (σ − 1)(1 + f) > γ sufficient for F (0) > 0.
Summing up, we can therefore conclude that the profit-maximization problem in Chapter
3.2 has a unique interior solution (for active producers) if (σ − 1)(1 + f) > γ and γ > σ − 1
simultaneously hold. QED
Derivation of Equation (3.15)
Aggregate revenues of all intermediate goods producers equal
R =M
∫
∞
φ∗
r(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) =Mr(φ
∗)
ν
ν − ξ =M
fγσ
γ − σ + 1
ν
ν − ξ , (3.53)
where (3.13) and (3.14) have been used. Dividing R by σ and subtracting fixed costs for
operating the local distribution network, Mf , and for installing the screening technology,19
M
∫
∞
φ∗
[1 + µ(φ)]
γ dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) =M [1 + µ(φ
∗)]
γ ν
ν − ξ =M
f(σ − 1)
γ − σ + 1
ν
ν − ξ , (3.54)
gives aggregate profits Π =Mξf/(ν − ξ). Dividing Π by M , we finally obtain (3.15). QED
Derivation of Equation (3.18)
Total distance of worker-specific abilities and task-specific skill requirements can be calculated
by multiplying the average distance of a firm by this firm’s employment level and aggregating
the resulting expression over all firms. This gives total underemployment:
U =M
∫
∞
φ∗
l(φ)
3[1 + µ(φ)]
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) =M
l(φ∗)
3[1 + µ(φ∗)]
∫
∞
φ∗
(
φ
φ∗
) (γ−1)ξ
γ dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗)
=M
l(φ∗)
3[1 + µ(φ∗)]
γν
γ(ν − ξ) + ξ , (3.55)
where (3.2), (3.6), and (3.13) have been used. Dividing U by economy-wide employment
L =M
∫
∞
φ∗
l(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) =Ml(φ
∗)
∫
∞
φ∗
(
φ
φ∗
)ξ
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) =Ml(φ
∗)
ν
ν − ξ , (3.56)
then gives average underemployment u in (3.18). QED
Derivation of Equation (3.24)
Total revenues in the open economy are given by
R =M
∫ φ∗x
φ∗
rn(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) +M(1 + τ
1−σ)
∫
∞
φ∗x
re(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) . (3.57)
Substituting (3.20) and accounting for (3.13), (3.14), we can calculate
R =M
fγσ
γ − σ + 1
(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
ν
ν − ξ . (3.58)
19Again, Eqs. (3.13) and (3.14) are used for computing Eq. (3.54).
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Dividing R by σ and subtracting fixed costs Mf , Mχfx, and
M
∫ φ∗x
φ∗
[1 + µn(φ)]
γ dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) +M
∫
∞
φ∗x
[1 + µe(φ)]
γ dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗)
=M
f(σ − 1)
γ − σ + 1
(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
ν
ν − ξ , (3.59)
we get aggregate profits Π = Mξf(1 + χfx/f)/(ν − ξ). Dividing Π by M , finally gives (3.24).
QED
Derivation of Equation (3.28)
Total underemployment in the open economy is given by
U =M
∫ φ∗x
φ∗
ln(φ)
3[1 + µn(φ)]
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) +M(1 + τ
1−σ)
∫
∞
φ∗x
le(φ)
3[1 + µe(φ)]
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) . (3.60)
Using (3.2), (3.6), (3.13), and accounting for the definition of the exporter share, χ = (φ∗x/φ
∗)
−ν
,
we can compute
M
∫ φ∗x
φ∗
ln(φ)
3[1 + µn(φ)]
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) =M
ln(φ∗)
3[1 + µn(φ∗)]
γν
γ(ν − ξ) + ξ
1− χ(φ∗x
φ∗
) (γ−1)ξ
γ
 . (3.61)
Using in addition le(φ)/ln(φ) = {[1 + µe(φ)] / [1 + µn(φ)]}σ−1, according to (3.2) and (3.6), as
well as [1 + µe(φ)] / [1 + µn(φ)] =
(
1 + τ1−σ
)ξ/[γ(σ−1)]
from (3.20), we can further compute
M(1 + τ1−σ)
∫
∞
φ∗x
le(φ)
3[1 + µe(φ)]
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗)
=M
ln(φ∗)
3[1 + µn(φ∗)]
γν
γ(ν − ξ) + ξ χ
(
φ∗x
φ∗
) (γ−1)ξ
γ (
1 + τ1−σ
) (γ−1)ξ
γ(σ−1) . (3.62)
Substitution of (3.61) and (3.62) in (3.60) gives
U =M
ln(φ∗)
3[1 + µn(φ∗)]
γν
γ(ν − ξ) + ξ
1 + χ
[(
1 + τ1−σ
) (γ−1)ξ
γ(σ−1) − 1
](
φ∗x
φ∗
) (γ−1)ξ
γ
 . (3.63)
Using (3.22), (3.23), and accounting for the definition of a(τ) in (3.28), we obtain
U =M
ln(φ∗)
3[1 + µn(φ∗)]
γν
γ(ν − ξ) + ξ
[
1 + a(τ)χ1+
ξ
νγ
fx
f
]
. (3.64)
Dividing U by economy-wide employment
L =M
∫ φ∗x
φ∗
ln(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) +M(1 + τ
1−σ)
∫
∞
φ∗x
le(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗)
=Mln(φ∗)
ν
ν − ξ
(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
(3.65)
and noting that µa(φ∗a) = µ
n(φ∗), finally gives u in (3.28). QED
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The impact of marginal trade liberalization on underemployment u
Let us first define ρ(τ) ≡ (1 + τ1−σ) ξσ−1 , with ρ′(τ) < 0. In view of (3.23) and (3.28), we can
then rewrite χ and a(τ) in the following way:
χ =
(
f
fx
(ρ(τ)− 1)
) ν
ξ
a(τ) =
ρ(τ)
γ−1
γ − 1
ρ(τ)− 1 . (3.66)
Totally differentiating u with respect to τ , therefore gives
du
dτ
= ua
{
χfx/f
1 + χfx/f
χ
ξ
γν
da(τ)
dρ
+
fx/f
(1 + χfx/f)
2
[
ξ
γν
χ
ξ
γν a(τ)
(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
+ χ
ξ
γν a(τ)− 1
]
dχ
dρ
}
ρ′(τ), (3.67)
according to (3.28). Substituting
da(·)
dρ
= − 1
ρ(τ)− 1
(
a(τ)
γ
− γ − 1
γ
1− ρ(τ)− 1γ
ρ(τ)− 1
)
,
dχ
dρ
=
ν
ξ
χ
ρ(τ)− 1 , (3.68)
we can calculate
du
dτ
=
Ω
ρ(τ)− 1
χfx/f
(1 + χfx/f)
2 ρ
′(τ), (3.69)
with
Ω ≡ χ ξγν
(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
γ − 1
γ
1− ρ(τ)− 1γ
ρ(τ)− 1 +
ν
ξ
(
χ
ξ
γν a(τ)− 1
)
. (3.70)
Noting that 1 + χfx/f = 1 + χ
1−ξ/ν
(
ρ(τ)− 1) holds, according to (3.66), it is easily confirmed
that 1 + χfx/f < ρ(τ) for any χ < 1. This implies
Ω < χ
ξ
γν
γ − 1
γ
ρ(τ)− ρ(τ) γ−1γ
ρ(τ)− 1 +
ν
ξ
(
χ
ξ
γν a(τ)− 1
)
= −
(
ν
ξ
− γ − 1
γ
)
χ
ξ
γν [1− a(τ)]− ν
ξ
(
1− χ ξνγ
)
.
Since the right-hand side of this inequality is negative, we can conclude that Ω < 0 and, in view
of ρ′(τ) < 0, du/dτ > 0 must hold. This confirms that a marginal decline in τ unambiguously
lowers underemployment u in our setting and thus completes the proof. QED
Source code for the calibration exercise in Chapter 3.5
The calibration exercise has been executed in Mathematica. In the following we offer the source
code to derive the reported values from Table 3.1. At first, we define ξ ≡ γ(σ − 1)/(γ − σ + 1)
and set the parameter values for σ = 6.7 and ν = 7 (ν = 9 or ν = 11).
ξ=γ(σ-1)/(γ-σ+1);54
σ=6.7;55
ν=7;56
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In a next step, we set ξ/ν = 0.87 and use the FindRoot command to solve for γ. With γ at
hand, we can compute the corresponding ξ-level. We use γ1 and ξ1 to refer to the specific values
of γ and ξ thus calculated. We also check whether the parameter restrictions from the main
text are fulfilled.
a=FindRoot[ξ/ν=0.87,{γ,100}];57
γ1=γ/.a58
ξ1=ξ/.a59
If[γ1<=(ν(σ-1))/(ν-σ+1), Print["Error: γ to low 1!"]]60
If[γ1<=σ-1, Print["Error: γ to low 2!"]]61
If[ν<ξ1, Print["Error: ν to low 1!"]]62
If[ν<σ-1, Print["Error: ν to low 2!"]]63
To simplify notation in the calibration exercise, we set f = 1 and accordingly use fx to measure
the fixed cost ratio fx/f . To compute this fixed cost ratio, we consider τ = 1.5, as suggested
by McGowan and Milner (2013) and Novy (2013), and set the share of exporters in (3.23) at
the value reported by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). We use χf to refer to this specific
value of χ and thus have χf = 0.15.20 Applying the FindRoot command gives fx, with fx1
being used to refer to the thus calculated value of the exporter fixed cost.
τ=1.5;64
χ=(fx (ˆ-1)(1+τ (ˆ1-σ)) (ˆξ/(σ-1))-1) (ˆν/ξ);65
χ1=χ/.{γ->γ1};66
χf=N[34558/230423];67
b=FindRoot[χ1==χf, {fx,0.5}];68
fx1=fx/.b69
To compute the impact of trade on wages, employment, welfare, and the average mismatch, we
can use Eqs. (3.28) and (3.39)-(3.41). Considering the computed values of the fixed cost ratio,
γ, and ξ, setting ζ = 0.5 and accounting for χf = 0.15, we can to compute the trade effects,
reported in Table 3.1.
ζ=0.5;70
Δw=((1+χ*fx)/(1+χ)) (ˆ1/(σ-1))(1+χ*fx) (ˆ1/ν);71
Δw1=Δw/.{χ->χf, fx->fx1};72
aτ=((1+τ (ˆ1-σ)) (ˆ((γ-1)ξ1)/(γ(σ-1))))/((1+τ (ˆ1-σ)) (ˆ(ξ1)/(σ-1))-1);73
Δu=(1+aτ*χ (ˆ1+ξ1/(ν*γ))*fx)/(1+χ*fx);74
Δu1=Δu/.{χ->χf, fx->fx1, γ->γ1};75
ΔEmployment(Δw1) (ˆζ/(1-ζ));76
ΔWelfare=ΔEmployment (ˆ1/ζ);77
Print["Welfare effects: ", Round[100*(ΔWelfare-1),0.01]];78
Print["Employment effects: ", Round[100*(ΔEmployment-1),0.01]];79
Print["Average mismatch effects: ", Round[100*(Δu1-1),0.01]]80
In the following, we offer the source code for computing the trade effects in the limiting case of
γ →∞, as reported in Chapter 3.5. Thereby, we consider the preferred parametrization of our
model and thus set ν = 11 and σ = 6.7 to compute ξ. We also check whether the parameter
constraints are fulfilled.
20More specifically, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) report that in their sample of 230423 French manu-
facturing firms 34558 firms export.
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σ=6.7;1
ν=11;2
ξ=γ(σ-1)/(γ-σ+1);3
ξ1=Limit[ξ, γ->Infinity];4
If[ν<ξ1, Print["Error: ν too low!"]]5
Using the calculated fixed cost ratio from table 3.1 together with τ = 1.5, we can compute the
exporter share if ξ = ξ1:
fx=0.983287’;6
τ=1.5;7
χ=(fx (ˆ-1)(1+τ (ˆ1-σ)) (ˆξ1/(σ-1))-1) (ˆν/ξ1);8
Print["Export share: ", Round[χ,0.01]]9
With ζ = 0.5, we can finally use Eqs. (3.39)-(3.41) to compute the impact of trade on welfare
and employment for the limiting case γ →∞.
ζ=0.5;10
Δw=((1+χ*fx)/(1+χ)) (ˆ1/(σ-1))(1+χ*fx) (ˆ1/ν);11
ΔEmployment(Δw1) (ˆζ/(1-ζ));12
ΔWelfare=ΔEmployment (ˆ1/ζ);13
Print["Welfare effects: ", Round[100*(ΔWelfare-1),0.01]];14
Print["Employment effects: ", Round[100*(ΔEmployment-1),0.01]];15
This completes the source code for the calibration exercise.
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Chapter 4
Trade and the Firm-internal
Assignment of Skills to Tasks
4.1 Introduction
The organization of production within firms is a key determinant of firm performance. The
ability to allocate scarce resources within the boundaries of firms efficiently, is essential for
firms to compete in modern economic life.1 When it comes to the organization of labor within
firms, this topic is discussed in the literature on personnel economics. However, in the trade
literature, firms were treated as a black box over centuries. This perspective has changed over
the last few years, where recent contributions have provided new insights, how trade shapes
the internal organization of national and multinational firms. Thereby, the focus has been on
corporate hierarchies. For instance, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) highlight that a firm’s
productivity depends on how production is organized, and this organization changes in the
process of globalization.2 This chapter takes a different approach and introduces the idea of
a task-based production process into a framework of international trade. Of course, with the
production process consisting of different tasks, firms face new problems that are ignored in
the existing literature. If the set of tasks in a firm differ in complexity and workers differ in
their abilities to perform these tasks, the organization of workers to specific tasks inside the firm
becomes relevant.3 Modeling the assignment of workers to tasks and a discussion on how this
assignment changes in an open economy is in the center of this chapter’s interest.
For this purpose, I introduce a task based production process along the lines of Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) into a standard trade model with monopolistic competition among heterogeneous
firms, as in Melitz (2003). In this framework, firm output is assembled from a continuum of
tasks that differ in complexity. For the performance of tasks, firms can hire low-skilled or high-
skilled workers, while a higher skill level causes a comparative advantage in the performance of
more complex tasks. How firms assign skills to tasks depends on the comparative advantage
of high-skilled workers and their skill premium. By altering the range of tasks performed by
1In a recent paper by Giroud and Mueller (2012), it is shown that firm-level productivity increase, due to the
efficient resource reallocation within firms.
2See also Marin and Verdier (2008b, 2012).
3Clearly, there exists a large theoretical literature, that discusses how heterogeneous workers sort to different
industries, how they match with other workers, firms, and with other factors of production and how trade affects
this matching and the wage distribution (see Grossman, 2013, for a recent survey of this literature).
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high-skilled workers, firms do not only affect their labor costs but also their productivity. To
determine the optimal skill range and to manage the firm and organize the complex production
process, firms need a fixed input of high-skilled workers. In a benchmark model, I assume
that labor markets are perfectly competitive. After solving for the general equilibrium in a
closed economy, I analyze changes in factor endowments, which can be interpreted as migration
problem. The main insights from this analysis are that an increase in the supply of low-skilled
workers raises the range of tasks performed by this skill type, which triggers a decline in the
productivity of firms. While low-skilled workers lose due to a reduction in their real wage, high-
skilled workers gain in absolute and relative terms, as they see their real wage and skill premium
rising. Even though the mass of firms increases, overall welfare effects are ambiguous due to the
decline in productivity. In the case of high-skilled migration, firm productivity increases as firms
use this skill type for the performance of a broader range of tasks. While low-skilled workers
experience an increase in their income, the impact on high-skilled wages are less clear-cut and
depend on model parameters. As firm number and productivity increases, overall welfare effects
are positive.
In a second step, I consider a minimum wage for the group of low-skilled workers, to account
for the empirical fact that unemployment is persistent especially among this group of workers.
This reduces welfare relative to a benchmark with fully flexible wages and generates unemploy-
ment of low-skilled workers. Moreover, the introduction of a minimum wage lowers per-capita
income of high-skilled and low-skilled workers and increase the relative income of high-skilled
workers. Similar to Brecher (1974), in such an economy migration of low-skilled workers is fully
absorbed by a pari passu increase in unemployment and a reduction in welfare but leaves all
other variables unaffected. In contrast to a situation with fully flexible wages, migration of
high-skilled workers reduces the range of tasks performed by this group of workers, and thus
firm-level productivity, due to a magnification effect at the entrance of firms. Moreover, high-
skilled workers gain in absolute and relative terms, and the unemployment rate for low-skilled
workers goes down, implying that welfare must increase.
To shed light on the assignment of skills to tasks and a firm’s production process if the coun-
try under consideration opens up to trade, I discuss trade between two fully symmetric countries.
Similar to Krugman (1979), in a situation with fully flexible wages, trade only increases the real
wage for each skill type and aggregate welfare, while leaving all other variables unaffected. How-
ever, when low-skilled wages are fixed by the government, trade also affects a firm’s production
process. Due to a standard division of labor effect, demand for firms in each country is higher in
the open economy. This stimulates aggregate labor demand, and, as low-skilled wages are fixed,
the skill premium in each country. Firms respond to this change in relative factor prices and
assign low-skilled workers to a broader range of tasks. This skill downgrading reduces produc-
tivity of firms and accounts for a so far unexplored channel, through which trade affects local
production practices. However, as trade reduces high-skilled task production, more firms can
enter the market, implying that welfare effects are positive.
After shedding light on how trade between two countries affects the task based production
process, I use the framework to discuss how changes in a countries labor market institutions spill
over to the partner country. Starting from an equilibrium with trade between two minimum
wage economies, an increase in one country’s minimum wage also affects the assignment of
skills to tasks in the partner country. Due to a reduction in aggregate labor demand which
reduces the skill premium, firms produce a broader share of tasks with high-skilled workers and
therefore become more productive. However, beside these positive productivity spillovers, firm
number and per-capita income for high-skilled workers are reduced, while low-skilled workers
face a higher unemployment rate, which, in sum, are instrumental for a decline in welfare.
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Accounting for differences in factor endowments has no impact on the insights from an open
economy scenario with fully flexible wages. However, if both countries set a minimum wage
for the group of low-skilled workers, high-skilled migration in one country increases the mass of
firms and the range of tasks performed by low-skilled workers in the partner country, and reduces
firm-level productivity, there. Low-skilled workers face a lower unemployment rate, while high-
skilled workers face an increase in the real wage, but see their relative income shrinking, and
welfare in the partner country rises.
By shedding light how trade affects the firm-internal labor market, this chapter is related to
a growing literature that analyzes how globalization shapes the organization of production. In
this chapter, changes in the assignment of workers with different skills to tasks with differing
complexity affects a firm’s productivity level. This is a novel mechanism that differentiates this
model from other trade models with a task-based production function. For instance, recent
contributions to the literature on offshoring builds upon Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).4
In the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) framework, production also consists of a continuum
of low-skilled and high-skilled tasks. However, their model provides a perfect mapping between
skills and tasks, as the set of tasks for each skill type is exogenous: low-skilled workers are
restricted to work in low-skill tasks and high-skilled workers are only assigned to high-skill tasks.
In my framework, things are more sophisticated, because each skill type can in principle perform
the whole range of tasks within a firm and the assignment decision depends on the relative
performance of low-skilled and high-skilled workers in task production and on the respective
factor costs. The endogenous assignment of workers with differing abilities to tasks with differing
skill requirements is also discussed in a recent paper by Egger and Koch (2013). While the
production side is similar to my framework, they differ with respect to heterogeneity in the
workforce. In the Egger and Koch (2013) framework, workers are horizontally differentiated,
implying that workers differ in their ability to perform certain tasks because their human capital
is occupation-specific. Moreover, firms have to invest into a screening mechanism to get some
information about the hidden task-specific abilities of workers. By increasing the screening
intensity, firms can improve the matching of workers to tasks and thereby firm productivity. In
the present model, firms have perfect information about the abilities of workers and the focus
is on how firms assign low-skilled and high-skilled workers to tasks with differing complexity.
Thereby, high-skilled workers have an absolute productivity advantage in the performance of
all tasks. However, they are also more expensive, and hence firms find it attractive to assign
high-skilled workers only to tasks with high complexity, since their comparative advantage is
declining with less complexity. The range of tasks performed by high-skilled workers determines
firm-productivity, and hence firms with higher skill intensity end up being more productive.
An alternative mechanism, that relates firm productivity to the organization of workers in the
production process is discussed by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). In their model it is the
hierarchy structure within firms, i.e. the number of layers of management and the knowledge
and span of control of each agent that is instrumental for firm performance.
By allowing for changes in the firm-internal assignment of workers to tasks, the chapter also
contributes to a vivid discussion on how trade affects productivity. The seminal paper by Melitz
(2003) proposes an increase in aggregate productivity due to a change in the composition of
active producers, while leaving firm-level productivity unaffected. Bustos (2011) extends the
Melitz-framework by allowing firms to invest into their technology. Since exporters gain market
size in the open economy, they find it more attractive to invest into their technology, and hence
end up having a higher productivity. In Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010), exporters
extend their screening investments and thus have a better workforce composition and therefore
4See, for instance, Kohler and Wrona (2011), Benz (2012) or Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
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higher productivity than in the closed economy. In Egger and Koch (2013) the expansion of
screening leaves the workforce composition unaffected but improves the assignment of workers to
tasks with positive productivity effects. Interestingly, empirical evidence at the firm-level is not
conclusive.5 My model provides a reasoning for this. Because trade expand demand for high-
skilled workers as a fixed input in the production process, it leaves less high-skilled resources
for task production. This worsens the skill composition with correspondent consequences for
firm-level productivity.6 This effect, however, does only exist if labor markets are not perfectly
competitive, with labor market imperfection being modeled by means of a binding minimum
wage.
By introducing a minimum wage for low-skilled workers, this chapter is related to a sizable
literature that accounts for different forms of labor market imperfections in the Melitz (2003)-
framework.7 One feature in these studies is that the labor market imperfection has no impact
on the productivity of a specific firm but affects the average productivity of all active producers
due to changes in the composition of firms. For instance, in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009),
a more important rent sharing motive in workers’ fair wage preferences reduces labor costs for
low productive firms relative to their more productive competitors, because wages in high pro-
ductive firms increase disproportionately with the rent sharing motive. This implies, somewhat
counterintuitive, that profits for the cutoff firm increase. With more unproductive firms being
able to survive in the market, the average productivity falls. A different mechanism is studied
in Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2012). In their paper, a more severe labor market imperfec-
tion increases the common wage and the marginal production costs proportionally. This forces
the least productive firms to exit and thus increases average productivity, because the compo-
sition of firms improves. In my model, productivity effects arise from different wage setting
institutions for low-skilled and high-skilled workers which affect the firm-internal assignment of
skills to tasks and thus a firm’s productivity. Hence, the labor market imperfection leads to a
reallocation of workers within firms, while in existing studies on heterogeneous firms, labor is
reallocated between firms.
Allowing for differences in the prevailing labor market institutions between two trading
partners, the chapter is also related to a literature that discusses labor market linkages in open
economies. Starting with the seminal work by Davis (1998), several authors have discussed
how labor market imperfections in one country spill over to foreign markets.8 In a recent pa-
per, Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2012) build upon a similar framework as the one considered
in this chapter. In particular, they also consider monopolistic competition between heteroge-
neous firms. However, in contrast to the approach taken here, production in Egger, Egger, and
Markusen (2012) only consists of a single task. They furthermore differ in the underlying entry
mechanism, by assuming an exogenous mass of potential entrants. This modification turns out
to be instrumental for their results. In particular, the exogenous pool of potential entrants
establishes a link between the minimum wage and the cutoff productivity of the marginal firm
and implies that if two countries with differing minimum wages engage in trade, they end up
5Wagner (2007) provides a survey on the link between exporters and productivity on the evidence from firm
level data. After studding 45 microeconometric studies he concludes that ”exporting does not necessarily improve
productivity” (p.1).
6This effect is well in line with empirical evidence. For instance, Harrigan and Reshef (2011) argue the
”empirical studies have failed to find large effects of trade liberalization on firm-level or plant-level skill upgrading”
(p.3).
7Prominent examples are Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008); Davis and Harrigan (2011); Egger and
Kreickemeier (2009, 2012); Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2012); Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011); Helpman
and Itskhoki (2010); Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010).
8Prominent examples are Oslington (2002), Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006), Meckl (2006) or Felbermayr,
Larch, and Lechthaler (2013).
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with differing compositions of local producers. In the present chapter, firm entry is modeled
along the line of Melitz (2003), and this renders the cutoff productivity level independent of the
prevailing minimum wage. Nonetheless, despite differences in the level, minimum wages can be
binding in both countries, because the endogenous assignment of skills to tasks allows to absorb
for differences in local labor market institutions. Taking stock, the model presented in this
chapter suggests that differences in labor market institutions lead to different skill intensities
and firm productivities, but leave the composition of producers unaffected.9
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Chapter 4.2, I introduce the model
and characterize the equilibrium outcome in the closed economy. I start with a benchmark
model, in which wages are fully flexible and then consider a model variant with a binding
minimum wage. Furthermore, I conduct two comparative static experiments and analyze how
changes in the endowment with low-skilled and high-skilled workers affect the equilibrium out-
come in the closed economy under the two labor market regimes. In Chapter 4.3, I provide
insights into the impact of trade on the firm-internal assignment of skills to tasks when labor
markets are perfectly competitive or low-skilled wages are set by the government. In Chapter
4.4, I discuss how labor markets are linked in open economies and analyze to what extent pre-
vious insights from my analysis depend on the assumption of symmetric countries. Chapter 4.5
concludes with a brief summary of the most important results.
4.2 The closed economy
4.2.1 Model structure and firm-level analysis
Consider an economy that is populated by an exogenous mass of L low-skilled and H high-skilled
workers and hosts two sectors of production: a final goods industry that assembles intermediates,
and an intermediates goods industry, which employs labor for performing different tasks. The
final good Y is homogeneous and produced under perfect competition, according to a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function (see Matusz, 1996):
Y =
[∫
ω∈Ω
x(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (4.1)
where x(ω) denotes the quantity of intermediate variant ω used in the production of Y , set
Ω represents the mass of available intermediate goods with Lebesgue measure M , and σ > 1
denotes the (constant) elasticity of substitution between variants of the intermediate.
Choosing the final good as nume´raire, profits in the final goods industry are Y−∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)x(ω)dω,
where p(ω) denotes the price of variety ω. Maximizing these profits with respect to x(ω) gives
intermediate goods demand10
x(ω) = Y p(ω)−σ. (4.2)
Intermediate goods producers compete with rival firms in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each firm produces a unique variety, by combining a continuum of tasks repre-
sented by the unit interval. I follow Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and use a simple Cobb-Douglas
9This mechanism would also be effective in a Krugman (1979)-type model with homogeneous producers.
However, in line with the recent literature in international economics and to contrast my results with Egger,
Egger, and Markusen (2012), I prefer a setting with heterogeneous firms along the lines of Melitz (2003), where
firms differ in terms of their (exogenous) productivity.
10Due to the choice of the nume´raire, the CES price index corresponding to Y , P = [
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−σdω]1/(1−σ),
is equal to one.
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function to formalize the assembly of tasks in the production of intermediates:
x(ω) = φ(ω) exp
[∫ 1
0
ln x(ω, i)di
]
, (4.3)
where φ(ω) is a firm’s baseline productivity that measures the efficiency to coordinate and
bundle tasks and x(ω, i) is the production level of task i in firm ω. Tasks are performed by
low-skilled and high-skilled workers, l(ω, i) and h(ω, i) respectively, who are employed in a
linear-homogeneous production function of the form11
x(ω, i) = αl(i)l(ω, i) + αh(i)h(ω, i), (4.4)
where αl(i) and αh(i) are the labor productivities of the two skill types, when performing task
i. The task level production function in (4.4) implies that low-skilled and high-skilled workers
are substitutes in the performance of tasks. However, the productivity of workers in performing
a specific task differs, because workers differ in their abilities, while tasks differ in their skill
requirements. To capture performance (i.e. productivity) differences across tasks between the
two skill groups in a simple way, I impose the following assumption on absolute and comparative
advantages in the performance of tasks:
Assumption 1 Denoting the labor productivity ratio between high- and low-skilled workers in
tasks i by α(i) ≡ αh(i)/αl(i), it is assumed that α(i) is a continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing and convex function of i, i.e. α′(i) > 0, α′′(i) ≥ 0, with α(0) = 1. To implement these
properties in a tractable way, I consider αl(i) = 1 and αh(i) = α(i) = exp[i] for all i ∈ [0, 1].
This assumption captures the idea that tasks can be ordered according to their complexity,
with a higher index referring to higher complexity. A high-skilled worker that is assigned to the
least complex task, is as productive as her low-skilled coworker, since her specific skills are not
required for performing the respective task. Things are different in the case of a more complex
task, where the higher skill level causes an absolute productivity advantage over low-skilled
coworkers. Changes in the assignment of workers of different skill levels to the different tasks
affect a firm’s productivity level. This is a novel mechanism that plays a crucial role in the
subsequent analysis and differentiates this model from other trade models with a task-based
production function.
Intermediate goods producers maximize their profits according to a two-stage optimization
problem. In a first step, firms assign skills to tasks and thereby determine the range of tasks
performed by low-skilled and high-skilled workers, respectively. In a second step, they choose
task-level output, which is equivalent to determining the task-level employment for a given
skill assignment. In the subsequent analysis, I solve this two-stage problem through backward
induction.
For a given assignment of workers to tasks, intermediate goods producers set task-level output
x(ω, i), to maximize their profits
pi(ω) = p(ω)x(ω)−
∫ 1
0
x(ω, i)ck(ω, i)di− fwh, (4.5)
subject to (4.2) and (4.3), where ck(ω, i) denotes the unit costs of a firm ω performing task i
with the preassigned skill type k = l, h and f measures the fixed input of high-skilled labor
11Acemoglu and Autor (2011) additionally account for medium-skilled workers in their model, since their main
motivation is to analyze the observed increase of employment in high-skilled and low-skilled occupations relative
to middle skilled occupations, which they call ”job polarization”. To keep the model tractable, I abstract from
this third skill type, here.
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that is required to manage the firm and organize the production process.12 With a Cobb-
Douglas production function, this gives the standard result of a constant cost share for each task.
Furthermore, in the special case of each task entering the production function symmetrically,
cost shares for all tasks are the same. To be more specific, substitution of (4.2) into the first-order
condition ∂pi(ω)/∂x(ω, i) = 0 gives
σ − 1
σ
p(ω)x(ω) = x(ω, i)ck(ω, i). (4.6)
Integrating over the unit interval, shows that prices are set as a constant markup σ/(σ−1) over
variable unit costs C(ω)/x(ω): p(ω) = [σC(ω)]/[(σ− 1)x(ω)], where C(ω) ≡ ∫ 1
0
x(ω, i)ck(ω, i)di
are a firm’s total variable labor costs.
With these insights at hand, I am now equipped to determine the optimal range of tasks
performed by a specific skill type. For this purpose, I focus on the case of interior solutions and
assume that both skill groups are used for the production of intermediates.13 Since tasks are
ordered according to their complexity, I can then define a unique threshold task z(ω) ∈ (0, 1),
for which the firm is indifferent between hiring low-skilled or high-skilled workers, at prevailing
relative wages s ≡ wh/wl. To put it formally, the unit costs ck(ω, z(ω)) of a firm ω performing
task z(ω) are the same irrespective of the assigned skill type k = l, h. This implies cl(ω, z(ω)) =
ch(ω, z(ω)) or, equivalently
wl =
wh
αh(z(ω))
(4.7)
and establishes s ≡ wh/wl = α(z). Due to the absolute advantage of high-skilled workers in
the performance of all tasks, the existence of an interior solution, z(ω) ∈ (0, 1), requires a
skill premium, i.e. s > 1. Furthermore, due to relative advantage of high-skilled workers in
performing more complex tasks, it follows that low-skilled workers will be assigned to all tasks
i < z(ω), while high-skilled workers will be assigned to all tasks i ≥ z(ω).14 Notably, since all
firms are price takers in the labor market and pay the same wh, wl, the threshold task z(ω) is
the same for all intermediate goods producers, and hence I can write z(ω) ≡ z for all ω. With
the threshold task at hand, I can combine Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) to rewrite firm output as
x(ω) = φ(ω)ϕ(z) exp
[∫ z
0
ln l(ω, i)di+
∫ 1
z
ln h(ω, i)di
]
(4.8)
where ϕ(z) ≡ exp
[∫ z
0
lnαl(i)di+
∫ 1
z
lnαh(i)di
]
= exp[(1 − z2)/2]. According to (4.8), firm
productivity consists of two parts: an exogenous baseline productivity φ(ω) and the endogenous
productivity term ϕ(z), which varies with the assignment of skills to tasks, and thus is a function
of threshold task z. From ϕ′(z) = −ϕ(z) lnα(z) = −zϕ(z) it follows that firms can raise their
productivity when performing a larger share of tasks with high-skilled workers. However, if
s > 1, this comes at the cost of higher wages and is therefore not necessarily beneficial.
A direct implication of the identical cost share (see above) is that the amount of workers
of a specific skill type employed for performing tasks is the same for all tasks performed by
12The assumption that high-skilled workers are needed to manage the firm and organize the production process
is in line with the literature focusing on the internal organization of firms in economies with heterogeneous workers
(see, for instance, Marin and Verdier, 2008b, 2012).
13Below, I will discuss a parameter constraint that needs to be fulfilled in order for such an interior solution
to materialize.
14For convenience, it is assumed that firms hire high-skilled workers for performing task z(ω).
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workers of this skill type. This can be seen from substitution of (4.4) and ck(ω, i) = wk/αk(i),
with k = l if i < z and k = h if i ≥ z, into (4.6), which gives wll(ω, i) = wll(ω) for all i < z
and whh(ω, i) = whh(ω) for all i ≥ z. Similarly, it follows from (4.4), (4.6) and (4.7) that
wll(ω) = whh(ω). This implies
s =
l(ω)
h(ω)
=
1− z
z
L(ω)
H(ω)
, (4.9)
where L(ω) =
∫ z
0
l(ω, i)di = zl(ω) and H(ω) =
∫ 1
z
h(ω, i)di = (1− z)h(ω) are firm ω’s total low-
skilled and high-skilled variable labor input, respectively. Accordingly, a firm’s skill intensity is
given by H(ω)/L(ω) = (1 − z)/[zα(z)] and thus decreasing in z. Putting together, I can thus
write a firm’s total variable labor costs as C(ω) = [wL(ω)/H(ω) + wh]H(ω), while this firm’s
output is given by x(ω) = φ(ω)ϕ(z){[(1 − z)/z]L(ω)/H(ω)}zh(ω). Substitution of (4.9), then
gives me for the variable unit cost of this firm: C(ω)/x(ω) = wzl w
1−z
h /[φ(ω)ϕ(z)], which is equal
to the marginal cost of the respective producer. Constant markup pricing therefore implies
p(ω) =
σ
σ − 1
wzl w
1−z
h
φ(ω)ϕ(z)
. (4.10)
Noting that revenues of firm ω are given by r(ω) = p(ω)x(ω) and taking into account that wl,
wh and ϕ(z) are the same for all producers, it follows from (4.2) and (4.10) that the revenue
ratio of two firms 1 and 2 with productivity levels φ(ω1), φ(ω2) is given by r(ω1)/r(ω2) =
[φ(ω1)/φ(ω2)]
σ−1. Hence, relative firm performance is fully characterized by the baseline pro-
ductivity ratio. I can thus skip firm index ω from now on, and instead refer to firms by their
productivity levels.
Regarding firm entry, I follow the literature on heterogeneous firms along the lines of Melitz
(2003) – with the mere difference that I consider a static model variant along the lines of
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) – and assume that
the baseline productivity is drawn by firms in a lottery from the common Pareto distribution,
G(φ) = 1 − φ−k.15 The participation fee for the lottery is fewh and this fee gives a firm a
single productivity draw. Having revealed their productivity, producers decide upon setting up
a plant and starting production by making the additional investment of f units of high-skilled
labor (see above). With revenues (and thus profits) increasing in baseline productivity, I can
identify a cutoff productivity level, φ∗, which separates active firms with φ ≥ φ∗ from inactive
ones with φ < φ∗. The profits from production of a firm with cutoff productivity φ∗ are equal
to zero by definition and I can thus characterize the marginal firm with cutoff productivity
level φ∗ by means of a zero profit condition pi(φ∗) = 0. This zero profit condition is usually
referred to by the term zero-cutoff profit condition. In view of a Pareto distribution of baseline
productivity levels, there is a proportional link between revenues of the marginal producer and
average revenues of all active producers. As outlined in the appendix, this link can be used to
establish the modified zero-cutoff-profit condition
p¯i =
fwh(σ − 1)
k − σ + 1 , (4.11)
where k > σ − 1 is required for a positive, finite value of p¯i. In equilibrium the costs of entering
the productivity lottery, fewh, must be equal to the expected profit of doing so, p¯i(1−G(φ∗)).
15Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2012) provide evidence for the Pareto distribution, using firm level
data for European countries.
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This establishes the free entry condition
p¯i = fewh(φ
∗)k. (4.12)
Combining (4.11) and (4.12), I can explicitly solve for cutoff productivity level φ∗:
φ∗ =
(
f
fe
σ − 1
k − σ + 1
)1/k
. (4.13)
Eqs. (4.11) and (4.13) are the key firm-level variables, which are also informative for economy-
wide variables. In particular, with φ∗ at hand, I can calculate the productivity average φ˜ ≡
[k/(k − σ + 1)]1/(σ−1)φ∗,16 which is useful because key aggregate variables in this model of
heterogeneous firms are the same as they would be in an otherwise identical model of homo-
geneous firms with productivity φ˜: R = Mr(φ˜), Π = Mpi(φ˜), and, Y = Mσ/(σ−1)x(φ˜) and
P = M1/(1−σ)p(φ˜). With these insights at hand, I can now turn to study the general equilib-
rium outcome in my model.
4.2.2 General equilibrium with perfect labor markets
To solve for the general equilibrium outcome in the closed economy, I have to specify how
wages are determined. I start with a benchmark scenario, in which wages of low-skilled and
high-skilled workers are flexible and determined in perfectly competitive markets. Using the
adding up condition, which simply says that adding up employment of a given skill type over
all producers must give total employment of the respective skill group, market clearing for
low-skilled workers establishes17:
L =M
∫
∞
φ∗
L(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) = zMs
fk(σ − 1)
k − σ + 1 , (4.14)
whereas for high-skilled workers, I obtain
H =M
∫
∞
φ∗
H(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) +Mf +Mefe =M
fk
k − σ + 1[(1− z)(σ − 1) + 1]. (4.15)
Furthermore, there exists a third condition, which I have to consider for characterizing the
general equilibrium outcome in the closed economy: I have to make sure that profit-maximizing
price-setting is in accordance with firm entry. Following Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2012)
I call the respective condition profit maximization condition and combine the solution for the
CES price index, P =M1/(1−σ)p(φ˜), with the choice of nume´raire, P = 1, and the price markup
condition in (4.10), applied for the firm with productivity φ˜. Using (4.13) and the definition of
φ˜, I can solve for
M =
[
wzl w
1−z
h ζ
ϕ(z)
]σ−1
, (4.16)
16As discussed in Melitz (2003), the average productivity φ˜ equals the weighted harmonic mean of the φ’s of
active producers, with relative output levels x(φ)/x(φ˜) serving as weights.
17In view of constant markup pricing, labor costs are a constant share (σ−1)/σ of a firm’s revenues: wlL(φ)+
whH(φ) = r(φ)(σ − 1)/σ. Using L(φ) = zl(φ), H(φ) = (1− z)h(φ) and accounting for wll(φ) = whh(φ), further
implies L(φ) = z[(σ − 1)/σ]r(φ)/wl and H(φ) = (1 − z)[(σ − 1)/σ]r(φ)/wh, respectively. Finally, combining
wh = α(z)wl and M
∫∞
φ∗
r(φ)dG(φ)/[1−G(φ∗)] = Mσkfwh/(k − σ + 1) from the appendix and Me = M(φ
∗)k,
allows me to compute (4.14) and (4.15).
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where ζ ≡ [σ/(σ − 1)] [(k − σ + 1)/k]1/(σ−1) {fe(k − σ + 1)/[f(σ − 1)]}1/k is a constant.
Putting together, there are hence four equations, namely (4.7) and (4.14)–(4.16) which jointly
determine the four endogenous variables: z, wl, wh and M . To determine the equilibrium
threshold task, I first combine the two labor market clearing conditions. Dividing (4.14) by
(4.15) and solving for the skill premium, I can calculate
s =
L
H
(1− z)(σ − 1) + 1
z(σ − 1) , (4.17)
with limz→0 s =∞, s = L/[(σ−1)H] if z = 1, and ds/dz = −(σL)/[(σ−1)H(z)2] < 0.18 Noting
further that Eq. (4.7) establishes a positive link between s and z;19 s = exp[z], combining (4.7)
and (4.17) therefore gives a unique solution for the skill premium and the threshold task in the
closed economy. Thereby the equilibrium solution for z and s depends on a country’s endowment
with low-skilled and high-skilled workers, respectively. Since firms need high-skilled workers to
manage the firm and organize the production process, a country’s relative endowment with
high-skilled workers must be sufficient large to guarantee that some workers are left for the
performance of tasks. To guarantee an interior solution with z ∈ (0, 1), exp[1] > L/[(σ − 1)H],
and therefore
H
L
>
1
(σ − 1) exp[1] (4.18)
must hold.20 This is the parameter domain, I am focusing on in my analysis.
The thus determined equilibrium level of z can be used in (4.15) to compute the equilibrium
mass of firms. Thereby, the labor market clearing condition for high-skilled workers determines
for a given threshold task the mass of firms that can be active in equilibrium. Finally, accounting
for (4.7), I can rewrite (4.16) as follows:
M =
[
wlζ
β(z)
]σ−1
, (4.16′)
where β(z) = ϕ(z)α(z)−(1−z) = exp[(1 − z)2/2]. Eq. (4.16′) determines for a given threshold
task and a given mass of producers the low-skilled wage rate wl and thus the unit cost wl/[φϕ(z)]
that are consistent with the markup pricing condition in (4.10). These insights are summarized
in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Provided that the relative supply of high-skilled workers is sufficiently high, with
H/L > {(σ − 1) exp[1]}−1, there exists a unique interior equilibrium, in which firms hire both
skill types for the performance of tasks, i.e. z ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Analysis in the text.
Figure 4.1 provides a graphical illustration on how the four equations (4.7) and (4.14)-(4.16′)
interact in determining the general equilibrium variables of interest. Thereby, it is taken into
18Intuitively, an increase in z reduces demand for high-skilled relative to low-skilled workers and thus reduces
the skill premium.
19In the absence of monopsony power of firms, workers are paid their marginal product of labor. With αl(i) = 1
and αh(i) = exp[i], the marginal productivity of high-skilled workers is increasing in the threshold task. Thus,
if z increases, this implies an increase in the skill premium.
20In this case, the skill premium determined by (4.7) is larger than the skill premium determined by (4.17),
when the two equations are evaluated at z = 1.
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account that for a given wl, both (4.15) and (4.16
′) establish a positive link between the threshold
task z and the mass of producers M . Differentiating (4.15), I can compute
dM
dz
∣∣∣∣
Eq.(4.15)
=M
σ − 1
(1− z)(σ − 1) + 1 > 0,
d2M
dz2
∣∣∣∣
Eq.(4.15)
= 2M
(σ − 1)2
[(1− z)(σ − 1) + 1]2 > 0,
(4.19)
which implies that locus (4.15) establishes a positive and convex relationship between M and z,
as depicted in the upper panel of Figure 4.1. Furthermore, differentiating (4.16′) gives
dM
dz
∣∣∣∣
Eq.(4.16′)
=M(σ − 1)(1− z) > 0, d
2M
dz2
∣∣∣∣
Eq.(4.16′)
=M(σ − 1) [(σ − 1)(1− z)2 − 1] ,
(4.20)
with d2M/dz2
∣∣
Eq.(4.16′)
being positive for small levels of z if σ > 2 and negative for high
ones. This establishes the S-shape of locus (4.16′) in the upper panel of Figure 4.1, while the
relationship is concave for σ < 2.21 The lower panel of Figure 4.1 captures (4.7) and (4.17) in
the (s, z)-space. To see how the equilibrium outcome is determined one has to start in the lower
panel, where equilibrium values of z and s are represented by the intersection point of (4.7) and
(4.17). I use index c to refer to an equilibrium with competitive labor markets. Combining the
equilibrium threshold level zc with (4.15) in the upper panel, then determines the equilibrium
mass of firms M c. Finally, given zc and M c, the position of locus (4.16′) has to be adjusted in
order to bring the low-skilled wage in accordance with constant markup-pricing and the price
index corresponding to Eq. (4.1). Hereby, it is notable that an leftward shift of (4.16′) refers to
an increase in wl.
In Figure 4.1, (4.16′) is plotted such that it intersects (4.15) at (M c, zc) from below. As
outlined in the next subchapter, this is a prerequisite for a stable equilibrium in a minimum
wage economy, which is analyzed below. To shed further light on this issue, it is notable that
dM
dz
∣∣∣∣z=zc,wl=wcl
Eq.(4.16′)
R
dM
dz
∣∣∣∣z=zc
Eq.(4.15)
(4.21)
is equivalent to zˆ R zc, with
zˆ ≡ 2σ − 1−
√
4σ − 3
2(σ − 1) (4.22)
and zˆ ∈ (0, 1) ∀ σ > 1. It therefore follows that in the competitive equilibrium locus (4.16′)
intersects locus (4.15) from below if zc < zˆ, requiring that
H
L
>
(1− zˆ)(σ − 1) + 1
zˆ(σ − 1) exp[zˆ] ≡ hˆ, (4.23)
which provides a more restrictive parameter constraint than (4.18). This is illustrated in Figure
4.1 where the dashed curve in the upper panel indicates a scenario with H/L = hˆ and z = zˆ.
Starting from such an outcome, an increase in H/L – due to a decline in L for a given H –
shifts locus (4.17) inwards and locus (4.16′) to the left in Figure 4.1, thereby establishing an
equilibrium in which (4.16′) intersects (4.15) from below.22
21Throughout the chapter, σ > 2 is assumed for illustrative reasons, while in principle, σ > 1 is sufficient for
establishing the results.
22Of course, the analysis above does not ensure that (4.15) and (4.16′) have a unique intersection point. Looking
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zc 1
Mc
sc
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium with fully flexible wages in the closed economy
4.2.3 Equilibrium with a minimum wage for low-skilled workers
It is an empirically well documented fact for industrialized economies, that involuntary un-
employment is especially persistent among low-skilled workers. Therefore, I introduce a (real)
binding minimum wage w, that is set by the government for this skill type. This implies that
the labor market clearing condition for low-skilled workers no longer holds, and the adding-up
condition for low-skilled workers now determines unemployment. To be more specific, (4.14) is
replaced by
(1− u)L = zMsfk(σ − 1)
k − σ + 1 (4.24)
with u denoting the unemployment rate, which is positive if the minimum wage is binding.
While (4.7), (4.15) and (4.16′) remain unaffected by this modification (except for wl being now
determined exogenously by minimum wage w), the determination of the equilibrium values for z
at the shapes of the two loci (4.15) and (4.16′), I cannot rule out that there exists a second intersection point to the
right of (zc,Mc). However, in such an intersection point z > zc and M > Mc must hold, and this is inconsistent
with an equilibrium, as can be seen when substituting (4.7) into (4.14) to obtain L = zezMfk(σ−1)/(k−σ+1).
Since the latter holds if z = zc andM = Mc, it must be violated if z > zc andM > Mc, rendering an intersection
point to the right of (zc,Mc) inconsistent with market clearing for low-skilled workers.
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and M changes. In contrast to the previous chapter with fully flexible wages, (4.15) and (4.16′)
now jointly determine the threshold task and the prevailing number of firms in the economy.
Given z, (4.7) then determines the skill premium. Finally, substitution of (4.7) and (4.15) into
(4.24), allows me to relate the unemployment rate to the computed skill premium:
u = 1− ln[s]s H(σ − 1)
L[(1− ln[s])(σ − 1) + 1] , (4.25)
with du/ds < 0. To see how the general equilibrium variables are linked in the minimum wage
economy, I can build on insights from Figure 4.1. Noting that the minimum wage is binding
if and only if w > wcl ≡ w, because otherwise firms would simply pay the competitive wage
and unemployment would fall to zero, it is immediate that in the minimum wage economy locus
(4.16′) is shifted leftwards relative to the benchmark scenario with competitive wages. Moreover,
provided that the relative supply of high-skilled workers is sufficiently large, i.e. H/L > hˆ as
discussed in the previous chapter, locus (4.16′) intersects (4.15) from below, implying that an
leftward shift of locus (4.16′) gives z < zc and M < M c.23 Since low-skilled workers are
more expensive in the minimum wage economy, firms assign them to a lower range of tasks.
This implies that more high-skilled labor is used as a variable input, leaving less resources for
entering the lottery and to manage the firm and organize the production process and thereby
lowering the mass of competitors.
Now it could be possible that the minimum wage is so high that employment of low-skilled
workers becomes eventually unattractive even for the least complex task, resulting in z = 0.
To rule out such a corner solution, I focus on a parameter domain for which (4.15) and (4.16′)
intersect at some z ∈ (0, 1). This is the case if w < w ≡ exp[1/2]ζ−1[H(k−σ+1)/(fkσ)]1/(σ−1).
If an interior equilibrium with z ∈ (0, 1) exists in the minimum wage economy, it follows from
the properties of (4.15) and (4.16′) that the equilibrium is unique. Furthermore, the equilibrium
is stable, as can be inferred from considering a point like A in the upper right panel of Figure 4.2.
In point A the mass of firms is too low for a given z, and M will increase until it is consistent
with the labor market clearing condition for high-skilled workers. However, in view of (4.16′),
the prevailing z is now too small for a given M . Hence, with constant markup pricing z must
increase in order to restore P = 1. This mechanism continues until the intersection point of
(4.15) and (4.16′) is reached.
With the solution for z and M at hand, skill premium s in the minimum wage economy
is determined in the lower right panel of Figure 4.2. Locus (4.25) in the lower left panel of
Figure 4.2 finally determines unemployment rate u in the minimum wage economy. Thereby,
locus (4.17) is used to construct the intercept of locus (4.25) with the vertical axis at the skill
premium s = sc, which leads to u = 0. With these insights, I am now equipped to discuss the
group-specific effects of a binding minimum wage. Looking at the group of high-skilled workers,
there are two counteracting effects on their income triggered by an increase in wl. On the
one hand, a higher wage for low-skilled workers, implies that high-skilled workers are employed
for a larger range of tasks in all active firms. This labor demand stimulus is counteracted by
a decline in the mass of firms entering the market, which lowers demand for both skill types
ceteris paribus. To see which of the two effects dominates I can substitute wh = α(z)w in (4.15)
and (4.16′) to compute
wh =
[
H(k − σ + 1)
fk
] 1
σ−1
ζ−1 exp
[
1 + z2
2
] [
1
(1− z)(σ − 1) + 1
] 1
σ−1
. (4.26)
23From the analysis in the previous chapter I know that an outcome with z > zc and M > Mc is inconsistent
with an equilibrium.
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Noting from above that introduction of a binding minimum wage lowers threshold task z, it
follows from (4.26) that dwh/dwl < 0. Accordingly, high-skilled workers are worse-off in the
minimum wage economy than in the benchmark model with competitive labor markets.
Regarding the group of low-skilled workers, there are winners and losers. Those, who keep
their job in a minimum wage economy, see their income rising, whereas those who lose their job
are worse off than in the competitive labor market scenario. To obtain a compulsory measure for
the group-specific welfare of low-skilled workers, I can look at (1− u)w. Substituting s = wh/w
into (4.24), it is immediate that introduction of the minimum wage, by lowering M , z and wh,
unambiguously lowers per-capita income (and thus welfare) of low-skilled workers.
While the skill premium s = α(z) is lower in the minimum wage economy than in the
benchmark model with competitive labor markets, setting w > wcl increases the return to high-
skilled workers relative to the expected income of low-skilled workers. This can be seen from
rewriting Eq. (4.24) as follows
wh
(1− u)w =
L
zM
k − σ + 1
fk(σ − 1) (4.27)
and noting from the discussion above that the introduction of a binding real minimum wage
lowers both z and M . Finally, since both skill types end up with a lower per-capita income
in a minimum wage economy, compared to a situation with fully flexible wages, it immediately
follows that welfare, measured by per-capita incomeW ≡ I/(H+L), where I = (1−u)Lw+Hwh
denotes aggregate labor income, is reduced. Proposition 8 summarizes the insights of introducing
a binding real minimum wage for low-skilled workers.
Proposition 8 For a binding minimum wage w ∈ (w,w), there exists a unique and stable
interior equilibrium with z < zc and M < M c if H/L > hˆ. Introduction of the minimum
wage lowers welfare relative to the benchmark of an economy with a competitive labor market
and it generates involuntary unemployment of low-skilled workers. Looking at the group-specific
effects, the introduction of a binding minimum wage w ∈ (w,w) lowers welfare of high-skilled
and low-skilled workers and – although lowering the skill premium – increases the relative income
of high-skilled workers.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
4.2.4 Comparative-static analysis
I complete the discussion of the closed economy, by shedding light on how changes in key
model parameters affect the general equilibrium variables of interest. An obvious candidate
for this comparative static exercise is a variation in the minimum wage. However since the
effects of changes in w on the variables of interest are monotonic, the respective insights for this
comparative static exercise can be directly inferred from Proposition 8 and do not require further
discussion. In the subsequent analysis, I therefore focus on changes in factor endowments and the
differential effects these changes have under the two labor market regimes studied in Subsection
4.2.2 and 4.2.3. Thereby, I restrict attention to parameter constellations withH/L > hˆ. Starting
with the benchmark situation where both wages are determined in competitive labor markets,
an increase in L shifts locus (4.17) outwards, as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 4.3. The
additional supply of low-skilled workers is absorbed by firms in assigning this skill type to a
broader range of tasks, which causes an increase in the threshold task zc and makes all active
firms less productive. Using less high-skilled workers in the production process implies that
more firms can enter the market, and thus M c goes up. To discuss the impact on factor returns,
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium with a minimum wage for low-skilled workers in the closed economy
note first that the labor market clearing condition for high-skilled workers remains unaffected
by a change in L. Hence, locus (4.16′) has to shift rightwards, to intersect locus (4.15) at the
new values for zc and M c, implying that the wage rate for low-skilled workers falls in response
to an increase in L. Things are different for high-skilled workers. Since this skill type becomes
relatively scare, the skill premium increases in a scenario with competitive labor markets. But
do high-skilled workers also gain in absolute terms, i.e. do they experience an increase in their
real wage? Clearly, there are two counteracting effects on the labor demand for this skill type.
On the one hand, the increase in z reduces labor demand for high-skilled workers, while, on the
other hand, additional firm entry stimulates demand for high-skilled workers. Since dwh/dz > 0
according to (4.26), it is the latter effect that dominates, and I can thus safely conclude that an
increase in the supply of low-skilled workers raises wh. Finally, to detect the implications of an
increase in the supply of low-skilled workers for aggregate labor income I = Lwl+Hwh =Mr(φ˜),
I make use of r(φ˜) = σkfwh/(k − σ + 1) from the appendix and note from above that a larger
supply of low-skilled workers raises both wh and M . This implies that aggregate labor income
goes up. However, this does not mean that per-capita income and thus welfare increases as well,
because the higher labor income is now distributed over a larger population. To shed light on
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this issue, I can substitute r(φ˜) = σkfwh/(k − σ + 1) together with (4.7) and the two labor
market clearing conditions (4.14) and (4.15) into W = (Lwl+Hwh)/(L+H) =Mr(φ˜)/(L+H)
to calculate
W =
σwh
z(σ − 1)(exp[z]− 1) + σ . (4.28)
From inspection of (4.28), the increase in wh triggered by the higher supply of low-skilled workers
stimulates per-capita income, while the implied increase in z reduces welfare due to the negative
productivity effect, as all producers perform less tasks with high-skilled workers. Accounting for
(4.26) I can furthermore calculate
W = exp
[
1
2
(1 + z2)
]
[(1− z)(σ − 1) + 1]− 1σ−1
z exp[z](σ − 1) + (1− z)(σ − 1) + 1 ζˆ, (4.29)
where ζˆ ≡ [H(k − σ + 1)/fk]1/(σ−1)σζ−1 and
dW
dz
=W
[
(exp[z]− 1)(z2 − z − 1)(σ − 1) + z
z(σ − 1)(exp[z]− 1) + σ +
1
(1− z)(σ − 1) + 1
]
. (4.30)
Eq. (4.29) establishes a non-trivial relationship between z and W , with the sign of (4.30)
depending on σ and the initial value of z. Clearly, if z is close to zero, dW/dz > 0 holds for
all σ, while things are different for z > 0. In particular for large σ-values it cannot be ruled
out that dW/dz < 0 for sufficient large z. To see this, one can evaluate (4.30) for instance at
σ = 2 and σ = 8, with corresponding zˆ-values of zˆ|σ=2 = 0.382 and zˆ|σ=8 = 0.69, respectively.
This gives dW/dz|σ=2z=0 = 0.5, dW/dz|σ=2z=0.3 = 0.53, dW/dz|σ=2z=zˆ = 0.53 and dW/dz|σ=8z=0 = 0.125,
dW/dz|σ=8z=0.3 = −0.14 and dW/dz|σ=8z=zˆ = −0.29.
Let us now turn to the minimum wage economy, for which the effect of changes in L are
depicted by Figure 4.4. Since in this case a higher L does neither affect the position of locus
(4.15) nor the position of locus (4.16′), it leaves the mass of producersM as well as the threshold
task z unaffected. Furthermore, since a change in L does not affect the position of locus (4.7)
in the lower right panel of Figure 4.4 either, the skill premium also remains unaffected by an
expansion of low-skilled labor supply. Of course, an increase in L shifts locus (4.17) outwards
in the lower right panel of Figure 4.4 and thus triggers a clockwise rotation of locus (4.25) in
the lower left panel of the figure. This implies an increase in unemployment rate u. Similar
to Brecher (1974), labor supply of unskilled workers in the minimum wage economy is not
a binding constraint, and hence an increase in the respective supply is fully absorbed by a
pari passu increase in unemployment. As a consequence, an increase in labor supply L leaves
high-skilled workers unaffected and lowers per-capita income of low-skilled workers, which is
instrumental for a decline in welfare.
Proposition 9 With competitive labor markets, an increase in L raises the range of tasks per-
formed by low-skilled workers. This triggers a decline in the productivity of intermediate goods
producers and leads to additional firm entry. The higher supply of L reduces per-capita income
of low-skilled workers and increases welfare of high-skilled workers while overall welfare effects
are ambiguous. With a binding minimum wage, an increase in the supply of low-skilled workers
is fully absorbed by a pari passu increase in unemployment. This lowers welfare and leaves all
other variables unaffected.
Proof. Analysis in the text
The implications of an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers when wages are fully flexible
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium with fully flexible wages in the closed economy
are indicated by the dashed lines in Figure 4.3. A higher H shifts locus (4.17) inwards and there-
fore lowers the threshold task (and the skill premium). As a consequence, firms become more
productive, because high-skilled workers are now used for a broader range of tasks. However,
in an economy with competitive labor markets the additional supply of high-skilled workers is
only partly absorbed by this firm-internal adjustment. Since low-skilled workers are replaced by
high-skilled ones, additional firms must enter to restore market clearing for low-skilled workers,
according to (4.14). This is captured by an upward shift of locus (4.15) in the upper panel of
Figure 4.3. And the upward shift of (4.15) paired with the decline in zc implies that (4.16′) must
shift leftwards, which requires an increase in the low-skilled wage wcl . In contrast, the impact
of an increase in H on the real wage of high-skilled workers is less clearcut. On the one hand,
an increase in the supply of a skill type renders this factor less scare and thus lowers its return
ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the increase in the skilled labor supply leads to additional
firm entry and thus stimulates demand for high-skilled workers as variable production input as
well as demand for high-skilled workers as a fixed input to manage the firm and organize the
production process. To shed further light on this issue, I can combine (4.14) and (4.16′) and
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account for wh = wlα(z) from (4.7) to compute
wh =
[
L(k − σ + 1)
fk(σ − 1)
] 1
σ−1
ζ−1 exp
[
1 + z2
2
] [
1
z exp[z]
] 1
σ−1
. (4.31)
Differentiating (4.31) with respect to z gives
dwh
dz
= wh
[
z − 1 + z
z
1
σ − 1
]
(4.32)
which is negative as long as z < (1 +
√
4σ − 3)/2(σ − 1) ≡ z˜. Noting from the definition of
zˆ in (4.22), that z˜ > zˆ as long as σ ≤ 3 + √5, I can furthermore conclude that dwh/dz < 0
and thus dwh/dH > 0 holds in the relevant parameter domain if the elasticity of substitution
is low. However, if σ > 3 +
√
5, I cannot rule out that dwh/dH < 0 for large initial values for
z. Finally, as a larger supply of high-skilled workers raises the mass of active firms, total labor
income increases. To discuss the impact on a country’s welfare level, I can infer from (4.28), that
given the increase in wh and the reduction in z, which leads to a positive productivity effect, a
country’s per-capita income is increasing in its endowment with high-skilled workers.24
Again, an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers exerts a different impact on the
general equilibrium variables of interest, when the wage rate for low-skilled workers is fixed by
a binding minimum wage. In a minimum wage economy, an increase in H shifts locus (4.15)
upwards, as indicated by the dotted curve in Figure 4.4. Hence, similar to the benchmark
scenario with competitive labor markets, the additional supply of high-skilled workers allows for
additional firm entry, so that M increases. However, with low-skilled labor supply being not a
binding constraint in the minimum wage economy, the additional demand for low-skilled labor at
the extensive margin – triggered by the additional firm entry – does not increase the factor return
of low-skilled workers implying that intermediate goods producers have no incentive to reduce
the range of tasks performed by low-skilled workers. Moreover, since the new intersection point
between locus (4.15) and locus (4.16′) moves north-east in Figure 4.4, there is a magnification
effect in the sense of dM/dH > 0, so that the range of tasks performed by low-skilled workers
increases. Hence, with a binding real minimum wage an increase in H reduces the range of
tasks performed by high-skilled workers and, as can be seen in the lower right panel of Figure
4.4, it raises the skill premium. Moreover, the increase in z implies a fall in productivity for
intermediate goods producers. The implications for the wage rate of high-skilled workers can
be seen when rewriting Eq. (4.7) as wh = w exp[z]. Since z rises in H, a higher supply of high-
skilled workers increases wh. Hence, high-skilled workers gain in relative
25 and absolute terms,
which is in contrast to the benchmark situation with competitive wages. However, also low-
skilled workers gain from the additional supply of H, due to additional employment of this skill
type. This can be seen from Figure 4.4, when noting that a higher supply of high-skilled workers
shifts locus (4.17) inwards, and therefore rotates locus (4.25) counter-clockwise in the lower left
panel of that figure. As a consequence, a higher skill premium must therefore be associated with
lower unemployment of low-skilled workers, implying a higher per-capita income (1−u)w of this
skill group. This is intuitive as the demand for low-skilled workers is stimulated by a increase in
z and M . Finally, the increase in the mass of intermediate producers also leads to higher total
labor income and, since both skill groups benefit, to higher per-capita income and thus welfare.
24As shown in the appendix, the positive impact is also present if σ is large and dwh/dH < 0 materializes.
25This can bee seen from (4.27). Accounting for dz/dH > 0 and dM/dH > 0, the relative per-capita income
of high-skilled workers wh/[(1− u)w] clearly increases.
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Figure 4.4: Endowment changes with a binding minimum wage
Proposition 10 With fully flexible wages, an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers
reduces the range tasks performed by low-skilled workers, thereby increasing the productivity of
active producers and the mass of active firms. Low-skilled workers receive a higher income and
the skill premium for high-skilled workers is reduced. The impact on high-skilled wages are
ambiguous and depend on the elasticity of substitution between variants of the intermediate.
Only if σ ≤ 3+√5 wages will increase, while for σ > 3+√5 the impact on wages is ambiguous.
Irrespective of the change in wh, welfare is positively affected by the expansion of H. With a
binding minimum wage, an increase in H raises the mass of firms and the threshold task, thereby
reducing the productivity of active producers. High-skilled workers gain in absolute and relative
terms, and the unemployment rate for low-skilled workers goes down, implying that welfare must
increase.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
This completes the discussion of the closed economy.
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4.3 The open economy
4.3.1 Basic structure
It is the purpose of this chapter to shed light on the assignment of skills to tasks and a firm’s
production process if the country under consideration opens up to trade. I thereby discuss the
differential consequences of trade between two countries indexed by j = 1, 2, whose economies
are characterized as in the previous chapter, when labor markets are perfectly competitive or
when there is a binding minimum wage for low-skilled workers. To keep the analysis tractable,
I thereby abstract from any trade impediments and assume that all firms export. This simpli-
fication seems to be justified, because in my model the revenue ratio of any two firms and thus
the export decision is fully characterized by baseline productivity levels, and hence my model
is not equipped to shed new light on the exporting decision of firms (see, for instance, Melitz,
2003; Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2007; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Therefore, I prefer the
more parsimonious structure without self-selection of firms into exporting in order to focus on
those aspects of the model that are new in the literature.
When the country opens up for trade, intermediate goods producers can raise their profits by
selling their variety to the foreign market. Abstracting from any trade impediments, Y and P
are identical to all firms irrespective of their home country. Furthermore, without selection into
exporting, trade does not alter the firm entry mechanism, so that (4.11)-(4.13) still hold after
a country’s movement from autarky to trade. As discussed in the previous chapter, the cutoff
productivity is independent of the labor market regime, hence φ∗1 = φ
∗
2 ≡ φ∗ and φ˜1 = φ˜2 ≡ φ˜∗
hold in the benchmark scenario of competitive labor markets as well as the minimum wage
economy. Constant markup pricing in both economies implies pij(φ
∗) = rj(φ
∗)/σ − fwhj = 0,
and therefore r1(φ
∗)/σ = fwh1 and r2(φ
∗)/σ = fwh2. Accounting for (4.2), (4.7) which is the
same as in the closed economy, (4.10) and the definition of β(z) I can compute
wl1
wl2
=
[
α(z2)
α(z1)
] 1
σ
[
β(z1)
β(z2)
]σ−1
σ
= exp
{
z2 − z1
2
[
2− σ − 1
σ
(z1 + z2)
]}
, (4.33)
which determines z1 relative to z2 in the open economy and implies z1 < z2 if wl1 > wl2. To
compare prices of the marginal firms in the two countries, first substitute (4.7) into (4.10), which
entails pj(φ
∗) = σwlj/[(σ−1)φ∗β(zj)]. As the cutoff productivity is the same in both economies,
I get p1(φ
∗)/p2(φ
∗) = wl1β(z2)/[wl2β(z1)]. Accounting for (4.33) and the definition of β(z) then
gives
p1(φ
∗)
p2(φ∗)
=
[
α(z2)β(z2)
α(z1)β(z1)
] 1
σ
= exp
[
z22 − z21
2σ
]
. (4.34)
To analyze the impact of intermediates trade on the general equilibrium variables of interest,
note first that both adding up conditions for low-skilled and high-skilled workers are the same
as in the closed economy. However, as the final good is now assembled with intermediate
varieties from both countries, the corresponding price index and therefore (4.16′) need to be
adjusted. In the open economy the mass of available intermediate varieties has changed to
Mt =M1+M2, implying that the price index in the open economy is given by P = [M1p1(φ˜)
1−σ+
M2p2(φ˜)
1−σ]1/(1−σ). Accounting for (4.7) and (4.10) together with P = 1 this can be written
as (see the appendix)
Mj =
[
wljζ
β(zj)
]σ−1 [
1 +
M−j
Mj
(
pj(φ
∗)
p−j(φ∗)
)σ−1]−1
. (4.35)
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This equation still establishes a positive relationship between the mass of producers and the
threshold task in the home country j, for given values of z and M in the foreign country −j.
With these insights, I am now equipped to study the impact of trade on the variables of interest.
I thereby start with a situation, in which both countries are fully symmetric and postpone a
discussion of country asymmetries to the extensions in Chapter 4.4. In Chapter 4.3.2, I thereby
analyze the implications of trade when labor markets are perfectly competitive, whereas in
Chapter 4.3.3, I shed light on the consequences of trade in a minimum wage economy.
4.3.2 Trade with perfect labor markets
With fully flexible wages, the eight endogenous variables in the open economy, wlj , whj , zj
and Mj , for j = 1, 2 are determined by condition (4.7) and the labor market clearing conditions
(4.14) and (4.15) – applied to the two economies – Eq. (4.33) and finally the profit maximization
condition in the open economy, Eq. (4.35), applied for country j.26 To illustrate the equilibrium
in the open economy, I can use the same graphical tool, as in the previous chapter. If wages are
set in perfectly competitive markets, the equilibrium threshold task and the skill premium are
jointly determined by (4.7) and (4.17), which are plotted in the lower panel in Figure 4.5. As
both loci remain unaffected by an opening up to trade, the skill premium and the threshold task
are the same as in the closed economy, i.e. sca = s
c
j and z
c
a = z
c
j , where index a refers to autarky
variables. Moreover, since the labor market clearing condition for high-skilled workers and thus
locus (4.15) remains unaffected as well, also the mass of firms in country j stays constant, i.e.
M ca = M
c
j . These findings indicate, that the intersection point between loci (4.15) and (4.35)
in the upper panel of Figure 4.5 is the same as in the closed economy equilibrium. According
to (4.33) and (4.34), prices for the cutoff firm in each market are identical when both countries
are fully symmetric, implying that (4.35) reads Mj = [wljζ/β(zj)]
σ−1(1/2). Hence, compared
to its closed economy counterpart in (4.16′), the profit maximization condition (4.35) is shifted
rightwards for any given wage rate for low-skilled workers walj . Opening up to trade raises
the mass of available intermediate varieties to Mt = M1 +M2. This increases country-specific
output Y and stimulates demand for each firm, according to (4.2). Therefore, aggregate labor
demand for each skill type is stimulated. With fully flexible wages, wl must increase, to bring
the economy back to zcj = z
c
a and M
c
j =M
c
a. According to wh = wlα(z) the wage rate for high-
skilled workers increases by the same extend, so that the skill premium remains at the autarky
level. Similar to Krugman (1979), trade between two fully symmetric countries therefore leads to
a positive income and thus welfare effect, while leaving all other variables of interest unaffected.
These findings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 If wages are fully flexible, a country’s opening up to trade with a symmetric
partner country has no impact on the skill premium, the firm internal assignment of skills to
tasks and the mass of active firms. However, trade increases the real wage for both skill types
and thus welfare.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
The findings from Proposition 11 do not hinge on the assumption that both countries are
symmetric in their relative endowments with high-skilled and low-skilled workers. This can be
easily inferred from the discussion above. As any change in the supply of L or H in Foreign,
leaves the position of loci (4.7), (4.15) and (4.17) in Home unaffected, it does not affect zj , sj
and Mj . Thus, when wages are fully flexible, trade between two countries that differ in their
26Note that (4.35) can only be applied for one country. Applying it for the other country simply confirms that
P1 = P2 = 1.
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Figure 4.5: Trade with fully flexible wages
relative endowments still exerts only a positive income and welfare effect, but does not change
the other variables of interest. Moreover, the strength of these effects depends on the stimulus
in labor demand for the two skill types. The higher the mass of intermediate producers in
the foreign country, the larger is the positive demand shock by opening up for trade from a
domestic country’s perspective. As M−j is increasing in L−j and H−j , welfare effects at Home
are therefore increasing in the size of the foreign factor markets.
4.3.3 Trade with a minimum wage for low-skilled workers
In this chapter, I again study trade between two fully symmetric countries, with the mere
difference, that governments in each country now set a binding minimum wage, w1 = w2. To
determine the eight endogenous variables sj , zj , Mj and uj , for j = 1, 2 I can make use of
(4.7), (4.15) and (4.24) – applied to both economies – (4.33) and (4.35). As discussed in the
closed economy, the labor market clearing condition for high-skilled workers and the profit
maximization condition now jointly determine the mass of firms and the threshold task. With
perfect symmetry between the two economies, (4.35) reads Mj = [wjζ/β(zj)]
σ−1(1/2) and is
shifted rightwards relative to its closed economy counterpart in Figure 4.6, implying that M
and z are increased compared to the autarky scenario. Since all other things equal, final goods
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producers have access to more differentiated intermediate goods, final output increases due to
a standard division of labor effect. This stimulates demand for intermediate goods, according
to (4.2), and therefore aggregate labor demand for each skill type. While the factor price for
low-skilled workers is fixed and remains unaffected, the wage rate for high-skilled workers will
increase.27 Thus, the relative factor costs have changed in favor of low-skilled workers and firms
respond to the cost increase by raising the threshold task to z > za. A lower skill intensity
implies that more high-skilled workers are left to entering the lottery and to manage the firm
and organize the production process, so that the mass of local intermediate goods producers
increases in both countries relative to the closed economy. The higher z furthermore implies an
increase in the skill premium, as can be seen in the lower right panel of Figure 4.6. Finally, the
adjustment in z and M contribute to an increase in low-skilled labor employment and a decline
in unemployment rate u as depicted in the lower left panel of Figure 4.6.28 From inspection
of Eq. (4.27) there are counteracting effects on the relative per-capita income of high-skilled
workers. However, solving (4.15) for M and substituting the respective expression into (4.27), I
can compute
wh
(1− u)w =
Lfk[(1− z)(σ − 1) + 1]
Hz(k − σ + 1) (4.36)
which, according to z < za, implies that trade unambiguously increases the relative per-capita
income of high-skilled workers. Finally, the increase in the wage rate for high-skilled workers
and the reduction in the unemployment rate triggers an increase in welfare. These findings are
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 12 With a binding minimum wage for low-skilled workers, a country’s opening up
to trade with a symmetric partner country reduces the unemployment rate for low-skilled workers
and increases the real wage, the skill premium and the relative per-capita income of high-skilled
workers. Welfare is unambiguously higher in the open economy than in the closed economy and
all active firms produce a broader range of tasks with low-skilled workers, which reduces observed
labor productivity.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
The results in Proposition 12 demand further discussion. First, there is a crucial difference
to the findings in the literature on heterogeneous firms. Usually, the claim in the literature is
that trade liberalization has a positive impact on economy-wide labor productivity by relocating
productive factors towards high-productive firms, which have excess to export markets and thus
benefit disproportionately from trade liberalization (see Melitz, 2003). Thereby, the firm-level
productivity stays constant, but selection to more productive firms increases the economy-wide
productivity. In my model, this channel is closed, as trade is costless and all firms participate in
exporting. This leaves the relative performance of any two firms unaffected, and hence there is no
relocation of productive factors towards high-productive firms. Here, productivity effects arise
at the firm-level due to adjustments in the assignment or workers to tasks. Thereby, it follows
from Proposition 11 and 12 that the existence of labor market imperfections are instrumental
for the impact of trade on firm productivity. With differences in the wage setting institutions
among low-skilled and high-skilled workers, a higher labor demand in the open economy changes
27To see this, remember from (4.26), that dwh/dz > 0.
28The reduction in the unemployment rate is also present in the Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2012) framework,
where production consists of a single task performed by one type of workers. Similar to this chapter, the positive
impact is a consequence of external scale economies in the production of the final good.
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Figure 4.6: Trade between two fully symmetric minimum wage economies
the relative factor return and therefore leads to adjustments in the assignment of skills to tasks
with consequences for a firm’s labor productivity.29
4.4 Extensions
So far I have restricted the analysis to the comparison of open and closed economy equilibria.
The aim of this Chapter is to shed light on how labor markets are linked in the open economy, i.e.
how variations in national labor market institutions and endowments spill over to the partner
country. I thereby focus on trade between two minimum wage economies as discussed in the
previous chapter. Starting from a scenario with fully symmetric countries, I discuss how (i) an
increase in Foreign’s minimum wage for low-skilled workers and (ii) migration of high-skilled
workers into the foreign economy, spill over to the domestic country.30
29I do not discuss endowment asymmetries here, as they are in the context of open minimum wage economies
at the agenda of Chapter 4.4.2.
30From the discussion in the closed economy, I know that adjustments in z and M are only present if there is a
change in the supply of high-skilled workers, while any change in L is fully absorbed in the unemployment rate.
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4.4.1 Minimum wage variations in the open economy
I start with a situation, in which the foreign country j = 2 adjusts its labor market institutions
by increasing the minimum wage, such that w1 < w2 holds.
31 While the implications for country
j = 2 are similar to these of the closed economy, the increase in w2 implies p1(φ
∗) < p2(φ
∗)
according to (4.34) and a lower mass of firms in country j = 2. This reduction in the mass of
intermediate goods producers now exerts an impact on the domestic country j = 1 according
to (4.35). A smaller mass of producers in country j = 2, shifts locus (4.35) of country j = 1
leftwards in Figure 4.6, whereas it leaves loci (4.7), (4.15) and (4.17) and thus (4.25) unaffected.
As a consequence, the range of tasks performed by low-skilled workers in country j = 1 must
fall.32 While the minimum wage for low-skilled workers is fixed in country j = 1, the factor
return for high-skilled workers falls according to wh = wα(z). Furthermore, since firms broaden
the range of tasks performed by high-skilled workers, all active firms become more productive.
However, increasing variable labor demand for high-skilled workers in the production process
leaves less resources as a fixed input for firm entry. As a consequence, the mass of intermediate
goods producers must fall in country j = 1. The adjustments in M1 and z1 imply a fall in
the labor demand for low-skilled workers and the unemployment rate increases. Looking at the
skill premium, high-skilled workers lose, but, according to (4.36), the reduction in z increases
relative per-capita income of high-skilled workers, due to an expansion of L-unemployment.
The negative impact on the wage for high-skilled workers and the increase in the unemployment
rate furthermore imply a reduction in welfare. These findings are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 13 Starting from an open economy equilibrium with minimum wages, an increase
in the minimum wage in one country reduces the mass of firms and the range of tasks performed
by low-skilled workers in the partner country, while it increases the productivity of active produc-
ers there. Low-skilled workers face a higher unemployment rate while high-skilled workers face
a reduction in the real wage. The relative per-capita income of high-skilled workers increases,
whereas welfare is reduced in the partner country.
Proof. Analysis in the text and the formal proof in the appendix.
Interestingly, an implication of (4.33) and (4.34) is that minimum wages remain binding
after opening up to trade and unemployment is persistent in both economies. In his seminal
article, Davis (1998) concludes, that ”international trade equalizes factor prices” (p.482), im-
plying that only one minimum wage remains binding. This has been criticized by Egger, Egger,
and Markusen (2012), using a model of heterogeneous firms where ”productivity differences of
marginal firms compensate for the prevailing wage differences” (p.774) such that minimum wages
remain binding in both countries. In the Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2012) framework, trade
changes the composition of active firms due to adjustments in the cutoff productivity. Moreover,
if countries differ in their minimum wage, adjustments in the entry decisions of firms lead to
φ∗1 6= φ∗2 and establish p1(φ∗1) = p2(φ∗2). In my model, any adjustment in the cutoff productivity
is closed since φ∗ remains unaffected from changes in the minimum wage. In contrast, the firm-
internal adjustment in the task-based production process allows firms to respond to changes in
labor market institutions and therefore factor prices. The endogenous assignment of skills to
tasks gives more flexibility to absorb differences in revenues, operating profits and fixed costs
Thus, I restrict the discussion to the interesting case where countries differ with respect to H and therefore z, s
and M in the closed economy.
31Comparing autarky with free trade between two countries that differ with respect to the minimum wage then
follows from adding the insights from this chapter to the discussion in the previous one.
32In the appendix, I provide a formal prove of dz1/dw2 < 0 and dz2/dw2 < 0.
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triggered by different labor market regimes. Hence, in my model a firms exogenous baseline
productivity is the same in the two economies, but firms adjust their endogenous productivity
part such that ϕ(z1) < ϕ(z2) if w1 < w2.
4.4.2 Asymmetries in endowments
This chapter provides insights on how an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers in the
foreign economy spills over to the domestic market. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium with
minimum wages in both countries, the implications for country j = 2 of an increase in H2 are
similar to these of the closed economy, especially it results in a higher z2 and M2. The higher
mass of intermediate goods producers in country j = 2, now exerts an impact on the domestic
country j = 1, according to (4.35). The increase in M2 shifts locus (4.35) of country j = 1
rightwards in Figure 4.6, whereas it leaves loci (4.7), (4.15) and (4.17) and thus also (4.25)
unaffected. As a consequence, the range of tasks performed by low-skilled workers in country
j = 1 must increase.33 As less high-skilled workers are used as a variable input, which implies
a fall in productivity of all active producers, more high-skilled workers are left to provide the
input for the lottery and to manage the firm and organize the production process, thus M1
increases. The increase in labor demand for low-skilled workers, triggered by the firm-internal
adjustment of skills to tasks and additional firm entry, implies that the unemployment rate
must fall in country j = 1. Looking at high-skilled workers, they experience an increase in the
real wage. However, from inspection of (4.36), it follows that the increase in z unambiguously
reduces relative per-capita income wh/[(1 − u)w]. Furthermore, the increase in group-specific
per-capita income levels (1 − u)w and wh provides a welfare stimulus in the domestic country.
These findings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 14 Starting from an open economy equilibrium with minimum wages in both coun-
tries, an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers in one country increases the mass of firms
and the range of tasks performed by low-skilled workers in the partner country, and reduces
productivity of active firms, there. Low-skilled workers face a lower unemployment rate, while
high-skilled workers face an increase in the real wage which raises welfare in the partner country.
Relative per-capita income of high-skilled workers falls in the partner country.
Proof. Analysis in the text and the formal proof in the appendix.
4.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter sets up a heterogeneous firms model along the lines of Melitz (2003). However,
the model accounts for a more sophisticated production process, in which a firm’s output is
microfounded using a continuum of tasks. Firms hire low-skilled and high-skilled workers for
the performance of tasks. Tasks differ in their complexity and workers differ in their ability to
perform these tasks, with high-skilled workers having a comparative advantage in performing
more complex tasks. How firms organize the firm-internal production process by assigning skills
to tasks depends on the respective factor costs and the productivity advantage of high-skilled
workers in performing more complex tasks. Accounting for a task-based production process,
allows me to discuss a so far unexplored adjustment margin, through which firms respond to
exogenous shocks.
I use this framework to analyze how imperfections in the labor market affect the firm-internal
assignment of skills to tasks in the closed economy. After characterizing the autarky equilibrium
33In the appendix, I provide a formal prove of dz1/dH2 > 0 as well as dz2/dH2 > 0.
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outcome with fully flexible wages for both skill types, I introduce a (real) minimum wage, that is
set by the government for low-skilled workers and causes involuntary unemployment of this skill
type. As relative factor prices are changed and low-skilled task production becomes more costly,
firms assign high-skilled workers to a broader range of tasks. This firm-internal skill upgrading
improves a firm’s labor productivity. However, as more high-skilled workers are employed for
the performance of tasks, less of them are left to manage firms and the mass of firms therefore
declines. Firm exit triggers a decline in aggregate output, income and welfare. After discussing
migration of low-skilled and high-skilled workers under the two different labor market regimes,
I use the model to discuss how trade between two countries affects the firm-internal production
process. Only when low-skilled wages are set by a binding minimum wage, trade exerts an impact
on the firm-internal assignment process. The opening up to trade raises demand for each firm
due to a standard division of labor effect. When the factor price for low-skilled workers is
fixed, the skill premium increases implying that high-skilled task production becomes relatively
unattractive. Firms respond in broadening the range of task production with low-skilled workers,
which reduces labor productivity of each firm. Aside from this negative productivity effect,
trade increases the mass of producers in each country and reduces the unemployment rate of
low-skilled workers. This causes an increase in per-capita income of both skill types, with high-
skilled workers benefiting disproportionately. As a consequence aggregate output, income and
welfare are stimulated. After discussing the movement from autarky to trade I show how changes
in local endowments and labor market institutions spill over to the partner country. Thereby,
I show that an increase in the minimum wage abroad reduces the range of tasks performed by
low-skilled workers at home, while it increases the productivity of active producers, there. Both
skill types end up with a lower per-capita income, and thus welfare is reducedat home.
The discussion in the main text abstracts from the fact that firms do also organize their
production process geographically. With a task-based production function, firms clearly have
an incentive to shift the production of tasks to countries with the lowest cost. In the absence
of impediments to shift and transport tasks between countries, task trade would then lead to
factor price equalization among the partner countries. Moreover, in contrast to the findings
above, trade in tasks implies that only the minimum wage in the high wage country remains
binding. As firms shift the production of tasks performed by low-skilled workers to the low
minimum wage economy, this increases labor demand for that skill type there, and the incentive
to shift tasks is present until the market clearing wage abroad is equal to the minimum wage at
home. The outsourcing of low-skilled tasks would therefore increase the domestic unemployment
rate. Moreover, to the extend that task trade also affects relative factor prices, firms will respond
by adjusting the assignment of skills to tasks.
Clearly, to keep the analysis tractable, this framework relies on several simplifying assump-
tions. However, they help to concentrate on the firm-internal adjustment margin and how firms
adjust their task-based production process, which is the focus of this chapter. By shedding light
on this new, so far unexplored channel, I hope that my findings encourage further research on
the organization of labor within firms.
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4.6 Appendix
Derivation of Eq. (4.11)
Aggregate revenues of all intermediate producers equal
R =M
∫
∞
φ∗
r(φ)
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) . (4.37)
Accounting for r(φ)/r(φ∗) = (φ/φ∗)σ−1 and using the Pareto distribution for parameterizing
G(φ), I can compute average revenues r¯ = R/M as follows:
r¯ = r(φ∗)
k
k − σ + 1 =
σkfwh
k − σ + 1 , (4.38)
where the second equality follows from the fact that constant markup pricing implies pi(φ) =
r(φ)/σ − fwh, while the marginal firm makes zero profits pi(φ∗) = 0. Therefore, average profits
in the market, p¯i = r¯/σ − fwh, can be expressed as (4.11). QED
Welfare effects of an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers
Substitution of (4.31) into (4.28) gives
W =
exp[ 1+z
2
2 ] (z exp[z])
−
1
σ−1
z(σ − 1)(exp[z]− 1) + σ ζ˜, (4.39)
where ζ˜ ≡ {L(k−σ+1)/[fk(σ−1)]}(1)/(σ−1)σζ−1. Taking the derivative of (4.39) with respect
to z, I can compute
dW
dz
∣∣∣∣
Eq.(4.39)
=W
[
z − 1
σ − 1
1 + z
z
− (σ − 1)(exp[z] + z exp[z]− 1)
z(σ − 1)(exp[z]− 1) + σ
]
(4.40)
dW
dz
∣∣∣∣
Eq.(4.39)
=W
[
(σ exp[z]z − σz − exp[z]z + z + 1) (σz2 − σ − z2 − σz)
z(σ − 1) [z(σ − 1)(exp[z]− 1) + σ]
]
. (4.41)
Noting that σz2−σ−z2−σz < 0, dWdz
∣∣
Eq.(4.39)
< 0 if A(z) ≡ σ exp[z]z−σz−exp[z]z+z+1 > 0.
From A(0) = 1 and A(1) = σ exp[1] − σ − exp[1] + 2 > 0, together with A′(z) = σ exp[z]z +
σ exp[z] − σ − exp[z]z − exp[z] + 1, where A′(0) = σ(exp[1] − 1)¿0 and A′(1) = 2σ exp[1] −
2 exp[1] + 1 > 0 and finally A′′(z) = (σ − 1) exp[z](2 + z) > 0, I can conclude that A(z) > 0
holds.
Derivation details for Eq. (4.35)
Starting from P = [Mjpj(φ˜)
1−σ + M−jp−j(φ˜)
1−σ]1/(1−σ) I can account for P = 1 to obtain
1 = Mjpj(φ˜)
1−σ +M−jp−j(φ˜)
1−σ. Noting that pj(φ˜) = [wljζ]/β(zj), according to (4.7) and
(4.10), this can be rewritten as in (4.35). To show that (4.35) still establishes a positive link
between zj and Mj for given foreign values of z−j and M−j , rewrite (4.35) as
Mj =
(
wljζ
β(zj)
)σ−1{
1 +
M−j
Mj
[
wlj
wl−j
β(z−j)
β(zj)
]σ−1}−1
(4.42)
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and thus as
(wljζ)
σ−1
=Mjβ(zj)
σ−1 +M−j
[
wlj
wl−j
β(z−j)
]σ−1
. (4.43)
This allows me to define the implicit function
Γ(zj ,Mj) ≡Mjβ(zj)σ−1 +M−j
[
wlj
wl−j
β(z−j)
]σ−1
− (wljζ)σ−1 . (4.44)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (4.44), gives me dMj/dzj = −[∂Γ(·)/∂zj ]/[∂Γ(·)/∂Mj ] =
Mj(σ − 1)(1− zj) > 0. QED
Derivation details for Chapter 4.4.1
To discuss the implications of an increase in w2 on z1 and z2 in the open economy, I can use
(4.33) and define the implicit function34
Γ1(z1, z2;w1, w2) ≡ w1
w2
− exp
{
z2 − z1
2
[
2− σ − 1
σ
(z1 + z2)
]}
= 0. (4.45)
To get a second relation between z1 and z2 as a function of the two minimum wages, I can
evaluate (4.44) for country j = 1. Substituting M1 and M2 from (4.15) with H1 = H2 = H and
accounting for the definition for β(z1), I can thus define the implicit function
Γ2(z1, z2;w1, w2) ≡
exp
[
σ−1
2 (1− z1)2
]
(1− z1)(σ − 1) + 1 +
exp
[
σ−1
2 (1− z2)2
]
(1− z2)(σ − 1) + 1
(
w1
w2
)σ−1
− fkw
σ−1
1 ζ
σ−1
H(k − σ + 1) = 0.
(4.46)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (4.45), (4.46) and accounting for dw1 = 0, gives
Γ1z1
dz1
dw2
+ Γ1z2
dz2
dw2
= −Γ1w2 and Γ2z1
dz1
dw2
+ Γ2z2
dz2
dw2
= −Γ2w2 . (4.47)
Applying Cramer’s rule, I can calculate dz1/dw2 and dz2/dw2 according to
dz1
dw2
=
Γ1z2Γ
2
w2 − Γ1w2Γ2z2
|A| and
dz2
dw2
=
Γ1w2Γ
2
z1 − Γ1z1Γ2w2
|A| , (4.48)
with |A| = Γ1z1Γ2z2 − Γ1z2Γ2z1 . The respective partial derivatives are given by
Γ1z1 =
w1
w2
(
1− σ − 1
σ
z1
)
> 0, Γ1z2 = −
w1
w2
(
1− σ − 1
σ
z2
)
< 0, Γ1w2 = −
w1
w22
< 0,
Γ2z1 = exp
[
σ − 1
2
(1− z1)2
]
σ − 1
[(1− z1)(σ − 1) + 1]2 [z1 − (1− z1)
2(σ − 1)],
Γ2z2 = exp
[
σ − 1
2
(1− z2)2
]
σ − 1
[(1− z2)(σ − 1) + 1]2 [z2 − (1− z2)
2(σ − 1)]
(
w1
w2
)σ−1
,
Γ2w2 = − exp
[
σ − 1
2
(1− z2)2
]
σ − 1
(1− z2)(σ − 1) + 1
(
w1
w2
)σ−1
1
w2
< 0.
34In the interest of readability, I use j = 1, 2 in the subsequent derivations instead j and −j.
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The signs of Γ1z1, Γ
1
z2, Γ
1
w2 and Γ
2
w2 need no further discussion. To determine the sign of Γ
2
z1
and Γ2z2 , note first that the requirement for a stable equilibrium is given by the same condition
zj < zˆ – with zˆ determined by (4.22) – in the closed as well as the open economy. Noting further
that the sign of Γ2zj is determined by the sign of g(zj) ≡ zj − (1 − zj)2(σ − 1), it follows from
g(0) = −(σ − 1) < 0, g(zˆ) = 0, and g′(zj) = 1 + 2(1 − zj)(σ − 1) > 0 that both Γ2z1 < 0 and
Γ2z2 < 0 are negative in the relevant parameter domain.
Furthermore, given the sign for the partial derivatives, it is easily confirmed that |A| < 0 and
dz2/dw2 < 0 hold. To determine the sign of dz1/dw2, I can calculate
dz1
dw2
=
1
|A| exp
[
σ − 1
2
(1− z2)2
]
σ − 1
(1− z2)(σ − 1) + 1
(
w1
w2
)σ−1
w1
w22[
1− σ − 1
σ
z2 +
z2 − (1− z2)2(σ − 1)
(1− z2)(σ − 1) + 1
]
dz1
dw2
=
1
|A| exp
[
σ − 1
2
(1− z2)2
]
(σ − 1)/σ
[(1− z2)(σ − 1) + 1]2
(
w1
w2
)σ−1
w1
w22
[σ + z2(σ − σz2 + z2)] ,
and thus dz1/dw2 < 0, due to |A| < 0. QED
Derivation details for Chapter 4.4.2
Consider w1 = w2. Then, (4.33) establishes the implicit function
Γ3(z1, z2) ≡ 1− exp
{
z2 − z1
2
[
2− σ − 1
σ
(z1 + z2)
]}
= 0. (4.49)
Furthermore, allowing for H1 6= H2, I can substitute M1 and M2 from (4.15) into (4.44) and
account for the definition of β(z) to formulate the implicit function
Γ4(z1, z2,H1,H2) ≡
H1
exp
[
σ−1
2 (1− z1)2
]
(1− z1)(σ − 1) + 1 +H2
exp
[
σ−1
2 (1− z2)2
]
(1− z2)(σ − 1) + 1
(
w1
w2
)σ−1
− fkw
σ−1
1 ζ
σ−1
k − σ + 1 = 0. (4.50)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (4.49), gives dz2 = −dz1Γ3z1/Γ3z2 . Furthermore,
applying the implicit function theorem to (4.50) and accounting for the previous result, allows
me to calculate
dz1
dH2
= − Γ
4
H2
Γ4z1 − Γ4z2Γ3z1/Γ3z2
. (4.51)
Accounting for Γ4H2 > 0, Γ
4
z1 = H1Γ
2
z1 < 0, Γ
4
z2 = H2(w1/w2)
1−σΓ2z2 < 0, Γ
3
z1 = Γ
1
z1w2/w1 > 0
and Γ3z2 = Γ
1
z2w2/w1 < 0, it follows immediately that dz1/dH2 > 0. Moreover, with dz2 =−dz1Γ3z1/Γ3z2 , dz2/dH2 > 0 holds. QED
Chapter 5
Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze how globalization shapes the organization of production
within firms, with a particular focus on the role of labor market imperfections in open economies.
Chapter 2 has presented a general oligopolistic equilibrium model of MPFs and labor market
imperfections due to union wage-setting in a subset of industries. This setting has been used to
tackle two questions that have sparked considerable interest of economists in recent years and
are of relevance for policy makers alike. The first question deals with firm-level (and related
economy-wide) adjustments to deunionization, a phenomenon that has been observed in all
industrialized countries over the last four decades. Associating deunionization with a reduction
in the share of unionized industries, it has been shown that deunionization raises both the
competitive and the union wage and thus renders a shortening of the product range attractive
for MPFs. In addition to the decline in firm scope, the cost increase lowers total output of all
interior varieties, so that firm scale decreases in unionized as well as non-unionized industries.
With firms concentrating on high-competence varieties, deunionization therefore leads to an
increase in labor productivity of all firms (except for the newly deunionized ones). The second
question that has been tackled in this chapter is the impact of trade on firm scale and scope. In
this respect, the main insight from the analysis is that, while firms become leaner and meaner as
in models of MPFs without labor market frictions, the additional labor force that has been set
free by the decline in firm scope is not equally allocated to unionized and non-unionized industries
and thus it is not guaranteed that all firms actually increase their scale when being exposed to
international trade. To be more specific, with labor market institutions being industry-specific,
the firm-level effects of trade depend on a non-trivial interplay of product differentiation and
the degree of unionization.
In Chapter 3 a model of heterogeneous firms along the lines of Melitz (2003) has been set up
using a production process that builds on a continuum of tasks with differing skill requirements.
Furthermore, it has been assumed that workers differ in their abilities to perform these tasks,
and firms therefore face the complex problem of matching heterogeneous workers with hetero-
geneous tasks. To solve this allocation problem in a satisfactory way, firms require information
about worker ability and they can get this information by screening their applicants. Screening
involves fixed costs and provides an imprecise signal about the ability of workers. The higher
the investment into the screening technology, the better is the signal and the better is therefore
the match between abilities of workers and skill requirements of tasks. Intuitively, firms that
have a higher ex ante productivity install a better screening technology, so that the hetero-
geneity of firms is reinforced by the endogenous investment into screening. This framework has
been used to study the consequences of trade for welfare and underemployment, arising from
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the mismatch between workers and tasks. If only the best (most productive) firms self-select
into exporting, trade exerts an asymmetric effect on the screening incentives of high- and low-
productivity firms. High-productivity firms expand production due to exporting, and therefore
find it attractive to install a better (more expensive) screening technology. In contrast, low-
productivity firms do not export and lose market share at home. In response, they lower their
screening expenditures. Despite this asymmetry in firm-level adjustments to trade, the average
mismatch between worker-specific abilities and task-specific skill requirements unambiguously
shrinks in the open economy. This points to a so far unexplored channel through which trade
can improve the labor market outcome and stimulate welfare.
Chapter 4 has presented a heterogeneous firms model along the lines of Melitz (2003). How-
ever, the model accounts for a more sophisticated production process, in which a firm’s output
is manufactured using a continuum of tasks similar to the framework in the previous chapter.
Firms hire low-skilled and high-skilled workers for the performance of tasks. Tasks differ in their
complexity and workers differ in their ability to perform these tasks, with high-skilled workers
having a comparative advantage in performing more complex tasks. How firms organize the
firm-internal production process by assigning skills to tasks depends on the respective factor
costs and productivity advantage of high-skilled workers in performing more complex tasks.
This framework has been used to analyze how imperfections in the labor market affect the
firm-internal assignment of skills to tasks in the closed economy. After characterizing the au-
tarky equilibrium outcome with fully flexible wages for both skill types, a (real) minimum wage
has been introduced. The minimum wage is set by the government for low-skilled workers and
causes involuntary unemployment for that skill type. As relative factor prices are changed and
low-skilled task production becomes more costly, firms assign high-skilled workers to a broader
range of tasks. This firm-internal skill upgrading improves a firm’s labor productivity. However,
as more high-skilled workers are employed for the performance of tasks, less of them are left to
manage firms and the mass of firms therefore declines. Firm exit triggers a decline in aggregate
output, income and welfare. After discussing migration of low-skilled and high-skilled workers
under the two different labor market regimes, the model has been used to discuss how trade
between two countries affects the firm-internal production process. Only when low-skilled wages
are set by a binding minimum wage, trade exerts an impact on the firm-internal assignment pro-
cess. The opening up to trade raises demand for each firm due to a standard division of labor
effect. When the factor price for low-skilled workers is fixed, the skill premium increases implying
that high-skilled task production becomes relatively unattractive. Firms respond in broadening
the range of task production with low-skilled workers, which reduces labor productivity of each
firm. Aside from this negative productivity effect, trade increases the mass of producers in each
country and reduces the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers. This causes an increase in
aggregate output, income and welfare and widens the gap of high-skilled and low-skilled labor
income. After discussing the movement from autarky to trade it has been shown how changes
in local endowments and labor market institutions spill over to the partner country. Thereby,
an increase in the minimum wage abroad reduces the range of tasks performed by low-skilled
workers at home, while it increases the productivity of active producers there. Both skill types
end up with a lower per-capita income, and thus welfare is reduced at home.
Of course, the organization of production has many different dimensions and this thesis
cannot provide a comprehensive picture of all possible channels through which globalization
and labor market imperfections may affect the organization of production. Moreover, to keep
the analysis tractable, the different frameworks rely on several simplifying assumptions, which
help to concentrate on the main issues that are focus of this thesis, such as adjustments in the
product range or the assignment of workers to tasks in response to trade liberalization. By
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shedding light on these new, so far unexplored firm-internal adjustment margins, I hope that
my findings encourage further research on the organization of firms.
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